Gender-Neutral “Holding Out” Presumption Establishes Parentage for Unmarried, Nonbiological Parents Under the 1973 UPA

1. Introduction

In JK v. HK (Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi, May 18, 2026), the court addressed whether an unmarried woman who is not the child’s birth parent and lacks a biological connection can nonetheless be adjudicated a legal parent under Hawaiʻi’s 1973 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), former HRS Chapter 584. The appellant, JK (“Ava”), and appellee HK (“Bailey”) (both women) planned a child together; Bailey gave birth to Kai. Ava co-parented Kai from birth, but after separation Bailey restricted contact and ultimately relocated with the child to Indiana.

The key legal issue was statutory: whether the “holding out” presumption in HRS § 584-4(a)(4)— written in male terms (“A man is presumed…”)—can apply to establish a mother-child relationship through HRS § 584-21, which directs that provisions applicable to the father-child relationship apply to mother-child determinations “insofar as practicable.”

The family court found Ava did receive Kai into her home and hold Kai out as her child, but ruled she could not be a legal parent “as a matter of law” because she was neither the biological/birth mother nor married to Bailey. The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reversed that legal conclusion.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court held that under the 1973 UPA, the presumptions in HRS § 584-4(a)—including the holding out presumption in HRS § 584-4(a)(4)—apply gender-neutrally to determine the existence of a mother-child relationship pursuant to HRS § 584-21.

Because the family court’s own factual findings satisfied the elements of “holding out,” Ava was a presumptive parent. The court further held the presumption was not rebutted by clear and convincing evidence under HRS § 584-4(b). The court therefore vacated the portions of the family court’s FOFs/COLs rejecting Ava’s legal parentage and remanded to establish Ava’s parentage and address custody/visitation.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) LC v. MG & Child Support Enf't Agency

The court treated LC v. MG & Child Support Enf't Agency, 143 Hawai'i 302, 430 P.3d 400 (2018), as controlling. In LC, the court held that although HRS § 584-4(a) is phrased in gender-specific terms, HRS § 584-21 requires applying those presumptions to determine a mother-child relationship “insofar as practicable.” The family court attempted to confine LC to married same-sex couples and to the Marriage Equality Act (MEA), but the Supreme Court rejected that narrow view: the dispositive interpretive engine in LC was the UPA itself (HRS § 584-21), not the MEA.

LC also supplied an important conceptual premise carried forward here: legal parentage may arise without a biological connection. That point undermined the family court’s “biology-or-marriage” rule.

2) Inoue v. Inoue

The opinion cited Inoue v. Inoue, 118 Hawai'i 86, 185 P.3d 834 (App. 2008), to illustrate that Hawaiʻi parentage presumptions can establish legal parentage even where a person is not the biological parent, reinforcing that the UPA’s presumptions are not strictly genetic.

3) A.A. v. B.B. and Doe v. Doe (de facto parent discussion)

The opinion referenced A.A. v. B.B., 139 Hawaiʻi 102, 384 P.3d 878 (2016), and Doe v. Doe, 116 Hawaiʻi 323, 172 P.3d 1067 (2007), in recounting Ava’s alternative theory as a de facto parent and the family court’s temporary visitation order. While the Supreme Court’s holding ultimately rests on statutory parentage (not merely de facto parentage), these cases frame why the distinction mattered: without legal parent status, enforcement (including practical law-enforcement assistance) can fail despite visitation orders.

4) Sister-state 1973 UPA authorities

The court buttressed its reading of the 1973 UPA by citing a strong consensus from other jurisdictions interpreting similar UPA language:

  • Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 46 (Cal. 2005) (applying holding-out provisions to determine maternity).
  • Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283 (N.M. 2012) (plain language directs father-child provisions apply to mother-child relationship).
  • In re Parental Responsibilities of A.R.L., 318 P.3d 581 (Colo. App. 2013) (holding-out presumption applies equally to women).
  • In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 98 A.3d 494 (N.H. 2014) (emphasizing presumptions serve child welfare/family integrity, not just biology).
  • Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d 1133 (Mass. 2016) (holding-out presumption is gender-neutral and not dependent on biology).

These authorities were used for two linked propositions: (1) the “apply father-child provisions to mother-child cases” clause in the 1973 UPA is an instruction to courts to apply presumptions gender-neutrally where workable; and (2) “natural” in these contexts does not function as a universal synonym for “genetic,” especially where the statutory presumption is based on conduct (receiving the child and holding out).

5) Statutory-interpretation and review standards cases

  • In re Doe, 95 Hawai'i 183, 20 P.3d 616 (2001): cited for core interpretive principles—ascertain legislative intent primarily from statutory text and read language in statutory context and consistent with purpose.
  • Cnty. of Kaua'i v. Hanalei River Holdings, Ltd., 139 Hawai'i 511, 394 P.3d 741 (2017): cited for the canon against surplusage (give effect to all parts of a statute).
  • Fisher v. Fisher, 111 Hawai'i 41, 137 P.3d 355 (2006): cited for standards of review for family court findings (clearly erroneous) and conclusions (de novo/right-wrong).

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Textual “two-step”: HRS § 584-3(1) + HRS § 584-21

The court began with the 1973 UPA’s own architecture. Under HRS § 584-3(1), the parent-child relationship between a child and the natural mother may be established either (a) by proof of having given birth or (b) “under this chapter.” That “or” matters: it signals that the chapter’s broader mechanisms (including presumptions) are not restricted to birth proof.

Then HRS § 584-21 supplies the method: in actions to determine a mother-child relationship, the UPA provisions applicable to the father-child relationship “shall apply” insofar as practicable. Reading these provisions together—consistent with LC v. MG & Child Support Enf't Agency—the court held that paternity presumptions in HRS § 584-4(a) (though written in male terms) apply to determine maternity where workable.

2) Rejecting the family court’s MEA/marriage limitation

The family court tried to distinguish LC on the ground it involved marriage and the MEA’s mandate of gender-neutral construction. The Supreme Court rejected that move for two reasons:

  1. LC did not hinge on the MEA: the family court in LC had not even relied on the MEA; instead, the Supreme Court’s operative analysis rested on the UPA’s own gender-neutralizing directive in HRS § 584-21.
  2. The holding-out presumption is not marriage-dependent: the court noted that several presumptions in HRS § 584-4(a), including HRS § 584-4(a)(4), do not require marriage at all. Construing the statute to make marriage a precondition for applying holding-out would effectively rewrite the presumption and contradict the chapter-wide instruction in HRS § 584-21.

3) Functional understanding of “natural” and the purpose of the 1973 UPA

The court emphasized that the 1973 UPA was enacted to “provide substantive legal equality for all children regardless of the marital status of their parents” (citing H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 190, in 1975 House Journal, at 1019). In that policy context, the court treated the presumptions—especially conduct-based ones like holding-out—as tools to secure stability and protection for children, not merely as proxies for genetic truth. The citation to In re Guardianship of Madelyn B. reinforces this welfare-and-family-integrity rationale.

4) Application: Ava satisfies HRS § 584-4(a)(4)

Having concluded the presumption is available in a mother-child case, the court applied it to the family court’s own findings: Ava received Kai into her home and openly held Kai out as her child; she participated in caregiving, medical authorization, and day-to-day parenting. Those findings triggered the statutory presumption.

5) Rebuttal standard: clear and convincing evidence

Under HRS § 584-4(b), presumptions may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court held no such rebuttal existed on this record. Critically, the family court’s “as a matter of law” exclusion was not a rebuttal; it was a legal error that prevented the statute from operating as written.

6) Legislative developments as confirmatory context (not a replacement rule)

The court discussed Hawaiʻi’s enactment of a new UPA (2017 version) in S.B. 1231, 33rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (2025), effective January 1, 2026 (new HRS Chapter 584A). It treated this as consistent with—rather than a departure from—the earlier UPA’s intended gender-neutral operation. The court cited Courtney G. Joslin, Preface to the UPA (2017), 52 Fam. L.Q. 437 (2018) to support the proposition that every iteration of the UPA includes a mandate to apply gendered provisions equally when determining women’s parentage.

In short: the 2017 UPA clarified in express language what HRS § 584-21 already required.

C. Impact

  • Unmarried, nonbiological parents gain a clear statutory route to legal parentage (pre-2026 cases): For cases governed by the 1973 UPA, the decision confirms that courts must apply conduct-based presumptions like holding-out to women when “practicable,” preventing categorical denials based solely on sex, marital status, or lack of genetics.
  • Constrains “biology-or-marriage” gatekeeping: The opinion rejects a common restrictive template (birth, genetics, or marriage) and centers the UPA’s broader protective purpose. This directly affects custody, visitation, relocation disputes, and enforcement realities where “non-parent” status can render orders practically ineffective.
  • Reinforces child-centered stability: By validating a parent-child relationship based on lived parenting and public recognition, the ruling aligns parentage outcomes with a child’s established familial bonds.
  • Guidance for trial courts: Trial courts must (a) first apply presumptions gender-neutrally under HRS § 584-21, and (b) treat rebuttal as an evidentiary question under the clear-and-convincing standard, not as a categorical legal bar.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Holding out” presumption (HRS § 584-4(a)(4))
A legal shortcut that treats someone as a presumed parent if they take the child into their home and openly act as the child’s parent. It is based on conduct and representation, not DNA.
“Insofar as practicable” (HRS § 584-21)
An instruction to apply father-focused parentage rules to mother-child disputes when it makes sense to do so. Some provisions may be inherently inapplicable (e.g., a rule that depends on male biology), but conduct-based presumptions are generally practicable for any gender.
Presumption vs. proof
A presumption means the law treats a fact as true (here, parentage) once certain conditions are shown—unless the other side successfully rebuts it.
Clear and convincing evidence (HRS § 584-4(b))
A heightened proof standard—stronger than “more likely than not.” It requires a high level of certainty before the court can override a presumption.
Legal parentage vs. de facto parentage
A legal parent has full recognized parental status and accompanying rights/obligations. A de facto parent may receive some protections based on caregiving reality, but as this case illustrates, lack of legal parentage can impede enforcement and limit remedies.

5. Conclusion

JK v. HK establishes a clear rule for Hawaiʻi cases governed by the 1973 UPA: the “holding out” presumption in HRS § 584-4(a)(4) applies gender-neutrally to determine a mother-child relationship through HRS § 584-21, and it is not limited to married couples or biological parents. Where the facts show the petitioner received the child into their home and openly held the child out as their own, parentage is presumed and may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.

The decision corrects a trial-level misreading that would have made marriage or biology a categorical gatekeeper to parentage, and it reinforces the UPA’s child-protective purpose: securing legal stability for children based on established family relationships.