Judicial Review Limits in Good-Faith Marriage Waiver Denials: Evidence-Weighing Is Unreviewable and Hardship Theories Must Be Exhausted

1. Introduction

In Sheraz v. Bondi (2d Cir. Feb. 12, 2026) (summary order), petitioner Ali Sheraz, a native and citizen of Pakistan, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denial of his request for a waiver of the joint petition requirement to remove conditions on his lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) status.

The case arose from a failed effort to remove the conditions on Sheraz’s residence following a marriage to a U.S. citizen. After the U.S.-citizen spouse withdrew a 2008 joint petition in 2009 with an allegation of marriage fraud (later recanted), USCIS repeatedly denied subsequent filings. Following divorce, Sheraz pursued a waiver requiring proof that the marriage was entered into “in good faith” under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B), and later attempted to raise “extreme hardship” contentions.

The central issues in the Second Circuit were jurisdictional and procedural as much as substantive: (i) how far appellate review extends over a discretionary waiver denial, (ii) what qualifies as a “question of law” versus an unreviewable dispute about evidence-weighting, (iii) whether Sheraz established a due process violation from inability to cross-examine a USCIS officer, and (iv) whether a hardship theory was properly exhausted before the agency.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part the petition for review. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider challenges that, in substance, disputed the agency’s weighing of evidence and factual inferences. On the merits of the reviewable legal claims, the Court rejected Sheraz’s contention that the agency “overlooked” evidence, reiterated that Sheraz bore the burden to prove good-faith marriage, rejected the due process claim for lack of prejudice and other reasons, found no error in the BIA’s standard of review (clear error for facts; de novo for law/discretion), and concluded the “hardship determination” argument was unexhausted.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Bador v. Garland, 107 F.4th 75 (2d Cir. 2024): The Court relied on Bador for the proposition that it may consider both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions where the BIA affirms the IJ, framing the scope of review and the operative reasoning under examination.
  • Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024): Cited to describe the boundary between reviewable “application of law to undisputed facts” and unreviewable factual disputes in discretionary immigration contexts, reinforcing the jurisdictional gatekeeping under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
  • Arevalo v. Bondi, 130 F.4th 325 (2d Cir. 2025): The key Second Circuit authority used to dismiss Sheraz’s arguments that attacked how the agency weighed evidence or drew inferences. Arevalo is deployed to characterize evidence-weight disputes as “questions of fact,” outside the Court’s limited jurisdiction over discretionary denials.
  • Alom v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 2018): Used in two ways: (i) to support the statement of limited jurisdiction over discretionary decisions and (ii) to confirm the BIA’s standard of review—clear error for factfinding, de novo for questions of law, discretion, and judgment—quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)-(ii).
  • Paucar v. Garland, 84 F.4th 71 (2d Cir. 2023): Cited for the Court’s de novo review of questions of law, anchoring the standard of review for the claims that survive the jurisdictional filter.
  • Garcia Carrera v. Garland, 117 F.4th 9 (2d Cir. 2024): The Court “assume[d], without deciding” that de novo review applies to mixed questions of law and fact, signaling an unresolved (but here non-dispositive) nuance about the precise standard for mixed issues in this procedural posture.
  • Boluk v. Holder, 642 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011): Central to the merits: Boluk is cited for the statutory burden allocation—under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B), the alien must demonstrate the marriage was entered into in good faith. The Court uses Boluk to reject Sheraz’s suggestion that the government bore the burden to prove a sham marriage in the waiver posture.
  • Burger v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2007): Provides the governing due process framework in immigration proceedings: the petitioner must show denial of a “full and fair opportunity” or deprivation of “fundamental fairness.”
  • Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2008): Supplies the additional due process requirement of “cognizable prejudice” attributable to the challenged process—used to reject Sheraz’s cross-examination argument because he did not articulate prejudice.
  • Vera Punin v. Garland, 108 F.4th 114 (2d Cir. 2024): Governs issue exhaustion: if an argument in the court of appeals cannot be closely matched to one presented to the BIA, it is unexhausted and cannot be heard. The Court relied on this to dispose of Sheraz’s “hardship determination” theory.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Jurisdictional Sorting Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252

The Court begins with the premise that a good-faith marriage waiver denial is discretionary, limiting appellate jurisdiction to “constitutional claims and questions of law” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1252(a)(2)(D). Applying Arevalo v. Bondi, it treats Sheraz’s “the weight of the evidence was in my favor” and “the agency should have credited X” arguments as unreviewable factual/evidentiary disputes. This is the principal basis for the “dismissed in part” disposition.

B. Good-Faith Marriage Waiver: Burden and “Overlooked Evidence”

For the portion of Sheraz’s claims framed as legal error (the agency allegedly “overlooked” evidence), the Court reviewed the record and concluded the claim was factually incorrect: the IJ considered Sheraz’s evidence but found it insufficient given adverse factors (including the spouse’s 2009 withdrawal alleging fraud, inconsistencies in financial records, and a suspect lease).

Critically, the Court rejects any burden-shifting theory. Citing Boluk v. Holder and the statute’s text, it reiterates that in this waiver posture the alien must prove the marriage was entered into in good faith.

C. Due Process and Cross-Examination

Sheraz argued a due process violation because he could not cross-examine the USCIS officer he alleged coerced his spouse into the 2009 withdrawal statement. The Court denied the claim for multiple independent reasons grounded in Burger v. Gonzales and Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey:

  • No articulated prejudice: Sheraz did not explain how cross-examination would likely have altered the outcome.
  • He did not call USCIS officers as witnesses.
  • The spouse was given an opportunity to testify about alleged coercion but did not attend the merits hearing, weakening the fairness claim.
  • The withdrawal statement’s authorship was not disputed (the handwritten withdrawal was in the record).
  • The agency’s decision rested on additional grounds (documentary inconsistencies and USCIS findings), making any alleged coercion dispute less central and undermining prejudice.

D. BIA Standard of Review (Clear Error vs De Novo)

Sheraz cursorily claimed the BIA applied clear-error review where de novo review was required. The Court rejected that contention, citing Alom v. Whitaker and the regulatory rule that factual findings are reviewed for clear error while legal questions and discretion/judgment are reviewed de novo. The Court noted the BIA stated the correct standard and nothing in its analysis suggested otherwise.

E. Exhaustion of “Hardship” Theory

Sheraz attempted to argue the IJ failed to consider “emotional hardship.” The Court held the argument unexhausted because Sheraz did not press a hardship claim before the IJ (and did not object when the IJ clarified the hearing would proceed only on good-faith marriage), and he raised no hardship argument before the BIA. Under Vera Punin v. Garland, the mismatch between the appellate argument and any BIA argument barred review.

3.3. Impact

Although designated a nonprecedential summary order, the decision is a clear illustration of how the Second Circuit operationalizes post-REAL ID jurisdictional limits in discretionary immigration decisions:

  • Evidence-weight challenges are jurisdictionally fragile: Petitioners must frame arguments as genuine legal errors (e.g., misallocation of burden, use of an incorrect legal standard, refusal to consider a category of evidence) rather than disagreements with the agency’s assessment.
  • Due process claims require a prejudice theory: Alleged procedural defects (including limits on cross-examination) must be connected to a plausible showing that the outcome could have been different.
  • Exhaustion is decisive: Even where a form application mentions “extreme hardship,” the argument must be developed before the IJ and BIA to preserve it.
  • Burden clarity in I-751 waiver litigation: The order reinforces that the alien bears the burden to prove good-faith marriage under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B), a point that frequently drives both litigation strategy and evidentiary presentation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Conditional LPR status: Some spouses receive a two-year “conditional” green card. To keep status, the couple usually must file a joint petition to remove conditions.
  • Joint petition requirement and waiver: If the marriage ends (e.g., divorce), the immigrant may seek a waiver and proceed alone, but must satisfy statutory criteria—here, proving the marriage was entered in good faith.
  • Good-faith marriage: The question is whether the spouses intended a real marital life at the time of marriage, not whether the relationship later failed. Regulations allow consideration of commingled finances and cohabitation (among other factors). See 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(e)(2).
  • Jurisdiction limits (“questions of law” vs “questions of fact”): Courts can review legal rules and constitutional issues, but often cannot reweigh evidence or revisit factual inferences in discretionary determinations.
  • Due process in immigration court: The proceeding must be fundamentally fair, but a petitioner must also show “prejudice”—that the alleged unfairness mattered to the outcome.
  • Issue exhaustion: Before raising an argument in federal court, the noncitizen generally must present it to the BIA first; otherwise the federal court will not consider it.

5. Conclusion

Sheraz v. Bondi underscores that appellate review of I-751 good-faith marriage waiver denials is tightly constrained: disputes over the agency’s evidentiary weighting are commonly unreviewable; due process claims must include a concrete prejudice showing; and alternative theories such as extreme hardship must be affirmatively litigated and exhausted before the agency. Substantively, the order reaffirms the statutory allocation of proof—under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B), the burden rests on the alien to demonstrate the marriage was entered into in good faith.