Inventory Searches Need Not Be “All-or-Nothing”: Pausing an Inventory to Seek a Warrant Does Not Defeat the Inventory-Search Exception

I. Introduction

This appeal arose from a street-level investigation that expanded quickly: after a store owner reported an arson tied to suspected drug dealing, Miami Gardens police identified Javarese Antwane Holmes as the suspect. Officers stopped Holmes while he was driving, arrested him, and moved to impound his vehicle. When an officer opened the driver’s door, Detective Kelly Gomez observed a handgun “tucked between the seat and the center console.” Officers removed the firearm for safety. Rather than completing a full inventory immediately, Gomez paused further searching and sought a search warrant, after which officers found a backpack containing cocaine, oxycodone tablets, and dipentylone.

Based on the vehicle discoveries and arson-related facts, police obtained a warrant to search the residence Holmes had exited shortly before arrest. That search yielded another firearm, matching-caliber ammunition, drug packaging paraphernalia, and documents and mail linking Holmes to the bedroom where items were found.

Holmes was convicted of drug distribution and firearms offenses. On appeal he challenged: (1) suppression of the vehicle and residence evidence; (2) admission of drug-related text messages under Rule 404(b); (3) qualification of a DEA agent as an expert on firearms use by street-level dealers; and (4) sufficiency of the evidence for the firearms counts.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held:

• Vehicle search: The initial warrantless entry/observation fell within the inventory-search exception, and the exception was not defeated because officers stopped the inventory after locating the gun and sought a warrant before searching further.
• Residence warrant: The affidavit established a sufficient nexus between Holmes and the residence and between the residence and evidence of criminal activity, satisfying probable-cause requirements for a home search.
• Text messages (Rule 404(b)): The drug-related texts were admissible to prove intent (not propensity), were supported by sufficient evidence under Huddleston v. United States, and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by prejudice, especially given limiting instructions.
• Expert testimony (Rule 702): The DEA agent was qualified by experience and training to testify about drug-dealer practices, including firearm use, and the testimony was helpful and reliably grounded.
• Sufficiency: Evidence supported both (a) possession of a firearm “in furtherance” of drug trafficking under § 924(c), and (b) constructive possession of the residence firearm under § 922(g).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Inventory searches and “standardized criteria”

• South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976): The foundational premise that it can be reasonable for police, having lawful custody of a vehicle, to search it for caretaking reasons (protecting property, guarding against claims, ensuring safety). Holmes relies on the warrant preference; the court relies on Opperman to recognize the longstanding inventory doctrine.
• Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990): Requires “standardized criteria” so inventory searches are not a “ruse for a general rummaging.” Critically, Wells also rejects a requirement that inventories be “totally mechanical ‘all or nothing.’” The panel used this “not all-or-nothing” language as the keystone for its new, practical rule: stopping an inventory after discovering a gun to seek a warrant does not make the initial search unreasonable.
• United States v. Isaac, 987 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 2021): Supplies the Eleventh Circuit’s two-part inventory framework: authority to impound plus compliance with department procedures, coupled with a “good faith” caretaking justification. The court treated the opening of the door as part of the inventory process because the record supported that towing/inventory had been initiated “as soon as” Holmes was arrested.
• United States v. Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1982): Emphasizes the core anti-pretext function of standardized policies—preventing investigatory searches disguised as inventories. The Holmes panel invoked Bosby to conclude the pretext concern “falls away” when officers do not exceed ordinary inventory scope and a written policy exists.
• United States v. Mundy, 621 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2010): Persuasive support for the proposition that terminating a valid inventory search and shifting investigative gears does not retroactively invalidate the inventory already underway. The Eleventh Circuit used Mundy to reinforce that pausing to seek a warrant can be “more protective” of rights.

2. Probable cause and nexus to a residence

• Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983): Defines probable cause as a “fair probability” evidence will be found in a particular place. Holmes frames the warrant as lacking a nexus; the court applies Gates to evaluate probability, not certainty.
• United States v. Delgado, 981 F.3d 889 (11th Cir. 2020): States the two nexus components for a home warrant—(1) connection between defendant and residence and (2) link between residence and criminal activity. The panel used this as the controlling standard.
• United States v. Tate, 586 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 2009): Illustrates that officer observations (e.g., suspect, car, residence) can link a location to criminal activity. Holmes mirrors Tate in that the suspect was observed leaving the residence and using a vehicle tied to the investigation.
• United States v. Lockett, 674 F.2d 843 (11th Cir. 1982): Warns that a suspect’s past contraband possession alone does not justify searching a home; there must be probability of evidence at that home. The court distinguished Holmes from a mere “past possession” scenario because officers had contemporaneous links: the car, the exit-from-home observation, and evidence suggesting trafficking activity.
• United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 654 (11th Cir. 1983): “There is no need to establish the reliability of information received from the victim of a crime.” This supported reliance on the store owner’s identification and information connecting Holmes to the events.
• United States v. Albury, 782 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2015): Endorses the inference that contraband of a type typically hidden at home can support probable cause for a residence search. The court leveraged Albury to support the commonsense conclusion that additional evidence would likely be found where Holmes was living/operating.

3. Rule 404(b), sufficiency of proof of “other acts,” and Rule 403 balancing

• United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228 (11th Cir. 2013): Provides the three-part test for 404(b) admissibility (relevance to non-character issue; proof by preponderance; Rule 403). The panel applied this to admit the texts for intent.
• Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988): Requires sufficient evidence for the jury to find the extrinsic act occurred. The panel emphasized the messages’ provenance (Holmes’s phone, self-identification) and expert interpretation of slang.
• United States v. Green, 873 F.3d 846 (11th Cir. 2017): Clarifies the preponderance threshold for extrinsic-act proof.
• United States v. Fey, 89 F.4th 903 (11th Cir. 2023): Recognizes that detailed conversations planning illicit acts can suffice under Huddleston. The panel analogized the drug texts to such “detailed account[s].”
• United States v. Booker, 136 F.4th 1005 (11th Cir. 2025): Recent authority that prior drug dealing is highly probative of intent to distribute and not overly prejudicial when intent is disputed. This substantially undercut Holmes’s Rule 403 argument.
• United States v. Cardenas, 895 F.2d 1338 (11th Cir. 1990) and United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179 (11th Cir. 2021): Support the curative force of limiting instructions and the presumption juries follow them.

4. Expert testimony on drug trafficking practices (Rule 702)

• United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc): Sets the reliability framework and the requirement that experience-based experts explain how experience leads to conclusions and is reliably applied.
• United States v. Harrell, 751 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2014): Reiterates the need for qualification and competent expert testimony on intended subject matter.
• United States v. Garcia, 447 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2006): Holds that narcotics-dealer operations are a proper subject for expert testimony and that experienced agents may help juries understand drug-distribution methods. This directly supported admitting the “street-level dealers carry guns for protection” testimony.

5. “In furtherance” under § 924(c) and constructive possession under § 922(g)

• United States v. Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2002): Defines “in furtherance” as the firearm helping, promoting, or advancing drug trafficking, and lists non-exhaustive nexus factors (accessibility, proximity to drugs, circumstances, etc.). The panel applied these factors to Holmes’s center-console gun and backpack drugs.
• United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2008): Example where firearm location relative to drug activity supported “in furtherance.”
• United States v. Harris, 7 F.4th 1276 (11th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2013): Reinforce that protection-related firearm possession, supported by circumstances and expert testimony, can satisfy § 924(c).
• United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568 (11th Cir. 2011): Defines constructive possession as knowledge plus ability and intent to exercise dominion and control. The panel used this to uphold the residence firearm conviction based on the bedroom links, key access, and phone search for the gun model.
• United States v. Laines, 69 F.4th 1221 (11th Cir. 2023), United States v. Capers, 708 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2013): Supply the sufficiency-of-evidence review posture (view evidence in the government’s favor; uphold if any reasonable construction supports guilt beyond reasonable doubt).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The inventory-search rule is about scope and pretext, not maximal completion

The opinion’s most consequential reasoning is its treatment of “procedure compliance” under the inventory exception. The Miami Gardens policy required opening containers and inventorying contents. Detective Gomez stopped after the gun was seen and sought a warrant; Holmes argued this deviation destroyed the exception.

The panel reframed the question from “did the officer complete every policy step” to “did the officer act reasonably within the caretaking function and standardized framework.” Anchored in Florida v. Wells, the court held that the Fourth Amendment does not demand a “totally mechanical ‘all or nothing’” inventory. A pause to seek a warrant after discovering a gun is not the kind of deviation that suggests an investigatory “ruse,” particularly where (i) a written standardized policy exists and (ii) officers did not exceed the scope normally permitted.

2. Opening the car door was treated as a natural first act within an already-initiated inventory

Holmes argued the door-opening was a separate, warrantless “search before the inventory.” The court treated that argument as inconsistent with the factual record: Gomez requested towing/inventory assistance immediately after arrest, and nothing suggested the door was opened for any purpose other than beginning the inventory process. The opinion’s practical observation—opening the door is the obvious first step—matters because it resists attempts to atomize a caretaking search into hyper-technical segments to trigger suppression.

3. Residential probable cause rested on converging links, not a single silver bullet

The panel applied Illinois v. Gates and the Eleventh Circuit’s nexus formulation in United States v. Delgado. It credited multiple, reinforcing facts: a victim’s report (with presumed reliability under United States v. Johnson), the suspect’s observed exit from the residence, the suspect’s vehicles at or near the property, and the inference (supported by United States v. Albury) that drug-related evidence is commonly kept at home. This combination satisfied both required links: Holmes-to-residence and residence-to-criminal activity.

4. Text messages and expert testimony were treated as classic “intent” proof in drug cases

On Rule 404(b), the panel adhered to the established three-part test from United States v. Sterling. It found sufficient proof the “other acts” occurred under Huddleston v. United States because the texts were Holmes’s, used drug slang, and directed customers to an address. On Rule 403, it relied heavily on United States v. Booker to conclude prior drug dealing is “highly probative” of intent and not overly prejudicial, especially with limiting instructions (United States v. Cardenas, United States v. Colston).

On Rule 702, the panel deployed United States v. Garcia to confirm the subject matter is proper for expert testimony and United States v. Frazier to validate experience-based reasoning. It found the agent sufficiently explained how experience from hundreds of investigations supports the conclusion that street-level dealers carry guns for protection, and why that inference fit the case facts (gun location, drug packaging, accessibility).

5. “In furtherance” and constructive possession were resolved through circumstantial inferences the jury could reasonably draw

The panel’s sufficiency review turned on deference to reasonable inferences. Under United States v. Timmons, the car gun’s accessibility and proximity to packaged drugs supported the “in furtherance” nexus, reinforced by expert testimony consistent with United States v. Williams. Under United States v. Perez, the residence gun was supported by knowledge (phone search for exact model) and dominion/control (links to the bedroom, key access, observed exit from the home), notwithstanding other occupants and ownership complexities.

C. Impact

1. Fourth Amendment litigation: inventory-search challenges become harder when officers stop early

The decision is likely to be cited most for its inventory-search holding. Defendants often argue an inventory is invalid if officers fail to follow policy to the letter. Holmes narrows that argument where the deviation is rights-protective (stopping to get a warrant) rather than rights-invasive (expanding discretion to rummage). Going forward in the Eleventh Circuit, suppression motions premised on “they didn’t finish the inventory” will face this response: the Fourth Amendment does not require “all-or-nothing” completion, so long as standardized criteria exist and officers did not exceed permissible scope.

2. Police practice: incentivizes warrant-seeking without forfeiting existing exceptions

The opinion removes a perverse incentive: officers need not fear that seeking a warrant after discovering a firearm will retroactively invalidate the caretaking basis for the initial inventory. That may encourage more frequent transitions from exception-based searches to warrant-based searches when practicable.

3. Search-warrant nexus: reinforces “converging links” and commonsense inferences

Holmes continues a trend in Eleventh Circuit probable-cause cases that tolerate warrants supported by multiple modest links rather than a single direct observation of contraband inside a home. This may strengthen warrants where officers can show observed residency cues plus reasons evidence is likely stored there.

4. Evidentiary practice: texts and agent experts remain powerful tools

On Rule 404(b), Holmes aligns with United States v. Booker in treating prior dealing evidence as strongly probative of intent. On Rule 702, it validates a familiar prosecutorial technique: agents explaining why guns are tools of the drug trade. Expect Holmes to be invoked to defend agent testimony specifically tying firearm possession to drug-trafficking “furtherance.”

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Inventory search: A caretaking search of an impounded vehicle to list property, protect police from claims, and ensure safety. It is lawful when done under standardized policy and not as a pretext to investigate.
• “Standardized criteria” (from Florida v. Wells): Departments must have rules guiding inventories so officers are not free to rummage based on hunches.
• Probable cause (from Illinois v. Gates): Not certainty—just a fair probability that evidence will be found in the place to be searched.
• Nexus to a home (from United States v. Delgado): Officers must connect (1) the suspect to the residence and (2) the residence to criminal activity/evidence.
• Rule 404(b): Prior bad acts cannot be used to show “he’s the kind of person who does this,” but can be used for intent, knowledge, absence of mistake, etc.
• Rule 403: Even relevant evidence can be excluded if unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value; limiting instructions often reduce prejudice concerns.
• Rule 702: Experts may testify if qualified and reliable, and if their specialized knowledge helps the jury understand evidence or decide a fact.
• § 924(c) “in furtherance” (from United States v. Timmons): The gun must advance the drug crime (e.g., protection, intimidation, safeguarding drugs/money); proximity and accessibility often matter.
• Constructive possession (from United States v. Perez): Even without holding an item, someone can “possess” it if they know it’s there and have the ability and intent to control it.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Javarese Holmes is most significant for its published clarification of the inventory-search exception: an inventory need not be executed in a rigid, maximal, “all-or-nothing” fashion, and officers do not forfeit the exception merely by stopping after discovering a firearm and seeking a warrant before proceeding. The court also reaffirmed settled frameworks for home-warrant nexus, 404(b) intent evidence in drug prosecutions, experience-based law-enforcement expert testimony under Rule 702, and sufficiency review for § 924(c) and § 922(g) convictions.