Limits of Alabama’s “Step-in-the-Dark” Rule and Invitee Status for Subcontracted Event Workers

1. Introduction

In Joseph v. Caritas of Birmingham (Ala. May 8, 2026), the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed a summary judgment entered by the Shelby Circuit Court in favor of Caritas of Birmingham (“Caritas”), a nonprofit religious mission that hosted a wedding reception for two of its missionaries at its facility.

The plaintiff, Sela Joseph, was a caterer who attended the event to assist a Yellow Bicycle Catering affiliate. After the reception, Joseph asked a Caritas representative how to leave; she was directed to follow a young woman through a dimly lit interior area to a door near a loading dock. Joseph exited into an unlit exterior area and fell off the loading dock, sustaining significant injuries.

The appeal centered on two premises-liability issues: (1) Joseph’s legal status on the property (invitee versus licensee), which determines the duty owed; and (2) whether the hazard was open and obvious as a matter of law under Alabama’s “total darkness/step-in-the-dark” line of cases such that Caritas owed no duty to warn.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Wise, writing for the Court, held:

  • Joseph was a business invitee because Caritas received a material benefit from her presence and services in furtherance of Caritas’s catering contract for the reception.
  • Summary judgment was improper because Joseph presented substantial evidence creating a fact question whether the conditions were total darkness (which can be open and obvious as a matter of law) or instead partial/poor light (which typically makes openness-and-obviousness a jury question).

The Court reversed the summary judgment as to negligence and remanded. Joseph did not pursue on appeal her wantonness and negligent/wanton hiring, training, and supervision claims, so the Court did not address them.

Justice Sellers dissented, concluding that, even viewing the evidence favorably to Joseph, the record established “total darkness,” triggering the rule of Ex parte Industrial Distrib. Servs. Warehouse, Inc. and Owens v. National Sec. of Alabama, Inc. and requiring affirmance.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Invitee vs. Licensee: “Material or Commercial Benefit”

The Court grounded Joseph’s status analysis in the established rule that an invitee is one who enters with consent to bestow a material or commercial benefit on the landowner.

  • Galaxy Cable, Inc. v. Davis — quoted for the baseline definition: an invitee enters to bestow a material/commercial benefit, and the owner owes duties to keep premises reasonably safe and warn of hidden dangers known to the owner but not the invitee.
  • Quillen v. Quillen (plurality opinion) — emphasized that an invitation alone does not make one an invitee; status turns on the nature of the visit, and the benefit must be “material or commercial,” not “spiritual, religious, or social.” The Court’s quotation traced this limitation through:
    • Autry v. Roebuck Park Baptist Church,
    • McCulty v. Hurley (Fla. 1957), and
    • Goldberg v. Straus (Fla. 1950).
    The Court also cited Nelson v. Gatlin for the proposition that the “nature of the visit” controls.
  • Bush v. Alabama Power Co. — used as a close analogy: an employee of an independent contractor working for the premises owner is an invitee.

Applying these authorities, the Court treated Joseph’s services as part of the performance of Caritas’s catering arrangement for its hosted event. Even though Joseph was paid by Wilton, the Court focused on the benefit to Caritas—the reception’s catering was a contracted-for service Caritas procured and used—making Joseph an invitee.

B. Duty to Invitees; Open-and-Obvious Doctrine; “Total Darkness” as a Narrow Per Se Category

After finding invitee status, the Court turned to duty and breach. The opinion synthesized the standard invitee duty and the open-and-obvious limitation through a line of Alabama cases:

  • Armstrong v. Georgia Marble Co. — repeatedly cited as the core formulation: use reasonable care to keep premises safe, or warn sufficiently so dangers can be avoided with ordinary care.
  • South Alabama Brick Co. v. Carwie and Unger v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P. — reinforced the modern restatement of the invitee duty and its warning component.
  • Lamson & Sessions Bolt Co. v. McCarty — the classic “hidden dangers, traps, snares, pitfalls” language; owners are not required to alter premises to remove known/obvious dangers.
  • Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Taylor and Hines v. Hardy — open-and-obvious is an objective inquiry: what a reasonable person in the invitee’s position would recognize.
  • Owens v. Ganga Hosp., LLC — collected modern open-and-obvious principles, including that “existence of a duty” is for the court.

The decisive “darkness” framework came from three key cases:

  • Ex parte Industrial Distrib. Servs. Warehouse, Inc. — stated the per se rule: “Total darkness, possibly concealing an unseen and unknown hazard, presents an open and obvious danger to someone proceeding through unfamiliar surroundings, as a matter of law.”
    The opinion recounted that decision’s reliance on Owens v. National Sec. of Alabama, Inc. and its “step-in-the-dark” reasoning (darkness itself places a reasonable person on notice that hazards may be concealed).
  • McClurg v. Birmingham Realty Co. (plurality opinion) — used as the Court’s organizing taxonomy: open-and-obvious issues are generally for juries, with narrow exceptions. It emphasized that the “types of conditions … per se” category is particularly narrow and that the Court has applied it to “only one condition: total darkness.”
  • Ex parte Kraatz — drew the critical distinction: dim/partial/poor light differs from total darkness because it can mislead a reasonable person into thinking hazards are visible/avoidable. It also highlighted that openness-and-obviousness depends on variable light qualities (direction, diffusion, shadows), making it generally unsuitable for summary judgment.

The Court also cited the broader procedural premise—openness-and-obviousness is “generally not” resolved on summary judgment—through: Ex parte Kraatz (quoting Harding v. Pierce Hardy Real Estate), as well as Denmark v. Mercantile Stores Co., Barnwell v. CLP Corp., Howard v. Andy's Store for Men, and the “no reasonable minds could differ” standard reflected in Jones v. Newton.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Why Joseph Was an Invitee

Caritas argued the “exchange of services” was between Wilton and Joseph, with only indirect benefit to Caritas or guests. The Court rejected this formalistic view and looked to the practical structure of the event:

  • Caritas hosted the reception at its facility.
  • Caritas contracted and paid for catering (Yellow Bicycle), and Joseph worked “in furtherance of” that contract’s performance.
  • The reception’s catering services were a material benefit Caritas obtained for an event it hosted.

Under Quillen and Galaxy Cable, Inc. v. Davis, that material benefit was enough to confer invitee status, consistent with Bush v. Alabama Power Co..

B. Why “Total Darkness” Did Not Mandate Judgment as a Matter of Law

Caritas’s summary-judgment strategy depended on characterizing the case as an Ex parte Industrial Distrib. Servs. Warehouse, Inc./Owens v. National Sec. of Alabama, Inc. “step-in-the-dark” scenario, where the danger is open and obvious per se.

The Court refused to treat the record as conclusively establishing total darkness for two main reasons:

  1. Conflicting evidence on light level:
    • Goldfon described it as “pitch black.”
    • Joseph used similar language at points (“very dark,” “pretty dark,” and agreeing once to “pitch black”).
    • But Joseph also testified there was “a little bit of moonlight,” that she thought she could see where she was going, and that she could see her hand and the area in front of her feet.
    • Photographs showed windows facing the loading-dock area, supporting an inference of some ambient illumination depending on conditions.
    Under Ex parte Kraatz, evidence of partial/poor light can create a jury question because such lighting may mislead a reasonable person into believing hazards are visible.
  2. Use of a route provided and expected by the premises owner:
    • Joseph asked how to exit and was directed by Caritas personnel to follow someone and exit through a particular door.
    • The Court treated this as analogous to Ex parte Kraatz: the plaintiff was using the path and conditions the premises owner provided and expected invitees to use.

The Court therefore held Joseph produced “substantial evidence” sufficient to avoid summary judgment and to allow a factfinder to decide whether the conditions were “total darkness” (potentially triggering the per se open-and-obvious rule) or instead “partial or poor light” (typically a jury question).

C. The Dissent’s Competing Framework

Justice Sellers read the deposition testimony as a cohesive admission of “total darkness,” treating the “moonlight” reference as too “measly” to change the legal character of the condition. On that reading, the dissent would apply Ex parte Industrial Distrib. Servs. Warehouse, Inc. and Owens v. National Sec. of Alabama, Inc. to find no duty and to affirm.

The majority, however, treated the record as mixed on the light level and emphasized that McClurg v. Birmingham Realty Co. frames “total darkness” as a narrow per se category. Where evidence supports a reasonable inference of something less than total darkness, Ex parte Kraatz counsels against summary resolution.

3.3. Impact

A. Clarified Limits on “Total Darkness” as a Per Se Open-and-Obvious Condition

The opinion reinforces McClurg v. Birmingham Realty Co.’s characterization of “total darkness” as an exceptionally narrow category and confirms that defendants cannot secure summary judgment merely by pointing to darkness-related testimony when the record also supports an inference of partial/poor light.

Practically, this shifts many “dark egress” cases—especially those involving exterior areas, natural light (moonlight), spill light from windows, or disputed visibility—away from per se dismissal and toward jury determination.

B. Directed Egress and Foreseeable Use of Specific Exits

Although the Court did not expressly create a separate doctrinal rule about “directed egress,” its reasoning places weight on the fact that Joseph used an exit she was told to use. Future litigants will likely emphasize whether the owner (or its agents) directed an invitee into a particular route or area, strengthening arguments that the owner “expected” invitee use of that area under the conditions provided—an important Kraatz factor.

C. Invitee Status for Workers Paid by Intermediaries

On status, the decision supports a functional approach: a worker may be an invitee even if paid by a subcontractor or intermediary, so long as the worker’s presence furthers a transaction or service that materially benefits the premises owner. This is especially significant for event venues and nonprofits that contract for services through third parties.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Business invitee vs. licensee: An invitee is on the property for a reason that materially benefits the owner (often commercial). A licensee is more like a social guest. The owner owes invitees a higher duty (reasonable care; warnings of hidden dangers).
  • Open and obvious danger: If a reasonable person would notice and appreciate the danger, the owner typically has no duty to warn or remedy it.
  • “Step-in-the-dark” / “total darkness” rule: In some cases, total darkness itself is treated as an open-and-obvious danger as a matter of law because it signals the risk of hidden hazards. But this per se rule is narrow and does not necessarily apply where there is evidence of partial illumination.
  • Summary judgment and “substantial evidence”: Summary judgment ends a case without trial only when no genuine fact disputes exist. “Substantial evidence” means enough evidence that reasonable jurors could find for the nonmoving party.

5. Conclusion

Joseph v. Caritas of Birmingham delivers two key lessons in Alabama premises liability:

  • Status: Workers providing services that materially benefit a premises owner— even when hired/paid through an intermediary—may qualify as business invitees, triggering the owner’s duty of reasonable care.
  • Darkness defenses: The “total darkness” per se open-and-obvious doctrine from Ex parte Industrial Distrib. Servs. Warehouse, Inc. and Owens v. National Sec. of Alabama, Inc. remains available but is tightly confined. Where the evidence supports an inference of partial/poor light or otherwise disputed visibility—particularly along routes the owner expects invitees to use—Ex parte Kraatz favors jury resolution, making summary judgment inappropriate.

The decision thus narrows the practical reach of “step-in-the-dark” summary judgments and underscores that visibility disputes, especially in exterior or mixed-light conditions, will often belong to the factfinder rather than being resolved as a matter of law.