Johnson v. Regional Supplemental Services: On a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, Courts May Not Replace the Complaint’s Alleged FMCSA “Refusal-to-Test” Basis with a Defendant’s New Theory

1) Introduction

In Johnson v. Regional Supplemental Services Inc., the Tenth Circuit reversed a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a pro se truck driver’s Wyoming negligence claim arising from an employer’s alleged inaccurate reporting to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) Drug & Alcohol Clearinghouse.

The plaintiff, William Douglas Johnson III, alleged that Regional Supplemental Services, Inc. (“RSS”) reported him for a “refusal-to-test” violation based on an asserted need for an “additional test” (49 C.F.R. § 40.191(a)(6)), allegedly premised on an inaccurate claim that his first specimen was invalid due to temperature. RSS, in moving to dismiss, urged a different refusal rationale: “confrontational behavior” (49 C.F.R. § 40.191(a)(8)). The district court accepted that alternative rationale and dismissed for no breach. The Tenth Circuit held that was error because, at the pleading stage, a court must accept the complaint’s well-pled facts as true and cannot substitute a defendant’s new factual theory to defeat plausibility.

2) Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit held that the district court improperly relied on RSS’s motion-to-dismiss account—i.e., that RSS “ultimately determined” confrontational behavior warranted reporting under 49 C.F.R. § 40.191(a)(8)—instead of accepting the complaint’s allegation that RSS reported a different refusal category: “Failed or decline to take an additional test” under 49 C.F.R. § 40.191(a)(6).

Because Mr. Johnson plausibly alleged (supported by attached documents) that RSS reported the “additional test” refusal and that the underlying “invalid specimen/temperature” premise was inaccurate, the complaint plausibly alleged breach of a conceded duty to report accurate information. The court therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Vasquez-Garcia v. Centurion, LLC, 172 F.4th 1150 (10th Cir. 2026)
    • Role in the opinion: The court relied on this decision twice: (1) for the rule that appellate review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is de novo and applies the same standards as the district court; and (2) for the core pleading principle that courts must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
    • Practical influence: This precedent framed the central error: the district court did the opposite by crediting RSS’s alternative factual narrative (confrontational behavior as the reported basis) over the complaint’s allegations and attached exhibits.
  • Licon v. Ledezma, 638 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2011)
    • Role in the opinion: Cited for the requirement that courts liberally construe pro se filings.
    • Practical influence: While liberal construction does not excuse pleading defects, it supports a fair reading of what Mr. Johnson alleged: that RSS’s reported refusal category (as shown on Clearinghouse materials) is the operative factual anchor at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
    • Role in the opinion: These cases supply the federal plausibility standard: the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim.
    • Practical influence: The panel applied plausibility to Mr. Johnson’s negligence theory by treating his allegations and attached documents as true at the pleading stage—then concluding the alleged inaccurate “additional test” refusal report plausibly constituted a breach causing harm.
  • Racher v. Westlake Nursing Home Ltd. P'ship, 871 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2017)
    • Role in the opinion: Cited for the Erie principle that in diversity cases federal courts apply state substantive law.
    • Practical influence: This grounded the elements of negligence in Wyoming law, while federal law (Rule 12(b)(6)) controlled the pleading and dismissal framework.
  • Moses Inc. v. Moses, 509 P.3d 345 (Wyo. 2022)
    • Role in the opinion: Provided the governing Wyoming negligence elements: duty, breach, proximate cause, and compensable damages.
    • Practical influence: The panel used these elements to explain why the alleged inaccurate Clearinghouse report could plausibly satisfy breach and causation (loss of ability to work leading to financial hardship), particularly where RSS did not dispute the duty to report accurately.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Pleading-stage discipline: The court emphasized that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the complaint’s sufficiency, not the defendant’s competing factual account. The district court erred by “assuming facts in RSS’s favor” and rejecting the complaint’s well-pled allegations.
  2. The “reason reported” matters at the pleadings stage: Mr. Johnson alleged (and attached documents indicating) RSS reported the refusal as “Failed or decline to take an additional test” under 49 C.F.R. § 40.191(a)(6). The district court instead treated the report as if it were based on 49 C.F.R. § 40.191(a)(8) (confrontational behavior). The Tenth Circuit held that neither RSS nor the court could “substitute a different reason” to justify dismissal.
  3. Regulatory context supported plausibility: The opinion highlighted FMCSA regulations establishing that the employer has a non-delegable duty to determine whether a refusal occurred (49 C.F.R. § 40.355(i)) and must timely report a refusal determination (49 C.F.R. § 382.705(b)(1)(iv)). Against that backdrop, an inaccurate report to the Clearinghouse is not merely a private dispute; it is alleged misconduct in the performance of a regulatory reporting duty with foreseeable employment consequences.
  4. Plausible breach and harm: Accepting the allegations as true, the complaint plausibly alleged that:
    • the initial specimen temperature was in the normal range (supporting the claim the first test was valid);
    • therefore an “additional test” would not have been required (undermining a § 40.191(a)(6) refusal theory); and
    • the resulting Clearinghouse entry prevented Mr. Johnson from operating commercially, causing substantial damages.

C. Impact

Although issued as a nonprecedential “Order and Judgment,” the decision has meaningful persuasive impact in at least three ways:

  • Limits on “post hoc” rationales at the pleading stage: Defendants cannot reliably obtain dismissal by offering an alternative factual justification in a motion to dismiss when the complaint alleges a different operative event (here, the specific refusal basis actually reported). The decision reinforces a basic but frequently litigated line: Rule 12(b)(6) is not a vehicle for fact substitution.
  • Negligence exposure tied to regulatory reporting: The opinion signals that, at least at the pleading stage under Wyoming negligence elements, inaccurate FMCSA Clearinghouse reporting can plausibly constitute breach and causation where the report foreseeably blocks employment. (The court did not finally decide liability; it held only that the claim was plausibly pled.)
  • FMCSA categories and accuracy disputes may be case-dispositive: The distinction between § 40.191(a)(6) (declining an additional test) and § 40.191(a)(8) (confrontational behavior) is not merely regulatory taxonomy; it can determine whether the pleaded “inaccuracy” theory is coherent. Future litigants should expect close attention to what was actually reported to the Clearinghouse and under what regulatory basis.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Rule 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss): A request to throw out a case because, even if the complaint’s facts are true, the law would not allow relief. Courts generally cannot decide whose facts are true at this stage; they test whether the plaintiff’s version states a plausible claim.
  • Plausibility (Twombly/Iqbal): The complaint must include enough factual detail to make the claim reasonably believable—not merely speculative—while still assuming the plaintiff’s facts are true.
  • Diversity jurisdiction and Erie: When parties are from different states and the amount-in-controversy requirement is met, federal courts can hear the case, but they apply state law for substantive claims (like negligence) and federal law for procedure (like Rule 12(b)(6)).
  • Non-delegable duty (in this context): FMCSA rules place the responsibility on the employer to make and report the refusal determination; the employer cannot avoid responsibility by pointing to a collection site or third party as the real decision-maker.
  • FMCSA Clearinghouse and “refusal-to-test” categories: The Clearinghouse is a federal database employers consult. A “refusal-to-test” can be reported under specific regulatory categories, including refusing an additional test (§ 40.191(a)(6)) or disrupting the process through confrontational behavior (§ 40.191(a)(8)). Which category was actually reported can matter for both regulatory compliance and civil liability theories.

5) Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit’s central teaching is procedural but consequential: when evaluating a negligence claim tied to FMCSA Clearinghouse reporting, a district court must assess plausibility based on the complaint’s allegations and attachments—not on a defendant’s alternative factual justification introduced in a motion to dismiss. Because Mr. Johnson plausibly alleged that RSS reported a refusal under § 40.191(a)(6) based on inaccurate information, and that the report foreseeably caused significant harm, dismissal at the pleading stage was improper. The case returns to the district court for fact development and merits adjudication under Wyoming negligence law.