Judicial Immunity Does Not Shield “Scare-Style” Detention and Mock Proceedings Outside Any Case or Court Sitting

1. Introduction

Latoreya Till v. Kenneth King arises from a vocational program held in a Michigan district court courtroom. The plaintiff, Latoreya Till, sued on behalf of her 15-year-old daughter, ELG, after ELG allegedly fell asleep during a judge’s off-session lecture and was then subjected to a “scare her straight” episode: handcuffs, a jail jumpsuit, hours in a holding cell, and a “mock trial” streamed on the court’s YouTube channel.

The defendant, Kenneth J. King (a state judge), moved to dismiss on absolute judicial immunity. The district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit accepted an interlocutory appeal and affirmed, holding that the complaint plausibly alleged nonjudicial acts not protected by judicial immunity. Till cross-appealed to defend the ruling on an alternative basis (“complete absence of all jurisdiction”), but the Sixth Circuit rejected that alternative theory as inapposite on these pleadings.

Core issues:

• Whether the alleged conduct qualifies as “judicial acts” for purposes of absolute judicial immunity.
• How pleading-stage indicators—such as the lack of a case number, docket entry, order, or formal proceeding—bear on the “judicial act” inquiry.
• Whether an alternative exception—actions taken in the “complete absence of all jurisdiction”—properly applies when the plaintiff’s theory is that the judge acted outside any judicial role at all.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Judge King’s motion to dismiss. Applying the two-factor test drawn from Stump v. Sparkman and reiterated in Brookings v. Clunk, the court held that Till plausibly alleged:

• Judge King’s conduct was not a “function normally performed by a judge,” because it did not further an “official act or sanction” and appeared instead “patently motivated by private interests” (to “scare” and humiliate ELG for disrespect).
• ELG did not deal with Judge King in his judicial capacity; the alleged encounter occurred after the official proceeding ended, during an off-session lecture, and culminated in a “phony mock trial” with no court record.

The court also addressed appellate forfeiture arguments (declining to deem Judge King’s immunity argument forfeited) and rejected Till’s cross-appeal theory that immunity was defeated because the judge acted in the “complete absence of all jurisdiction,” explaining that this exception presupposes conduct that is judicial in nature—an assumption inconsistent with Till’s primary “nonjudicial act” theory.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Holding)

A. Pleading-stage lens and standard of review

• Booth Fam. Tr. v. Jeffries (de novo review of Rule 12 dismissals) and Hodges v. City of Grand Rapids (quoting Marvaso v. Sanchez) supplied the familiar 12(b)(6) framework: accept pleaded facts as true, draw reasonable inferences for the plaintiff, and ask whether relief is plausible. This mattered because the panel repeatedly emphasized that it was assessing plausibility at the motion-to-dismiss stage—not adjudicating what “really happened.”
• Brookings v. Clunk characterized the availability of absolute judicial immunity at 12(b)(6) as a question of law. That framing enabled early appellate review on immunity and anchored the panel’s structured “judicial act” analysis.

B. Appellate forfeiture (raised, but excused)

• Till argued forfeiture under Scott v. First S. Nat'l Bank (quoting Rees v. W.M. Barr & Co.) because Judge King allegedly failed to engage the district court’s reasoning.
• The panel invoked its discretion under Mosier v. Evans to excuse forfeiture, relying on Aaron v. King (quoting Glennborough Homeowners Ass'n v. U.S. Postal Serv.) to emphasize forfeiture’s anti-surprise purpose. Because the brief meaningfully addressed the legal/factual issues, there was no sandbagging.

C. The “judicial act” test and its application

• Mireles v. Waco supplied the foundational boundary: judges are immune for judicial acts, but “not immune” for “nonjudicial actions.”
• The operational test came from Stump v. Sparkman, as quoted in Brookings v. Clunk: (1) whether the act is a function normally performed by a judge, and (2) whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.
• Brookings v. Clunk and Barrett v. Harrington emphasized “paradigmatic judicial acts” as dispute resolution between parties invoking jurisdiction; conduct not tied to adjudication is “less likely” judicial.
• Barrett v. Harrington supplied a crucial doctrinal gloss: to qualify as judicial, an act should “further[] [an] official act or sanction.” The panel treated that concept as a dividing line between official judicial function and performative/retaliatory conduct.
• Barnes v. Winchell added that actions “patently motivated by private interests” are less likely to be judicial. The panel used the alleged “scare her straight” motive—amusement for “followers and fan base”—as a private-interest indicator.
• Cameron v. Seitz and Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1701(a) acknowledged the genuine judicial power to control the courtroom and punish contempt. But the panel stressed that “not all actions taken by a judge in his courtroom” are immune, and that immunity has limiting principles even within courthouse walls.
• The panel cited out-of-circuit examples to illustrate that “inside the courtroom” is not dispositive: Gibson v. Goldston (4th Cir.) and Gregory v. Thompson (9th Cir.) (no immunity where a judge used excessive force to remove someone). These cases reinforced the concept that location and title do not convert plainly nonadjudicative misconduct into a judicial act.

D. The “record/order” indicator and formal judicial cognizance

• The panel leaned on Stump v. Sparkman and In re Summers to explain why court paperwork and formal judicial “cognizance” matter: in Stump, the judge signed and acted upon a petition—even if procedurally deficient—supporting immunity.
• Here, the complaint alleged no case number, order, or court record for the “sham proceedings,” which the panel treated as a fact suggesting the opposite of Stump: not merely procedurally defective adjudication, but plausibly no adjudication at all.

E. Sister-circuit guidance: disciplining nonlitigant children

• Rockett ex rel. K.R. v. Eighmy (8th Cir.) was the closest analogue: an unrobed judge “decided to put [children] in jail” to show “what [he] can do.” The Sixth Circuit found it persuasive that “discipline and scare” tactics against children did not reflect a function normally performed by a judge.

F. The key counterpoint: a contempt-based case (distinguished)

• Judge King relied on Orta v. Repp (unpublished). There, a judge ordered a spectator to take a drug test and later held her in contempt and sentenced her to jail.
• The panel distinguished Orta on multiple grounds emphasized in the opinion: (a) it is unpublished and nonprecedential; (b) the judge in Orta was on the bench preparing for a case; and (c) the judge entered a formal contempt finding and sentence—clear indicia of official judicial action. By contrast, Judge King allegedly had left the bench, removed his robe, held a lecture, and conducted an off-session “mock trial” unconnected to any docketed matter.

G. Additional immunity cases cited by Judge King (distinguished)

• Ashelman v. Pope (9th Cir.) and Mireles v. Waco involved classic courtroom-administration measures connected to pending cases (defendant appearance; ordering an attorney brought to court). These were closer to “paradigmatic” dispute-resolution functions than the alleged conduct here.
• King v. Myers (4th Cir.) involved directing charges and criminal complaints—an “official act or sanction” consistent with Barrett v. Harrington’s emphasis on official process.
• Green v. Maraio was treated as largely irrelevant because it focused on “clear absence of all jurisdiction,” not whether the acts were judicial in nature.

H. Cross-appeal doctrine and the “absence of jurisdiction” exception

• The panel noted the cross-appeal was unnecessary under Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, because a prevailing party may defend a judgment on any ground properly raised below without cross-appealing, so long as it does not seek to enlarge its rights.
• On the merits of the alternative theory, the panel invoked Mireles v. Waco’s “complete absence of all jurisdiction” exception and used Mann v. Conlin’s probate-judge-criminal-trial example to illustrate the exception’s proper domain. The panel held the exception did not fit because it presupposes judicial acts (just done without jurisdiction), whereas Till alleged nonjudicial acts—i.e., no exercise of judicial authority at all.

3.2. Legal Reasoning (How the Sixth Circuit Reached Its Result)

A. The court treated “judicial immunity” as function-based, not location-based

The opinion’s central move is to deny the premise that anything done by a judge “in a courtroom” is immune. While acknowledging a judge’s authority to control proceedings (and contempt power under Michigan law), the panel emphasized that immunity tracks the nature and purpose of the act—whether it is part of adjudication or the administration of a pending matter—not the mere use of judicial trappings.

B. “Official act or sanction” and “private interests” served as the practical dividing line

Using Barrett v. Harrington and Barnes v. Winchell, the panel framed the allegations as describing conduct that did not “further[] [an] official act or sanction,” but rather served personal motives: retribution for perceived disrespect and performance for an online audience. The complaint’s allegations that the episode was streamed on YouTube, designed for “followers,” and described by Judge King as his own “Scared Straight” episode helped situate the conduct as plausibly nonjudicial.

C. Formal process mattered: no docket, no case number, no order

The opinion does not establish a rigid “paperwork requirement,” but it uses the absence of ordinary judicial formalities as a strong plausibility cue. Where Stump v. Sparkman involved a signed petition and judicial action taken on it, this case was pleaded as “sham proceedings” with no record—supporting the inference that the conduct was extrajudicial theater rather than defective adjudication.

D. The “judicial capacity” prong turned on how ELG encountered the judge

On the second Stump factor, the Sixth Circuit focused on the complaint’s depiction of the setting: ELG was part of a vocational program; court had recessed; the judge had removed his robe; and the “mock trial” occurred after the day’s proceedings ended. Those allegations supported the inference that ELG dealt with Judge King as a lecturer/teacher (a nonjudicial role), not as a judge presiding over a matter involving ELG.

E. The court’s restraint: a pleading-stage holding

The panel’s holding is careful: it concludes only that Till plausibly alleged nonjudicial acts, making dismissal on judicial immunity inappropriate at this stage. The decision leaves room for later factual development, but it puts the burden on the defendant to defeat the allegations with a record, not on the plaintiff to prove them at Rule 12.

3.3. Impact (Likely Effects on Future Cases)

• Clearer boundary for “performative” or “disciplinary theater” conduct: The decision signals that using court infrastructure to “teach a lesson” to nonlitigants—especially minors—outside a court sitting, and without formal judicial process, is plausibly nonjudicial and thus not protected by absolute immunity at the pleading stage.
• Process indicia will matter early: Litigants challenging judicial misconduct may focus complaints on whether there was a case number, order, contempt finding, docket entry, or other official act—because the Sixth Circuit treated the absence of these as meaningful to the immunity inquiry.
• Social media amplification as “private interest” evidence: The opinion suggests that broadcasting and courting a “fan base” can support an inference of private motive, which can push conduct outside “judicial function” as alleged.
• Constraining overreading of contempt/control authority: While contempt and courtroom control remain protected when legitimately exercised, the opinion cautions against treating those concepts as a license for coercive, custodial punishments untethered to a pending proceeding or formal contempt process.
• Doctrinal housekeeping on alternative exceptions: The court’s treatment of “complete absence of all jurisdiction” clarifies pleading strategy: plaintiffs should not conflate (a) “judicial act without jurisdiction” with (b) “nonjudicial act.” They are different routes around immunity, with different predicates.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Absolute judicial immunity: A doctrine shielding judges from damages liability for acts performed as judges (to protect independent decision-making). It is not a general “job-related” immunity; it attaches to judicial acts.
• Judicial act vs. nonjudicial act (the Stump v. Sparkman test): Courts ask (1) whether the act is one judges normally perform (typically tied to adjudication or official sanctions), and (2) whether the person dealt with the judge in a judicial capacity (as part of a court matter).
• Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss: Tests whether the complaint plausibly states a claim. Courts assume pleaded facts are true and draw inferences for the plaintiff.
• Interlocutory appeal: An appeal taken before the case ends. Immunity decisions are often appealable early because immunity is a protection from being sued/forced to litigate, not just from losing.
• Contempt power: A court’s power to punish disruptive behavior that threatens proceedings or the court’s authority (e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1701(a)). Legitimate contempt typically involves formal process and is tied to a court sitting or proceeding.
• “Complete absence of all jurisdiction” exception: Even judicial acts lose immunity if a judge acts wholly outside the court’s subject-matter power (e.g., a probate judge conducting a criminal trial, as in the example cited via Mann v. Conlin). This exception presumes the act is judicial in character; it does not apply where the conduct is alleged to be nonjudicial.

5. Conclusion

Latoreya Till v. Kenneth King tightens the functional limits of judicial immunity in the Sixth Circuit at the pleading stage. When a complaint plausibly alleges that a judge used courtroom trappings to conduct custodial “scare” tactics and a “mock trial” against a nonlitigant minor—outside any court sitting, without a docketed case or formal order, and for personal or performative motives—those allegations can describe nonjudicial acts, defeating absolute judicial immunity on a motion to dismiss.

The opinion’s broader significance lies in its insistence that judicial immunity protects adjudication and legitimate judicial administration—not coercive theater—and that courts will look for objective markers of official action (process, records, connection to a pending matter) when drawing that line.