Date: Mar 18, 2026

Ioio v. City of New York: Premature Appeals May Ripen After Final Judgment, but Undesignated Orders Remain Unreviewable; No Private OSHA Claims and COVID Vaccine Mandates Survive Rational-Basis Review

Introduction

In Ioio v. City of New York (2d Cir. Mar. 16, 2026) (summary order), numerous plaintiffs—largely City employees—challenged New York City’s COVID-19 vaccination mandates applicable to City employees. They sued the City of New York, related municipal agencies, and officials, asserting claims under (i) the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), (ii) the Free Exercise Clause and substantive due process via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (iii) Title VII, (iv) the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), and (v) New York common-law fraud, and they sought Rule 11 sanctions.

The appeal presented both threshold appellate-jurisdiction questions (because the appealed order was initially nonfinal) and merits questions about whether OSHA can be privately enforced and whether COVID vaccine mandates violate constitutional rights. It also raised professional-responsibility concerns about allegedly false citations and unauthorized inclusion of individuals as plaintiffs.

Summary of the Opinion

Affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the challenged claims and denying sanctions.
Appellate jurisdiction existed over the appealed (initially nonfinal) dismissal order because final judgment entered before the appeal was heard and appellees suffered no prejudice.
No appellate jurisdiction to review denials of recusal and class certification because those orders were not designated in the notice of appeal.
OSHA: employees have no private right of action; additionally, any preemption theory was nonjusticiable because mandates were no longer in effect.
Constitutional claims: controlling Second Circuit precedent upholding COVID vaccine mandates applied; mandates were neutral, generally applicable, and satisfied rational-basis review.
NYCHRL: plaintiffs’ “per se” theory failed because they established no underlying federal civil-rights violation.
Sanctions: no abuse of discretion in denying sanctions against the City; however, the Court referred plaintiffs’ counsel to the Court’s Grievance Panel under Local Rule 46.2 based on apparent false citations and plaintiff-authorization issues.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Appellate jurisdiction, finality, and the notice of appeal

Uniformed Fire Officers Ass'n v. de Blasio, 973 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2020): cited for the Second Circuit’s independent duty to confirm appellate jurisdiction.
Marquez v. Silver, 96 F.4th 579 (2d Cir. 2024), quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984): reinforced the “final judgment rule” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291—errors are ordinarily reviewed in a single appeal after final judgment.
Houbigant, Inc. v. IMG Fragrance Brands, LLC, 627 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam), quoting Smith v. Half Hollow Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2002): supplied the “ripening” rule—an appeal from a nonfinal order can be heard if final judgment is entered before the appeal is heard and the appellee suffers no prejudice.
Houbigant, Inc. v. IMG Fragrance Brands, LLC, 627 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam): also framed the interplay between partial dismissals and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certifications.
Arzuaga v. Quiros, 781 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2015): used to illustrate how final judgment is deemed entered via Fed. R. Civ. P. 58’s timing mechanisms when no separate judgment is entered.
Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014): controlled the scope-of-appeal holding: designations in the notice of appeal define the court’s jurisdiction; orders not designated are generally not reviewable.

These authorities collectively drove the court’s procedural holdings: the appeal could proceed as to the originally appealed dismissal order (because it ripened), but it could not be expanded to cover other rulings (recusal/class certification) omitted from the notice of appeal.

2) OSHA enforcement and mootness

New Yorkers for Religious Liberty, Inc. v. City of New York, 125 F.4th 319 (2d Cir. 2025): supported the conclusion that challenges to now-expired mandates may be moot where the court cannot grant effective relief.
Donovan v. OSHRC, 713 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1983), citing Marshall v. OSHRC, 635 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1980): supplied the dispositive merits rule—employees do not have a private right of action under OSHA; enforcement is committed to the Secretary of Labor (subject to inapplicable exceptions).

3) Free Exercise and substantive due process challenges to vaccine mandates

We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266 (2d Cir. 2021): was the controlling precedent squarely upholding COVID-19 vaccine mandates and rejecting the existence of a fundamental right that makes such requirements unconstitutional in the public interest during a health emergency.
Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990): provided the doctrinal framework—neutral laws of general applicability receive rational-basis review even if they incidentally burden religious practice.

4) Briefing abandonment and standards of review

City of Providence v. Bats Glob. Mkts., Inc., 878 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017); Hamilton v. Westchester County, 3 F.4th 86 (2d Cir. 2021), quoting Dane v. UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co., 974 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2020): articulated de novo review of dismissals and the plausibility standard, while refusing to credit conclusory allegations.
Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676 (2d Cir. 2023), quoting Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1997): underpinned the holding that failing to argue claims in the opening brief constitutes abandonment (applied to Title VII and fraud).

5) Recusal principles and counsel-conduct authorities

United States v. Wolfson, 558 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000), quoting Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1998): supported rejecting recusal theories resting on remote, contingent, indirect, or speculative interests.
Park v. Kim, 91 F.4th 610 (2d Cir. 2024): served as the court’s cautionary benchmark that Rule 11 duties include confirming the existence and validity of cited authorities.
People v. Macerola, 391 N.E.2d 990 (N.Y. 1979): was invoked for the ethical obligation to obtain express client consent in joint representation—relevant to the allegation that an individual was named as a plaintiff without permission.

Legal Reasoning

1) Jurisdiction: “Ripening” does not expand the scope of what was appealed

The Second Circuit separated two ideas that are sometimes conflated in practice: (i) whether an appeal from a nonfinal order can be entertained once final judgment later enters, and (ii) whether the notice of appeal validly brings particular rulings within the court’s jurisdiction.

Applying Houbigant, Inc. v. IMG Fragrance Brands, LLC, the court held the appealed dismissal order became reviewable once the remaining claims were dismissed and final judgment was deemed entered (via Rule 58’s 150-day rule), and appellees showed no prejudice. But relying on Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P. and Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B), it refused to review recusal and class-certification rulings because those orders were not designated in the notice of appeal.

The court’s footnote analysis emphasized that the “merger” concept (Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4)) depends on actually noticing an appeal from the final judgment; the appellants here did not.

2) OSHA: mootness and, independently, no private right of action

The panel first noted that because the challenged vaccine mandates were no longer in effect, it could not grant meaningful relief on the preemption theory, invoking the justiciability logic of New Yorkers for Religious Liberty, Inc. v. City of New York.

Independently—and dispositively—it held that OSHA does not supply a private cause of action for employees, following Donovan v. OSHRC. Appellants’ attempt to recast their suit as something other than “enforcement” was rejected as wordplay: a lawsuit alleging an OSHA violation is, functionally, an enforcement attempt that the statute reserves to the Secretary of Labor.

3) Constitution: neutral, generally applicable vaccine mandates receive rational-basis review

On the Free Exercise and substantive due process claims, the court treated We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul as controlling and “unequivocal.” Under that framework, absent a fundamental right against vaccine requirements, neutral laws of general applicability are reviewed for rationality. The City’s asserted rationale—responding to the COVID-19 public health crisis—satisfied rational-basis review.

The panel also rejected the suggestion that intervening Supreme Court precedent had implicitly undercut vaccine-mandate precedent; it read We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul as having already addressed and rejected similar arguments.

4) NYCHRL: conclusory “per se” theory fails without an underlying violation

Appellants offered essentially one sentence: a federal civil-rights violation is “per se” an NYCHRL violation. The court assumed this theory for argument’s sake but found it irrelevant because appellants established no federal civil-rights violation; thus the NYCHRL claim fell with the federal claims.

5) Sanctions and counsel conduct: denial affirmed, but counsel referred

The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to sanction the City. However, it took the unusual step (for a merits disposition) of referring appellants’ counsel to the Second Circuit’s Grievance Panel under Local Rule 46.2. Two concerns drove this: (i) apparent false citations in the appellate brief (with the court unable to locate the referenced “leading” NY cases), and (ii) indications that at least one person was named as a plaintiff despite expressing non-consent—conduct the court linked to professional and ethical duties, citing Park v. Kim and People v. Macerola.

Impact

Appellate practice (Second Circuit): The order underscores a practical but strict lesson—ripening can cure prematurity, but it does not cure an incomplete notice of appeal. Litigants must designate the final judgment (or qualifying final order) if they intend to capture merged interlocutory rulings.
Workplace-safety litigation: The decision reiterates that OSHA is primarily an administrative enforcement scheme; employees seeking workplace relief must look to other statutory or constitutional vehicles, not a direct OSHA claim.
COVID-19 mandate challenges: The panel’s merits discussion further stabilizes We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul as the governing Second Circuit template: neutral, generally applicable vaccine mandates tied to public health objectives are highly likely to survive rational-basis review.
Professional responsibility: The referral signals heightened appellate sensitivity to fabricated/nonexistent citations and client-authorization defects—issues that can independently trigger disciplinary scrutiny even when the merits are straightforward.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Final judgment rule (28 U.S.C. § 1291): Appellate courts typically review only “final” decisions—those that end the case in the district court. Partial dismissals usually are not immediately appealable.
Rule 54(b) certification: A district court can make some partial judgments immediately appealable by expressly directing entry of final judgment as to certain claims/parties. Without that, partial dismissals are generally nonfinal.
Premature appeal that “ripens”: Sometimes a notice of appeal filed too early becomes effective if the district court enters final judgment before the appeal is decided and no party is prejudiced.
Notice of appeal “designation” (Fed. R. App. P. 3): The notice must identify what is being appealed. If you omit an order (or fail to appeal the final judgment when needed), the appellate court may lack jurisdiction to review that order.
Mootness: If a challenged policy is no longer in effect and the court cannot grant practical relief, the dispute may be nonjusticiable.
No private right of action: Some statutes create rights but assign enforcement exclusively to the government. OSHA, as construed by the Second Circuit, is enforced by the Secretary of Labor rather than through employee lawsuits.
Neutral law of general applicability & rational-basis review: If a law does not target religion and applies generally, it is usually upheld so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest—an easy standard to satisfy.
Rule 11 and attorney discipline referrals: Rule 11 addresses improper filings in district court. Separately, appellate courts can refer attorneys for disciplinary review when briefing suggests serious misconduct (e.g., nonexistent citations or client-consent problems).

Conclusion

Ioio v. City of New York (though nonprecedential) is a tightly reasoned application of settled law with notable practical lessons. Procedurally, it illustrates that a premature appeal can become reviewable after final judgment, yet the appellate court’s jurisdiction remains bounded by what the notice of appeal actually designates. Substantively, it reaffirms two durable propositions in this litigation space: OSHA is not privately enforceable by employees, and neutral, generally applicable COVID-19 vaccine mandates are reviewed under—and typically survive—rational-basis scrutiny. Finally, the opinion’s referral of counsel to the Grievance Panel highlights the court’s intolerance for unreliable citations and potential client-authorization lapses, signaling that appellate advocacy must meet exacting accuracy and ethics standards independent of the merits.