Invalid Appeal Waiver Does Not Bar Suppression Review; De Bour Escalation Upheld Based on Dispatch/Order-of-Protection Information and Traffic-Violation Probable Cause

1. Introduction

In People v Williams (2026 NY Slip Op 04577 [4th Dept July 24, 2026]), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed a judgment of Erie County Court convicting Alexander Williams—upon a guilty plea—of attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 220.16 [1]).

Although the defendant pleaded guilty, he appealed on three principal grounds: (1) his waiver of the right to appeal was invalid; (2) the County Court erred in denying suppression of physical evidence recovered after (a) a pedestrian stop in Orchard Park and (b) a traffic stop in Collins; and (3) the sentence was unduly harsh and severe.

The decision is most notable for two recurring issues in New York criminal practice: (i) rigorous appellate scrutiny of appeal waivers, and (ii) structured review of police encounters under the De Bour framework (for street encounters) and Robinson (for traffic stops supported by probable cause), with emphasis that police conduct must be justified “at its inception and at every subsequent stage.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Appeal waiver: The Fourth Department agreed the waiver of the right to appeal was invalid (citing People v Thomas, People v Smith, and People v Harold), and therefore did not bar review of suppression or sentencing issues.
  • Suppression—pedestrian stop: The court held the escalating levels of intrusion—from initial approach through detention and arrest—were supported sequentially by the information known to police, including dispatch information about a domestic disturbance and an order of protection, proximity to the reported location, and the defendant’s conduct.
  • Suppression—traffic stop: The stop was justified because the officer observed a traffic violation (crossing the double yellow center line), and subsequent steps (ordering the defendant out, obtaining consent to frisk, and eventual arrests/search) were lawful as the investigation developed probable cause tied to drugs recovered from the passenger and related circumstances.
  • Sentence: The sentence was not unduly harsh or severe.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Appeal waiver doctrine

  • People v Thomas, 34 NY3d 545, 565-566 (2019), cert denied 589 US 1302 (2020): Central authority for careful policing of appeal waivers. The Fourth Department relied on it to invalidate the waiver here, thereby preserving appellate review of issues that would otherwise be foreclosed.
  • People v Smith, 237 AD3d 1558, 1559 (4th Dept 2025) and People v Harold, 233 AD3d 1503, 1503 (4th Dept 2024): Recent departmental applications of Thomas that reinforce the Fourth Department’s strict approach to determining whether a waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
  • People v McCracken, 217 AD3d 1543, 1544 (4th Dept 2023): Cited for the proposition that an invalid waiver does not preclude review of suppression contentions.

B. Pedestrian stop: the De Bour/Hollman/Moore structure

  • People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 (1976): Foundational four-level framework governing police-initiated street encounters. The court used De Bour both to categorize each stage and to test whether escalation was justified.
  • People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 184-185 (1992): Reinforces and operationalizes De Bour, especially regarding the scope and nature of permissible questioning at lower levels.
  • People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 498-499 (2006): Summarizes the four levels (request for information; common-law inquiry; forcible stop/detention; arrest) and their respective standards, providing the opinion’s organizing definition block.
  • People v Garcia, 20 NY3d 317, 322 (2012): Cited to describe the permissible content of “basic, nonthreatening questions” during a level one request for information.
  • People v Martinez, 80 NY2d 444, 448 (1992): Defines “reasonable suspicion,” the key threshold for a level three forcible stop and detention.
  • People v Howard, 129 AD3d 1654, 1655 (4th Dept 2015), lv denied 27 NY3d 999 (2016) and People v Savage, 137 AD3d 1637, 1639 (4th Dept 2016): Used comparatively to validate (or distinguish) the sufficiency of dispatch description/proximity facts as “objective, credible reason” and as escalatory justification.
  • People v Darby, 234 AD3d 708, 709-710 (2d Dept 2025), lv denied 43 NY3d 1007 (2025) and People v Dibble, 43 AD3d 1363, 1364 (4th Dept 2007), lv denied 9 NY3d 1032 (2008): Stand for the rule that during a level two encounter, police may request consent to search if the request is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the intrusion.
  • People v Atkinson, 185 AD3d 1438, 1439 (4th Dept 2020), lv denied 35 NY3d 1092 (2020); People v Thacker, 156 AD3d 1482, 1483 (4th Dept 2017), lv denied 31 NY3d 1018 (2018); and People v McKinley, 101 AD3d 1747, 1748 (4th Dept 2012), lv denied 21 NY3d 1017 (2013): Departmental applications supporting the conclusion that the facts here rose at least to founded suspicion (level two) and, given the order-of-protection context, to reasonable suspicion (level three).

C. Suppression burdens and appellate limits

  • People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 (1971): Allocates burdens in suppression litigation—defendant bears ultimate burden to prove illegality, but the People must go forward first to show the legality of police conduct.
  • People v Walker, 221 AD3d 1568, 1568 (4th Dept 2023): Applied to restate the Berrios framework.
  • People v Potter, 208 AD3d 802, 803 (2d Dept 2022), lv denied 39 NY3d 941 (2022): Cited for the defendant’s proof standard in suppression matters—preponderance of the evidence.
  • People v Gonzalez, 55 NY2d 720, 721-722 (1981), rearg denied 55 NY2d 1038 (1982), cert denied 456 US 1010 (1982) and People v Heverly, 230 AD3d 1534, 1535 (4th Dept 2024), lv denied 42 NY3d 1053 (2024): Support the principle that appellate review of suppression determinations is confined to the suppression hearing record.
  • People v Allen, 188 AD3d 1595, 1596 (4th Dept 2020), lv denied 36 NY3d 1117 (2021) and People v Wallace, 181 AD3d 1214, 1215 (4th Dept 2020): Provide the “justified at inception and at every subsequent stage” and “totality of circumstances” framing that the court repeatedly applied to both the pedestrian and traffic sequences.

D. Traffic stop and vehicle search doctrine

  • People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349 (2001): The governing New York rule that probable cause of a traffic violation justifies a stop, and officer motive (including pretext) is irrelevant.
  • People v Howard, 129 AD3d 1469, 1470 (4th Dept 2015), lv denied 26 NY3d 968 (2015), reconsideration denied 26 NY3d 1089 (2015): Cited for deference to suppression-court credibility findings unless clearly unsupported by the record.
  • People v Addison, 199 AD3d 1321, 1322 (4th Dept 2021): Supports the proposition that crossing the double yellow center line (VTL §§ 1120[a], 1128[a]) provides a lawful basis for a traffic stop.
  • People v Ibrahim, 194 AD3d 1378, 1379 (4th Dept 2021), lv denied 37 NY3d 992 (2021): Cited for authority that once a vehicle is lawfully stopped, officers may direct the driver to exit.
  • People v Bethea, 191 AD3d 1487, 1488 (4th Dept 2021), lv denied 36 NY3d 118 (2021) and People v Booth, 158 AD3d 1253, 1255 (4th Dept 2018), lv denied 31 NY3d 1078 (2018): Support the conclusion that once drugs were recovered from the passenger, the police had probable cause to arrest and to search the vehicle as part of the developing circumstances.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Invalid waiver restores appellate review

The Fourth Department first invalidated the appeal waiver under People v Thomas and its departmental progeny (People v Smith; People v Harold). That determination was dispositive on the scope of review: because the waiver could not be enforced, the court reached the merits of suppression and sentence severity.

B. Pedestrian stop: stepwise justification under De Bour

Applying People v De Bour (as summarized by People v Moore and People v Hollman), the court assessed whether each escalation was supported by the required quantum of suspicion:

  1. Level one (request for information): The officer had an “objective, credible reason” to approach and ask “what was going on” and for pedigree information because dispatch described a suspect in a domestic disturbance walking eastbound on Southwestern Boulevard, and the defendant matched the description and was near the reported location (supported by People v Howard [129 AD3d 1654] and contrasted with People v Savage).
  2. Level two (common-law right of inquiry): The encounter could be intensified because the officer had a “founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot” based on dispatch information that the defendant was subject to a no-offensive-contact order of protection, and had allegedly pulled off the victim’s wig and taken her phone; the officer also encountered the defendant within about 50 yards of the dispatched address and saw no other matching pedestrians. At this level, the officer could request consent to search, so long as reasonably related to the circumstances (People v Darby; People v Dibble).
  3. Level three (forcible stop/detention): Forcible detention required “reasonable suspicion” (defined in People v Martinez). The court held reasonable suspicion existed that the defendant committed a crime—namely, violation of the no-offensive-contact order of protection—thereby justifying attempted detention.
  4. Level four (arrest): The court held probable cause arose from information obtained during the investigation and the defendant’s resistance to detention. Under the Allen principle, the encounter remained lawful at every stage, so physical evidence was not suppressible.

C. Traffic stop: probable cause of a VTL violation and lawful escalation

Under People v Robinson, probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred makes the stop constitutional regardless of the officer’s subjective motivation. Crediting the officer’s testimony (with deference to suppression-court credibility findings under People v Howard [129 AD3d 1469]), the court found the stop justified because the vehicle crossed the double yellow center line (VTL §§ 1120[a], 1128[a]) (see People v Addison).

Once the stop was lawful, ordering the defendant out was lawful (People v Ibrahim). Subsequent investigative developments—bulge observed, consent to pat-down, orders of protection learned, inconsistent/false identifying information about the passenger, the passenger’s statement about attempting to obtain drugs, and recovery of drugs from the passenger—culminated in probable cause to arrest and to search the vehicle, including recovery of scales with drug residue (supported by People v Bethea and People v Booth). Again, the court emphasized legality “at its inception and at every subsequent stage.”

D. Sentence review

Even though the invalid waiver allowed review, the Fourth Department concluded the sentence was not unduly harsh or severe, and therefore declined to modify it.

3.3 Impact

  • Appeal waivers remain fragile on appellate review: The decision continues a strong Fourth Department trend of refusing to enforce waivers that do not satisfy People v Thomas. Practically, this increases the likelihood that suppression and sentencing claims will receive merits review despite guilty pleas.
  • Order-of-protection and domestic-dispatch information can support rapid De Bour escalation: The opinion signals that dispatch information describing a suspect, combined with close geographic/temporal proximity and knowledge of an order of protection, can support progression from level one through level three—particularly where the suspected offense is a violation of an order of protection (a point likely to recur in domestic incident policing).
  • Robinson continues to insulate traffic stops from “pretext” arguments: By reiterating that officer motivation is irrelevant once there is probable cause of a traffic violation, the opinion reinforces the centrality of objective traffic observations in sustaining stops that lead to more serious criminal investigations.
  • “Every subsequent stage” analysis is outcome-determinative in suppression litigation: The court’s repeated reliance on People v Allen underscores that suppression disputes often turn less on the initial encounter and more on whether each incremental step is supported by the information acquired up to that point.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Waiver of the right to appeal
A defendant may give up (waive) the right to appeal as part of a plea bargain, but only if the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. If the waiver is invalid, the appellate court can still review issues that a valid waiver might have barred.
Suppression of physical evidence
Evidence can be excluded (“suppressed”) if it was obtained through unconstitutional police conduct (e.g., an unlawful stop or search). Courts analyze whether police actions were lawful at each step.
De Bour levels (street encounters)
New York divides police encounters into four levels requiring increasing justification:
  1. Level 1: Request for information—needs an objective, credible reason.
  2. Level 2: Common-law inquiry—needs founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
  3. Level 3: Forcible stop/detention—needs reasonable suspicion the person committed a felony or misdemeanor.
  4. Level 4: Arrest—needs probable cause.
Factual burdens at a suppression hearing
The People must first come forward with evidence that police conduct was lawful; the defendant ultimately must prove illegality by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not).
Probable cause for a traffic stop (Robinson rule)
If an officer has probable cause that a traffic law was violated, the stop is valid—even if the officer’s real goal was to investigate something else.

5. Conclusion

People v Williams reinforces two key themes in New York appellate criminal practice: (1) appellate courts—especially the Fourth Department—will scrutinize appeal waivers closely and invalidate them under People v Thomas where appropriate, preserving merits review; and (2) suppression outcomes frequently hinge on disciplined, stage-by-stage justification—under De Bour for pedestrian encounters and Robinson for traffic stops—ensuring police conduct is lawful “at its inception and at every subsequent stage.” Here, despite an invalid appeal waiver, the Fourth Department found both police encounters lawful and affirmed the conviction and sentence.