Iowa Criminal Jurisdiction Is a Nonwaivable Statutory Prerequisite Decided by the Court, Not a Jury Element

Introduction

Case: State of Iowa v. Dillon Michael Heiller (Iowa Supreme Court, Apr. 17, 2026).
Parties: The State of Iowa (appellee) prosecuted Dillon Michael Heiller (appellant). The ACLU of Iowa participated as amicus curiae.
Background: A 2018 Volkswagen Tiguan was reported stolen in La Crosse, Wisconsin. The next day, police located Heiller in Waukon, Iowa, in possession of the vehicle and arrested him. Iowa charged him with first-degree theft under a “theft by taking” theory (Iowa Code §§ 714.1(1), 714.2(1)), and he was convicted (as second-degree theft after a value-related reduction).
Key issue on further review: Whether Iowa had statutory criminal jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 803.1 to prosecute theft by taking when the “taking” occurred in Wisconsin, and whether the defendant could raise that jurisdictional challenge for the first time on appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision, vacated Heiller’s conviction and sentence, and remanded. The Court held:

  • Criminal jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 803.1 is not an “element of the offense” that must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, it is a procedural, threshold question of law for the court.
  • Satisfaction of § 803.1 is a necessary, nonwaivable prerequisite to prosecution; a defendant may raise a challenge to Iowa’s criminal jurisdiction at any time during the pendency of the case, including for the first time on appeal.
  • On the merits, § 803.1 did not authorize prosecution for the charged offense because theft by taking is not a continuing offense and the taking occurred in Wisconsin.
  • Section 803.1(1)(d) did not apply because Iowa’s theft statute does not specifically prohibit wholly out-of-state conduct.
  • The State could not salvage the conviction by amending judgment to the purported lesser included offense of operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent (Iowa Code § 714.7) because that offense likewise criminalizes the taking of possession/control (which occurred in Wisconsin), not mere continued possession in Iowa.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Iowa cases on “territorial/criminal jurisdiction” and the Court’s course correction

  • State v. Rimmer, 877 N.W.2d 652 (Iowa 2016): The Court reaffirmed (and in this case explicitly quotes) Rimmer for the proposition that challenges to territorial jurisdiction “cannot be waived.” But it also identifies Rimmer as a source of confusion insofar as it had described territorial/criminal jurisdiction as an “essential element of the crime.” The Heiller Court uses Rimmer as both (a) authority for nonwaivability and (b) an example of why the “jurisdiction-as-element” framing created doctrinal tension with criminal procedure practice (including pretrial review of charging documents and dismissal mechanisms).
  • State v. Liggins, 524 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1994): Previously stated that territorial jurisdiction is an “essential element” to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and submitted to the jury (at least when disputed). The Court repudiates that characterization, explaining it is not supported by the Criminal Code and is incompatible with the constitutional and procedural framework for “elements.”
  • State v. Serrato, 787 N.W.2d 462 (Iowa 2010), and State v. Wagner, 596 N.W.2d 83 (Iowa 1999) (en banc): Both repeated the “essential element” formulation. The Court expressly overrules the prior statements in Rimmer, Serrato, Wagner, and Liggins to the extent they held criminal jurisdiction is an element for the jury.
  • State v. Hippler, 545 N.W.2d 568 (Iowa 1996) (en banc): Used to anchor the key merits holding that “theft by taking is not a continuing offense.” That principle is decisive: if taking is a single completed act, later possession in Iowa does not supply an Iowa element for § 803.1(1)(a)/(2).
  • State v. Heiller, ___ N.W.3d at ___, 2026 WL 784065 (Iowa Mar. 20, 2026): The Court references its own recent decision vacating the court of appeals in the companion case. It also cites the companion decision for substantive propositions about theft by taking (non-continuing) and about § 714.7 tracking the “taking” concept.
  • State v. Hustead, 538 N.W.2d 867 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995): Cited (with Liggins) to note Iowa’s statutory expansion of territorial jurisdiction beyond common law.

2) “Elements” jurisprudence and why jurisdiction is not one

  • State v. Cooley, 21 N.W.3d 137 (Iowa 2025), and State v. Bailey, 2 N.W.3d 429 (Iowa 2024): The Court uses these to define “elements” as the constituent parts of a crime specified by the statute defining the offense. Because the theft statute does not include Iowa criminal jurisdiction as a constituent part, jurisdiction cannot be treated as an “element.”
  • State v. Lewis, 242 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1976) (en banc), Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), overruled on other grounds by Alleyne: The Court invokes these authorities to underscore the constitutional rule that if something is an “element,” it must be charged, submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This supports the Court’s point that Iowa’s “jurisdiction-as-element” language was inconsistent with actual Iowa practice (where juries are rarely instructed on jurisdiction) and would create constitutional friction if taken seriously.

3) Criminal procedure consequences: dismissal vs acquittal and double jeopardy

  • Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013): Cited to highlight that failures of proof on an element generally produce acquittals with double jeopardy consequences. The Court contrasts this with Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(5)(b), which provides for dismissal when territorial jurisdiction is lacking and contemplates temporary custody to transfer the defendant—features that fit a threshold power-to-prosecute inquiry, not an element-of-guilt inquiry.
  • State v. Karpov, 458 P.3d 1182 (Wash. 2020) (en banc): A persuasive authority rejecting the claim that jurisdiction is an “essential element” to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, reinforcing the Court’s move away from the “element” label.

4) Persuasive authority: territorial jurisdiction as a question of law for the court

  • People v. Betts, 103 P.3d 883 (Cal. 2005): The Court relies heavily on Betts as the most thorough analysis. Betts frames territorial jurisdiction as a procedural question about the court’s authority, not guilt/innocence. It also emphasizes efficiency and defendant protections (resolving jurisdiction pretrial, writ review). The Iowa Supreme Court adopts the same conceptual framework.
  • State v. Beverly, 618 A.2d 1335 (Conn. 1993): Reinforces that crime “elements” come from the defining statute and that jurisdiction is a court-decided power question; also supports the conclusion that the federal jury-trial right does not extend to non-guilt procedural authority questions.
  • Other cited authorities aligned with the “court decides” approach include: Mitchell v. United States, 569 A.2d 177 (D.C. 1990); State v. Jackson, 118 P.3d 1238 (Kan. 2005); McNamara v. State, 377 P.3d 106 (Nev. 2016); State v. Reldan, 449 A.2d 1317 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982); State v. Aguilar, 736 P.2d 620 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam); State v. Belloli, 766 A.2d 928 (R.I. 2001); State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006).

5) Nonwaivability and raising the issue on appeal

  • State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189 (Iowa 2022): Used to clarify what “error preservation” means (raising an issue and obtaining a ruling), and to separate that concept from whether an issue may nevertheless be raised for the first time on appeal.
  • State v. Pagliai, 30 N.W.3d 226 (Iowa 2026): Supports the core premise that crime and punishment are statutory and that courts must administer criminal law in accord with legislative commands—here, the legislature’s calibrated choice in § 803.1 about when a person is “subject to prosecution.”
  • Persuasive authorities supporting the “may be raised at any time” rule include: State v. Streater, 559 A.2d 473 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); People v. McLaughlin, 606 N.E.2d 1357 (N.Y. 1992); State v. Shrum, 455 N.E.2d 531 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); State v. Williams, 530 P.3d 919 (Or. Ct. App. 2023); State v. Dudley, 614 S.E.2d 623 (S.C. 2005).

6) The territorial principle and modern expansion

  • Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911): Provides the classic “effects” principle—out-of-state acts intended to and producing detrimental effects in the forum can justify punishment—used here as historical context for states’ broader jurisdictional assertions.
  • Model Penal Code § 1.03 (A.L.I. 1962): Cited as a major modern source for expanded state territorial jurisdiction statutes (contextualizing § 803.1).

7) Offense-specific intent-at-taking for § 714.7

  • State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 2010), and State v. McCormack, 293 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa 1980): Cited to support that “operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent” (Iowa Code § 714.7) proscribes the taking of possession/control, and that the intent requirement must coincide with that taking—undermining the State’s attempt to ground jurisdiction in later in-Iowa operation/possession.

Legal Reasoning

1) Reframing “criminal jurisdiction” as a threshold, court-decided prerequisite (not a jury element)

The Court’s central doctrinal move is to disentangle “criminal jurisdiction” from the concept of “elements of the offense.” It reasons:

  • Text and structure: Elements come from the statute defining the crime; Iowa’s theft statute does not include jurisdiction as a constituent part.
  • Constitutional coherence: If jurisdiction were an “element,” it would need to be submitted to the jury in every case, which is not how Iowa practice operates and would create systemic constitutional tension.
  • Rules of criminal procedure: Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(5)(b) explicitly contemplates judicial determination (“If the court determines it lacks territorial jurisdiction…dismiss…”) and remedial steps inconsistent with element-based acquittals.
  • Better-reasoned authority: Persuasive case law (especially People v. Betts) treats territorial jurisdiction as procedural—about adjudicatory authority—not guilt.

The Court therefore overrules contrary language in Rimmer, Serrato, Wagner, and Liggins, and clarifies that judges decide criminal jurisdiction (including necessary factual disputes) as a matter of law.

2) Nonwaivability and appellate timing: “error preservation” does not control sovereign power limits

The Court draws a sharp distinction:

  • Error preservation concerns whether the district court had an opportunity to decide an issue.
  • Criminal jurisdiction under § 803.1 concerns whether the State has statutory authorization—an antecedent condition to prosecuting at all.

Because § 803.1 reflects the legislature’s calibrated choice about when a person is “subject to prosecution,” the Court holds that ordinary error-preservation doctrines cannot “overcome” the legislative command. A conviction obtained without § 803.1 authorization is not merely erroneous; it is beyond the sovereign’s chosen prosecutorial power and is therefore challengeable at any time during the case’s pendency, including on appeal.

Importantly, the Court clarifies that this is not a question of the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction in the classic sense; it is instead about whether the State, as sovereign, has invoked prosecutorial authority under the statute.

3) Applying § 803.1 to theft by taking: the “taking” happened in Wisconsin

On the merits, the Court applies § 803.1(1)(a) and § 803.1(2), which allow prosecution if the offense is committed wholly or partly in Iowa, including when conduct that is an element (or an element-result) occurs in Iowa. The State’s argument hinged on the jury instruction’s “possession or control” language.

The Court rejects that parsing because the instruction’s operative verb is “took”: theft by taking criminalizes the act of taking possession/control, not ongoing possession. Under State v. Hippler and the Court’s own companion State v. Heiller reasoning, theft by taking is complete at the moment of taking. The record showed the vehicle was taken from La Crosse, Wisconsin (parked on Sept. 28, missing by Sept. 30, reported stolen to La Crosse PD), so no element occurred in Iowa.

4) Rejecting § 803.1(1)(d): “specifically prohibits” means the statute must expressly reach extraterritorial conduct

The Court reads § 803.1(1)(d) as requiring an offense “based upon a statute that specifically prohibits conduct wholly outside of the state.” It treats “specifically” as a limiting word with real work to do; otherwise, the subsection would swallow the jurisdictional scheme by allowing courts to extend any generally worded criminal statute to out-of-state conduct via interpretation. Because nothing in the theft chapter expressly targets wholly out-of-state conduct, subsection (1)(d) cannot supply jurisdiction.

5) No “lesser included” fix: § 714.7 also hinges on the place of the “taking”

The Court rejects the State’s request to amend the judgment to Iowa Code § 714.7 (operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent). Even though Heiller was found operating/possessing the vehicle in Iowa, the Court treats § 714.7 as, like § 714.1(1), proscribing the act of taking possession/control without consent, with intent coinciding at the taking. Because the taking occurred in Wisconsin, Iowa still lacks § 803.1 authorization.

Impact

1) Doctrinal clarity: jurisdiction is no longer a “jury element” in Iowa

The most immediate impact is structural: Iowa trial and appellate courts now have clear guidance that criminal jurisdiction under § 803.1 is a court-decided, threshold, procedural prerequisite rather than a jury element. This resolves the practical inconsistency the Court identified—jury instructions almost never included a jurisdiction element—and prevents future constitutional confusion about what must be proven to juries beyond a reasonable doubt.

2) Litigation practice: earlier, more focused jurisdictional litigation (and more appellate review)

Defendants have a newly reinforced pathway to litigate § 803.1 as a pretrial dismissal issue under Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(5)(b). At the same time, prosecutors must anticipate that § 803.1 challenges can surface even late, including for the first time on appeal, because the issue is nonwaivable during the case’s pendency.

3) Charging discipline: matching the theory to an Iowa jurisdictional hook

The case exposes a recurring risk: charging “theft by taking” when the taking likely occurred out of state, then trying the case as if it were “possession of stolen property” (Iowa Code § 714.1(4), uncharged here). Post-Heiller, prosecutors must align:

  • the charged offense’s elements,
  • the evidence on where those elements occurred, and
  • the jurisdictional basis under § 803.1.

4) Limiting effect on cross-border property crimes

The decision narrows Iowa prosecutions where the conduct that constitutes the “taking” occurs across state lines and the only Iowa contact is later possession or operation. Unless the charged statute’s elements occur partly in Iowa (or another § 803.1 prong is satisfied), Iowa cannot prosecute that offense—leaving prosecution to the state of the taking, or requiring Iowa to charge an offense whose elements actually occur in Iowa (if available and appropriately charged).

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Criminal jurisdiction (under § 803.1): Not “does the courthouse have power over criminal cases generally,” but “did the Iowa legislature authorize Iowa to prosecute this offense given where it happened?”
  • Subject matter jurisdiction vs. criminal jurisdiction: Subject matter jurisdiction is the court’s general authority to hear a category of cases. Criminal jurisdiction here is the State’s statutorily limited authority to prosecute a particular crime with certain geographic connections.
  • “Element of the offense”: A fact the crime-defining statute requires the State to prove to convict. The Court holds § 803.1 is not part of the theft statute’s elements.
  • “Theft by taking” is not continuing: The crime is complete when the defendant first takes possession/control with intent to deprive. Later possession in another place is not the “taking.”
  • Nonwaivable during pendency: Even if a defendant did not object in the district court, they may still challenge § 803.1 authorization on appeal while the case is ongoing, because the issue goes to the State’s power to prosecute under the statute.
  • § 803.1(1)(d) “specifically prohibits”: The underlying criminal statute must expressly reach wholly out-of-state conduct; general statutes silent on geography do not qualify.

Conclusion

State of Iowa v. Dillon Michael Heiller establishes two major clarifications in Iowa law. First, Iowa Code § 803.1 criminal jurisdiction is a court-decided, procedural prerequisite, not a jury-triable “element” of substantive offenses—overruling contrary statements in State v. Rimmer, State v. Serrato, State v. Wagner, and State v. Liggins. Second, because § 803.1 defines when a person is “subject to prosecution,” its satisfaction is nonwaivable during the case’s pendency and can be raised even for the first time on appeal.

On the facts, the Court’s application of the non-continuing nature of theft by taking meant Iowa lacked authority to prosecute: the “taking” occurred in Wisconsin, and neither § 803.1(1)(a)/(2) nor § 803.1(1)(d) applied, nor could a lesser offense cure the geographic defect. The decision will reshape how Iowa courts and litigants analyze cross-border crimes: jurisdiction must be established as a threshold matter, and charges must match an Iowa-authorized jurisdictional basis grounded in where the offense’s elements actually occurred.