Iowa Code § 692A.105 Is Limited to Temporary Lodging Away from the Principal Residence (Not Change-of-Residence Prosecutions)

Introduction

This case centers on the boundaries of Iowa’s sex-offender registry statutes—specifically the distinction between (1) reporting a change in residence under Iowa Code § 692A.104 and (2) reporting temporary lodging away from the principal residence under Iowa Code § 692A.105. Joshua Kelly Uranga, a long-time registrant, was charged and convicted under § 692A.105 (temporary lodging). But the State’s proof and theory at trial focused on his allegedly late registration of a move from Pilot Mound to Boone—conduct that fits § 692A.104, not § 692A.105.

The Iowa Supreme Court addressed whether a conviction under § 692A.105 can stand when the State fails to prove the statute’s trigger—being “away from the principal residence ... for more than five days”—and instead proves (at most) a residence-change violation.

Summary of the Opinion

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• State v. Dorsey, 16 N.W.3d 32 (Iowa 2025).
  Used for sequencing appellate review: sufficiency first because a successful claim requires acquittal and moots new-trial issues.
• State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189 (Iowa 2022).
  Supplies the governing sufficiency standard (errors at law; substantial evidence; view evidence in the light most favorable to the State) and confirms sufficiency is preserved by the trial/verdict.
• State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514 (Iowa 2022).
  Establishes that unobjected-to instructions become the “law of the case” for sufficiency review. The Uranga court distinguishes Mathis because Uranga did object, so statutory text controls.
• Eisenhauer ex rel. Conservatorship of T.D. v. Henry Cnty. Health Ctr., 935 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2019).
  Cited for the rule that a requested instruction must be given when correct, applicable, and not covered elsewhere—supporting the court’s critique of the rejected request to track § 692A.105’s “away ... for more than five days” language.
• Des Moines Civ. & Hum. Rts. Comm'n v. Knueven, 988 N.W.2d 694 (Iowa 2023).
  Used both for instruction specificity/misstatement principles and, critically, for the remedy logic: if evidence is insufficient under the proper instruction/statutory standard urged by the defendant, dismissal (here, acquittal) is required.
• State v. Cooley, 21 N.W.3d 137 (Iowa 2025) (quoting State v. Schuler, 774 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa 2009)).
  Reinforces that marshaling instructions need not quote statutes verbatim, but must be correct; stylistic variance is allowed, substantive variance is not.
• State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 2018).
  The central interpretive precedent for § 692A.105. Coleman addressed ambiguity in “within five business days of a change” and held “change” means when the offender began staying away. Uranga clarifies Coleman’s statement about “changes his location” concerned timing, not the underlying trigger element (absence from principal residence for more than five days).
• Coleman (quoting In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495 (Iowa 2014)).
  Supports the interpretive principle that when the legislature defines terms, courts are bound by those definitions (“own lexicographer”).
• Olson v. BNSF Ry., 999 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 2023) (quoting Winger v. CM Holdings, L.L.C., 881 N.W.2d 433 (Iowa 2016)).
  Provides the requirement that objections to instructions be specific enough to alert the trial court—used to confirm Uranga’s objection was adequate, opening the door to statutory-element sufficiency review.
• State v. Grice, 515 N.W.2d 20 (Iowa 1994).
  Cited for the function of the trial information: notice to the defendant to prepare a defense and informing the court of legally sufficient allegations.
• State v. Meyers, 129 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 1964).
  Invoked for the foundational proposition that a formal accusation is essential; without it, the court lacks jurisdiction to proceed.
• State v. Adcock, 426 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (citing State v. Trucke, 410 N.W.2d 242 (Iowa 1987) (en banc) and State v. Bartlett, 164 N.W. 757 (Iowa 1917)).
  Supplies the “nullity” principle: conviction for an uncharged, non-included offense is invalid. Uranga uses this line to reject “saving” a § 692A.105 conviction by proof that fits § 692A.104.
• The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamiliton).
  Quoted to emphasize the separation-of-powers value of courts refusing to validate prosecutions that exceed the charged offense—an institutional justification for enforcing charging boundaries.

Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds in three connected steps:

1. Identify the charged crime and its statutory trigger.
   Uranga was charged under § 692A.105, which requires reporting “any location” where the offender is staying when away from the principal residence ... for more than five days. The court treats “away ... for more than five days” as the core trigger; without it, the duty never arises.
2. Correct the lens for sufficiency review (statute, not flawed instruction).
   Although the marshaling instruction framed the crime as failing to report that he “changed his location from his principal residence,” Uranga objected and requested language tracking the statute and trial information (“staying away ... for more than five days”). Because the objection was specific, the court reviews sufficiency against § 692A.105 itself (consistent with Des Moines Civ. & Hum. Rts. Comm'n v. Knueven), rather than treating the instruction as the law of the case (as in State v. Mathis).
3. Apply the statutory elements to the record and reject a “substitution” theory.
   The State’s evidence showed (at most) a move/eviction timeline: eviction on November 18 and a move to Boone on November 19, with in-person registration on November 30. But the State presented no evidence that Uranga was away from his principal residence (first Pilot Mound, then Boone) for more than five days during the charged timeframe. Proving an arguably late residence-change report would implicate § 692A.104, but that is not the offense charged. Under the Adcock/Trucke/Bartlett line, the court refuses to uphold a conviction by treating proof of a different statutory violation as good enough.

Impact

The decision meaningfully tightens charging and proof discipline in chapter 692A prosecutions:

• Clear statutory boundary: § 692A.105 is not a catchall for “not where you said you were” or “you moved and didn’t report in time.” It is a specific “temporary lodging” rule, triggered only by being away from the principal residence for more than five days.
• Charging precision in registry cases: Prosecutors must select the correct provision—§ 692A.104 for residence changes, § 692A.105 for qualifying absences—and then prove the elements of that provision.
• Jury-instruction consequences: Where defendants properly object and request statute-tracking language, appellate courts may measure sufficiency against the correct statutory elements, increasing the likelihood of outright acquittal (not retrial) when the State’s proof targets the wrong duty.
• Litigation focus: Future § 692A.105 cases will likely turn on evidence of (a) the registrant’s principal residence at the relevant time, (b) the start date of the “away” period, and (c) whether the absence exceeds five days—rather than on general suspicion the registrant was not truly living at a registered address.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Principal residence” (§ 692A.101(20)): the registrant’s main in-state home. If the registrant has only one residence in Iowa, that one is the principal residence.
• “Residence” vs. “principal residence” (§ 692A.101(24)): “residence” is broad—where the person resides, sleeps, habitually lives, or is stationed with regularity—whether or not the registrant labels it as such. “Principal residence” is a subset concept used for certain duties.
• § 692A.104 (change of residence): requires reporting within five business days when the registrant adds, begins, or terminates a residence.
• § 692A.105 (temporary lodging): requires reporting a location where the registrant is staying when away from the principal residence for more than five days.
• “Marshaling instruction”: the jury instruction listing the elements the State must prove. If it misstates the law and the defendant properly objects, appellate review can revert to the statute’s actual elements.
• “Sufficiency of the evidence” / “substantial evidence”: whether the evidence could convince a rational jury beyond a reasonable doubt on each element of the charged offense.
• “Trial information”: the formal charging document. The opinion emphasizes that conviction must match the charge; proof of a different offense cannot substitute.

Conclusion

The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Uranga establishes a sharp, practical rule: § 692A.105 applies only to temporary lodging situations—i.e., being away from the principal residence for more than five days—and cannot be used to convict based on a mere change of residence. The opinion also reinforces two systemic safeguards: (1) properly objected-to instruction errors do not redefine the elements for sufficiency purposes, and (2) charging documents matter—courts will not uphold convictions by allowing the State to prove a different, uncharged statutory offense.