Judicial Review Is Available for Statutory Ultra Vires Challenges to Antiquities Act Proclamations When the Act Imposes Discernible Limits

Case: Garfield County, Utah v. Trump (substitution noted under Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2); opinion addresses President Biden’s Antiquities Act proclamations)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date: June 23, 2026
Panel: CARSON, ROSSMAN, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges (FEDERICO, J., dissenting)

1. Introduction

This consolidated appeal arises from President Biden’s October 2021 proclamations expanding Utah’s Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument and Bears Ears National Monument under the Antiquities Act, 54 U.S.C. § 320301. Plaintiffs—Utah (the State), two Utah counties, and other individuals and groups—alleged that the Proclamations exceeded the Antiquities Act by (i) protecting items that are not “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest,” and (ii) reserving more land than “the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected.” They also brought APA claims against federal agencies based on interim management plans implementing the Proclamations.

The district court dismissed the suit chiefly on sovereign-immunity/justiciability grounds and dismissed some plaintiffs for lack of standing. The Tenth Circuit’s decision principally addresses a recurring separation-of-powers question: when (if ever) may federal courts review presidential action alleged to exceed statutory limits—here, the Antiquities Act.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Core rulings:

  • Ultra vires / sovereign immunity: The district court applied an incorrect understanding of the ultra vires exception and of what is “committed to the President’s discretion.” The Tenth Circuit held that judicial review is available where the authorizing statute “places discernible limits” on presidential action; and it rejected the notion that ultra vires review is limited to constitutional (not statutory) claims. The court remanded for the district court to interpret the Antiquities Act’s limits and determine whether plaintiffs plausibly alleged the President acted beyond them.
  • APA claims: Because BLM adopted final resource management plans superseding the challenged interim plans, the agency actions underlying plaintiffs’ APA claims no longer existed. The court vacated the APA dismissals and remanded for the district court to assess the effect of the final plans.
  • Standing (Individuals/BlueRibbon): The Individual Plaintiffs and BlueRibbon waived their standing challenge by failing to raise it in the opening brief; dismissal of their claims was affirmed.
  • Form of dismissal: Jurisdictional dismissals must be without prejudice; the court directed modification accordingly.

Importantly, the panel did not decide whether the Proclamations actually violate the Antiquities Act; it held only that the district court’s threshold jurisdictional analysis was wrong and that the statutory-limits questions must be addressed on remand.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and how they shaped the decision)

A. Sovereign immunity and the ultra vires framework

  • Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782 (2014) and Dep't of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42 (2024): supplied first principles—sovereign immunity is the default; waiver must come from Congress.
  • Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) and Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002): anchored the proposition that immunity extends to officers acting for the sovereign, but not when their conduct is ultra vires.
  • Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) and Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949): provided the doctrinal “switch”: acts outside statutory power (or unconstitutional acts) are not sovereign acts, so sovereign immunity does not bar suit.
  • United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d 543 (10th Cir. 2001): reinforced that plaintiffs must allege not merely illegality, but action beyond delegated power.
  • Chambers of Com. of U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996): used to reject the district court’s “too-general” pleading requirement; otherwise, presidential action would become effectively unreviewable so long as it invoked a statute.
  • Harper v. Jones, 195 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1952): cited for the established availability of review when an officer acts “in excess of his authority.”

B. “Committed to discretion” limits on review

  • Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994) and United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940): stood for nonreviewability where Congress confers essentially unfettered discretion (“in his judgment,” “for whatever reason he sees fit”), leaving no legal question for courts to decide.
  • Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19 (1827) and Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. State of S. Dakota ex rel. Payne, 250 U.S. 163 (1919): illustrated historic contexts in which the nature of the power commits determinations to the President (e.g., emergencies/war).
  • Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002) and Murphy Co. v. Biden, 65 F.4th 1122 (9th Cir. 2023): critical persuasive authorities. The Tenth Circuit aligned with these circuits’ view that where “discernible limits” exist (in the authorizing statute or another statute), reviewing whether the President stayed within those limits is consistent with separation of powers.

C. Antiquities Act-specific Supreme Court signals

  • Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920), Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), and United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32 (1978): treated as evidence that courts can examine whether a monument designation involves qualifying “objects” under the Act, rather than treating the President’s characterizations as unreviewable.
  • Mass. Lobstermen's Ass'n v. Ross, 349 F. Supp. 3d 48 (D.D.C. 2018): cited as an example of lower-court engagement with Act limits in litigation touching Antiquities Act proclamations and management.

D. Interpreting statutory limits after Chevron’s overruling

  • Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): used to rebut the idea that statutory ambiguity itself implies delegation of law-interpreting power to the executive; courts remain responsible “to say what the law is” (with respect as appropriate, but without abdication).
  • Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010): supported a presumption favoring judicial review absent “clear and convincing” evidence that Congress meant to preclude it.

E. Cause of action and equity

  • Safe Streets All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865 (10th Cir. 2017): distinguished; plaintiffs there sought an “equitable” claim to enforce preemption under the Supremacy Clause, not ultra vires relief against an officer acting beyond statutory limits.
  • Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320 (2015): invoked for the proposition that equity historically supplies a vehicle to restrain ultra vires conduct in appropriate settings.
  • Patchak v. Zinke, 583 U.S. 244 (2018) and Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923): used to frame the judiciary’s constitutional role in resolving cases by interpreting and applying law, including to determine statutory limits.

F. The Kyne / “Hail Mary” debate

  • Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), Nuclear Regul. Comm'n v. Texas, 605 U.S. 665 (2025), and Ry. Clerks v. Ass'n for Benefit of Non-contract Emps., 380 U.S. 650 (1965) (with Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964)): the majority acknowledged that some ultra vires doctrines are “strictly limited,” but it declined to decide whether plaintiffs here must satisfy Kyne’s stringent “specific prohibition / plain crossing” standard because the suit is not an interlocutory end-run around a statutory review scheme in the same way Kyne was.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Correcting the district court’s ultra vires “lack authority altogether” requirement

The district court treated plaintiffs’ challenge as nonreviewable because they did not deny that the President may create monuments at all. The Tenth Circuit rejected that framing: an ultra vires claim can assert that the President has authority in general, but exceeded statutory limits in a particular proclamation (e.g., designating non-qualifying “objects” or reserving more land than the “smallest area compatible” permits).

B. Discretion to “declare” is not discretion to redefine statutory boundaries

The panel parsed § 320301(a) and (b). While § 320301(a) says the President may “in the President’s discretion” declare qualifying objects to be monuments, the court treated the statutory categories (“historic landmarks,” “historic and prehistoric structures,” and “other objects of historic or scientific interest”) as judicially interpretable limits. In the court’s view, allowing the President to conclusively define the limits would render statutory text surplusage and erase Congress’s constraints.

C. The “smallest area compatible” clause is a mandatory limit, not an unreviewable policy choice

The court emphasized the mandatory wording (“shall be confined”) and the absence of an express discretion clause in § 320301(b). It rejected the proposition that a broad term like “compatible” automatically commits the entire inquiry to presidential discretion, especially after Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo. The court also used a reductio: if the government’s view prevailed, a President could reserve an implausibly vast area to protect a modest object, nullifying the “smallest area” constraint.

D. Separation-of-powers framing

The opinion treats judicial enforcement of congressionally drawn boundaries as separation-of-powers consistent rather than intrusive: when Congress creates “discernible limits,” courts honor Congress’s allocation of power by policing those limits, rather than deferring to executive self-definition.

E. Remedy caution

The panel noted that an injunction directly against the President is doctrinally fraught; if plaintiffs ultimately succeed, relief may need to run against the implementing agencies. The court left this remedial design to the district court on remand.

3.3 Impact

A. Immediate doctrinal impact in the Tenth Circuit

  • Reviewability clarified: Plaintiffs may pursue non-APA, statutory ultra vires challenges to presidential Antiquities Act proclamations where the Act’s textual limits are alleged to be exceeded.
  • “Discernible limits” test adopted: By aligning with Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush and Murphy Co. v. Biden, the Tenth Circuit strengthens an emerging inter-circuit consensus that Dalton v. Specter does not bar review where Congress supplied meaningful statutory boundaries.
  • Statutory (not only constitutional) ultra vires review: The court expressly rejected the district court’s view that only constitutional excess can trigger the ultra vires exception.

B. Practical impact on Antiquities Act litigation

  • More merits adjudication of Act terms: Litigants can expect increased focus on what counts as “objects of historic or scientific interest” and how to assess “smallest area compatible,” including evidentiary records aimed at landscape-scale protection rationales.
  • Higher litigation stakes for proclamations: While the panel did not decide that plaintiffs stated a viable claim, it ensures that future challenges in the circuit will not be terminated solely on a “no-review” sovereign-immunity theory where statutory limits are pleaded.
  • Administrative-law knock-on effects: The APA portion highlights a recurring tactic and risk: challenges to interim plans can become moot when final plans supersede them, pushing plaintiffs toward challenging final plans (or seeking different forms of relief).

C. Doctrinal tension highlighted by the dissent

Judge Federico’s dissent—leaning heavily on Nuclear Regul. Comm'n v. Texas—warns that the majority’s approach risks converting ultra vires review into routine statutory merits review. That tension foreshadows future litigation over whether Kyne-like “specific prohibition / plain crossing” thresholds should constrain Antiquities Act challenges, and whether “objects”/“smallest area compatible” questions are too discretionary to qualify.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Sovereign immunity: The government generally cannot be sued unless it consents. This is a jurisdictional bar.
  • Ultra vires: A narrow path around sovereign immunity when an official acts beyond the power the law gives them (i.e., outside the statute’s boundaries), so the act is not treated as the sovereign’s act.
  • “Committed to discretion” (nonreviewability): Courts will not review decisions where Congress has given the President (or an agency) essentially unfettered choice, leaving no legal standard to apply. The majority held the Antiquities Act contains legal standards (“discernible limits”), so this doctrine does not automatically apply.
  • APA “final agency action”: Under the APA, courts usually review only agency actions that are final and have legal consequences. Here, interim plans were replaced by final plans, changing the posture of APA claims.
  • Standing and waiver: Standing requires a plaintiff to show a concrete injury traceable to the defendant and redressable by the court. Separately, if a party does not raise an issue in its opening appellate brief, it is typically waived.

5. Conclusion

Garfield County, Utah v. Trump establishes (and solidifies within the Tenth Circuit) that courts are not jurisdictionally barred from hearing statutory ultra vires challenges to presidential Antiquities Act proclamations when the statute imposes “discernible limits.” The panel rejected the view that the President’s invocation of a discretionary statute ends judicial inquiry, emphasizing that courts retain their constitutional role in interpreting statutory terms and enforcing congressionally enacted constraints.

The opinion’s significance is less about monument boundaries on the merits (which remain undecided) and more about the courthouse door: it reopens judicial review that the district court had closed on sovereign-immunity and nonreviewability grounds, while leaving unresolved—consistent with the dissent’s warning—how demanding the ultra vires threshold ultimately must be, and what remedies may properly issue if the President is found to have exceeded statutory authority.