Judicial Review Survives § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) When USCIS Denies Discretionary Relief on a Pure Question of Statutory Interpretation

I. Introduction

In Fredis Ortez Reyes v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026), the Fourth Circuit addressed a recurring jurisdictional issue in immigration litigation: whether the INA’s “jurisdiction-stripping” provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), bars federal courts from reviewing an agency decision that denies discretionary immigration relief when the denial rests exclusively on a question of statutory interpretation.

The dispute arose from USCIS’s denial of an I-730 petition seeking derivative asylum for the asylee’s spouse under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). USCIS denied the petition solely because the beneficiary previously had a removal order, concluding that the INA’s reinstatement provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), barred “any form of relief.”

The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that because I-730 adjudication involves discretion, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) foreclosed judicial review. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that courts retain jurisdiction where the agency decision turns on a pure legal question about statutory meaning and authority rather than an exercise of discretion or a fact-bound eligibility determination.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar review of USCIS’s I-730 denial when the denial is based exclusively on USCIS’s interpretation of the INA—specifically, whether § 1158(b)(3)(A) must be construed to incorporate the purported bar in § 1231(a)(5).

Distinguishing between (a) unreviewable discretionary judgments and fact-based threshold determinations and (b) reviewable “pure” legal questions of statutory construction, the court concluded that the agency’s action here fell into the latter category. It therefore reversed the jurisdictional dismissal and remanded for the district court to decide the merits of the statutory question.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Bouarfa v. Mayorkas and Patel v. Garland: jurisdiction stripping reaches facts underlying discretionary relief

The court began with the Supreme Court’s modern framework on the scope of jurisdiction stripping in immigration:

  • Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 604 U.S. 6 (2024)—interpreting § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), the Court explained that the statute “precludes judicial review of factual findings that underlie a denial of discretionary relief,” including findings about “threshold requirements established by Congress.”
  • Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022)—the foundational decision for the proposition that factual determinations tied to discretionary relief can be insulated from review.

The Fourth Circuit treated these cases as establishing a critical baseline: Congress can bar review of factfinding that is intertwined with discretionary relief. But the court emphasized that the present case was not about facts at all—USCIS did not weigh circumstances or apply discretionary standards under § 1158(b)(3)(A); it simply adopted a categorical statutory reading and denied on that basis alone.

2. Shaiban v. Jaddou: extending the Bouarfa/Patel logic to § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) for fact-bound determinations

The government relied heavily on Shaiban v. Jaddou, 97 F.4th 263 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1046 (2025), where the Fourth Circuit applied the Bouarfa/Patel approach to § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and held that courts lacked jurisdiction to review certain factual findings underlying USCIS’s discretionary decisionmaking.

But the panel carefully distinguished Shaiban. There, USCIS made a “fact-bound” threshold determination (including an estoppel-related question tethered to the record and the agency’s eligibility assessment) under a statutory scheme giving USCIS discretion over eligibility determinations for adjustment. The Shaiban court itself described the relevant question as a “fact-bound estoppel determination” within the discretionary framework.

In Ortez Reyes, by contrast, USCIS made no individualized, record-driven threshold findings; it made a categorical legal determination about statutory interaction: whether § 1158(b)(3)(A) should be read to incorporate § 1231(a)(5).

3. Mejia Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.: focus on the “particular decision” Congress made discretionary

The panel invoked the decision-specific method described in Mejia Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 562 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2009): courts must “look at the particular decision being made” and ask whether Congress designated that decision as discretionary.

This framing supported the Fourth Circuit’s key move: even if the overall I-730 adjudication process contains discretionary components, the particular decision USCIS made here was not “discretionary” in nature—it was purely interpretive.

4. Lin v. Heffron: I-730 adjudication includes discretion, but that does not end the jurisdictional inquiry

The court acknowledged that § 1158(b)(3)(A) confers discretion on USCIS in I-730 adjudications, citing Lin v. Heffron, No. 22-1380, 2023 WL 566343 (4th Cir. Jan. 27, 2023). But it treated that point as insufficient to resolve jurisdiction, because the decisive question was not whether I-730 decisions can be discretionary in general, but whether USCIS exercised discretion in this case or instead resolved the matter solely by legal construction.

5. Moore v. Frazier and Zadvydas v. Davis: courts can review the scope of agency authority

The panel anchored its holding in the distinction between challenging:

  • “how the agency exercised its discretion” (often barred), and
  • the agency’s statutory interpretation / authority (reviewable).

It cited Moore v. Frazier, 941 F.3d 717 (4th Cir. 2019) for the proposition that statutory-interpretation challenges are separable from discretionary decisions. It further relied on Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), which explained that jurisdiction stripping addresses “the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion,” not “the extent of the Attorney General’s authority,” which is “not a matter of discretion.”

That Zadvydas distinction supplied the controlling principle: when a plaintiff argues that the agency applied the wrong statute or misread the INA, the plaintiff is contesting the scope and meaning of the agency’s legal authority, not requesting judicial second-guessing of discretionary judgment.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

  1. Identify the jurisdictional bar and its domain.

    Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) removes jurisdiction over “any other decision or action” whose authority is “specified” to be “in the discretion” of the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security. Following Bouarfa/Patel and Shaiban, this bar can encompass not only ultimate discretionary judgments but also certain factfinding intertwined with discretionary relief.

  2. Characterize the agency decision actually made.

    The panel emphasized that USCIS’s denial treated § 1231(a)(5) as “the dispositive and exclusive reason” for denial. There was “no consideration” of the couple’s circumstances and no application of discretionary standards under § 1158(b)(3)(A). USCIS instead adopted a statutory reading that derivative asylum must yield to reinstatement-based limitations.

  3. Apply the legal/factual divide.

    Because the denial turned on a “pure legal question of statutory construction”—whether § 1158(b)(3)(A) incorporates § 1231(a)(5)—the decision was not an “exercise of discretion” within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction to decide the merits.

Notably, the Fourth Circuit did not decide the underlying merits of whether § 1231(a)(5) bars derivative asylum. It confined itself to the threshold jurisdictional question and remanded for merits adjudication.

C. Impact

The opinion’s most significant practical effect is jurisdictional: it clarifies that in the Fourth Circuit, federal courts may review USCIS denials of discretionary immigration benefits when the denial is based solely on the agency’s statutory interpretation rather than a discretionary balancing or fact-bound eligibility determination.

  • Preservation of a judicial forum for statutory-meaning disputes.

    The decision prevents § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) from becoming a blanket shield for agency legal interpretations whenever the underlying benefit is discretionary in some respect.

  • Agency decision-writing incentives.

    By focusing on what USCIS “actually did,” the opinion may encourage clearer separation in USCIS decisions between (a) discretionary determinations and (b) legal interpretations that define eligibility or the statute’s scope.

  • Litigation strategy for benefit denials.

    Plaintiffs challenging USCIS denials in the Fourth Circuit will likely frame claims as pure questions of law—i.e., whether USCIS exceeded statutory authority or misinterpreted the INA—rather than contesting individualized weighing or factual determinations.

  • Potential ripple effects for reinstatement-related bars.

    Because USCIS relied on § 1231(a)(5) as a categorical bar, the remand tees up broader questions about how reinstatement interacts with other forms of immigration relief. Even though the Fourth Circuit did not decide that interaction here, its jurisdictional holding ensures courts can adjudicate it.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Jurisdiction stripping” (8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)).

    Congress can limit when federal courts may review immigration decisions. Section 1252(a)(2)(B) removes jurisdiction over certain discretionary decisions. But, as this case underscores, courts generally can still decide “What does the statute mean?” questions unless Congress clearly bars that too.

  • Discretion vs. law.

    A discretionary decision is one where the agency is permitted to choose among outcomes based on judgment (often after considering facts and equities). A legal question asks what the statute authorizes or requires. This case holds that when USCIS denies solely because it reads the statute to compel denial, courts can review that legal reading.

  • Derivative asylum (8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A)).

    Derivative asylum allows certain family members (such as a spouse) of a person granted asylum to obtain asylum-related status through that relationship, typically via an I-730 petition.

  • Reinstatement of removal (8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)).

    If someone reenters the United States after being removed, the prior removal order can be “reinstated.” Agencies sometimes treat reinstatement as barring various forms of relief. The merits question in this case (left for remand) is whether that bar applies to derivative asylum under § 1158(b)(3)(A).

V. Conclusion

Fredis Ortez Reyes v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services reaffirms an important boundary on the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions: even when an immigration benefit involves agency discretion, federal courts in the Fourth Circuit retain jurisdiction to review denials that rest solely on statutory interpretation. The court distinguished fact-bound determinations and discretionary judgments (often unreviewable under Bouarfa/Patel/Shaiban) from challenges to the scope of statutory authority (reviewable under Moore and Zadvydas).

By reversing the district court’s dismissal and remanding for merits consideration, the Fourth Circuit ensured that disputes about how the INA’s provisions fit together—here, § 1158(b)(3)(A) and § 1231(a)(5)—remain subject to judicial resolution rather than being insulated by the mere presence of discretion elsewhere in the adjudicatory scheme.