Internal Safety Policies and Independent-Contractor Injuries: No Kansas Tort Duty Without Knowledge, Retained-Control Causation, or § 324A Reliance

1. Introduction

In Chilelli v. Signify North America Corporation (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 2026), Bradley J. Chilelli—an employee of demolition contractor Hosea Project Movers (Hosea)—sued Signify North America Corporation (Signify) for common-law negligence after he fell through an opening on a catwalk during demolition of a large gas oxy furnace at Signify’s Salina, Kansas facility, sustaining catastrophic injuries including paralysis.

The central issues were (i) whether Signify owed Chilelli a duty under Kansas negligence and premises-liability principles when the hazard arose from demolition work performed by an independent contractor, and (ii) whether Signify’s internal contractor-safety materials (SOCSMR) or its asserted authority to stop unsafe work could supply the missing duty. A subsidiary appellate issue challenged the district court’s denial of leave to exceed local page limits in summary-judgment briefing.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Signify. It held that, under Kansas law, Chilelli failed to establish a duty because there was no evidence Signify had actual (or constructive) knowledge of the specific exposed opening before the accident, and because the risk was “intimately connected” with the very demolition work Hosea was hired to perform. The court also rejected the argument that Signify’s internal safety requirements created a tort duty absent reliance or acceptance under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A. Finally, it found no abuse of discretion in enforcing the district court’s local briefing page limits.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Markley v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 59 F.4th 1072 (10th Cir. 2023): Cited for the summary-judgment lens—viewing facts and reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. It framed the court’s approach to the record, but did not alter the legal duty analysis.
  • New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. TSG Ski & Golf, LLC, 128 F.4th 1337 (10th Cir. 2025): Provided the de novo standard of review for summary judgment, reinforcing that the appellate court independently assesses whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
  • Anderson v. Com. Constr. Servs., Inc., 531 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2008): Supplied the choice-of-law rule leading to application of Kansas law because the accident occurred in Kansas.
  • D.W. v. Bliss, 112 P.3d 232 (Kan. 2005): Anchored the negligence elements under Kansas law, emphasizing that duty is indispensable—without duty, there can be no breach.
  • Brock v. Richmond-Berea Cemetery Dist., 957 P.2d 505 (Kan. 1998): Set the knowledge requirement for landowner liability arising from dangerous conditions: actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge based on the condition existing long enough that ordinary care would discover it. This was decisive because Chilelli conceded no evidence of Signify’s actual knowledge and offered no evidence of employee awareness.
  • Aspelin v. Mounkes, 476 P.2d 620 (Kan. 1970): Supplied the independent-contractor limitation: an owner generally has no duty to protect an independent contractor from risks “arising from or intimately connected with defects in the premises which the contractor has undertaken to repair.” The panel treated the exposed hole as a risk created by (and inseparable from) removing the funnels—work Hosea was hired to do—placing the accident squarely within Aspelin’s rationale.
  • Honeycutt ex rel. Phillips v. City of Wichita, 836 P.2d 1128 (Kan. 1992) and Gooch v. Bethel A.M.E. Church, 792 P.2d 993 (Kan. 1990): These cases controlled the “assumed duty” theory via Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A. The panel relied on Gooch’s threshold requirement that the recipient of services must accept them in lieu of or in addition to its own obligation. With no showing that Hosea or Chilelli knew of or relied upon SOCSMR, internal policy could not be transmuted into a tort duty.
  • Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2007) and Stenson v. Edmonds, 86 F.4th 870 (10th Cir. 2023): Defined abuse-of-discretion review for “supervision of litigation” decisions, including briefing limits. These authorities supported affirmance because the page limit was evenly applied and Chilelli failed to identify arguments he could not make within the limit.
  • Hernandez v. George, 793 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1986) and Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980): Reinforced deference to district courts in interpreting and applying local rules (here, D. Kan. Local R. 7.1(d)(2)).

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Duty turned on knowledge and on the contractor-risk rule.

    Applying D.W. v. Bliss and Brock v. Richmond-Berea Cemetery Dist., the court treated knowledge of the specific hazard as foundational to any landowner duty for a dangerous condition. Chilelli conceded no evidence that Signify’s project leader (or any Signify employee) knew of the exposed opening pre-accident, and he presented no constructive-knowledge evidence (e.g., duration, inspections, reports) sufficient to impute knowledge under ordinary care.

    Even beyond knowledge, the court applied Aspelin v. Mounkes to classify the opening as a risk “intimately connected” with Hosea’s demolition work: removing the funnels necessarily exposed the holes. That framing is important: it characterizes the hazard not as a latent premises defect the owner failed to remedy, but as a work-created or work-uncovered condition inherent in the contracted task. Under that view, the owner’s duty to protect the contractor’s employees from that risk is substantially curtailed.

  2. “Retained control” arguments were not enough on this record.

    Chilelli argued Signify “retained control” over safety because its representative could stop unsafe work and did stop work after the accident. The panel treated this as insufficient to create duty in the absence of evidence tying Signify’s control to the creation, knowledge, or management of the specific hazard before the incident. In effect, generalized stop-work authority did not substitute for proof that Signify directed the method of work or undertook a safety role that displaced or supplemented Hosea’s own safety obligations in a way recognized by Kansas tort doctrine.

  3. Internal safety policies did not create a tort duty without § 324A reliance/acceptance.

    The post-accident narrative referenced SOCSMR and suggested they had not been implemented locally due to resource/experience limits. Chilelli contended SOCSMR applied pre-accident. The court assumed arguendo that SOCSMR applied, but held that “Signify’s own internal safety policies, absent some showing that there was reliance on Signify’s implementing them, do not create a tort duty,” citing Honeycutt ex rel. Phillips v. City of Wichita and Gooch v. Bethel A.M.E. Church.

    This is a significant doctrinal move: it separates (i) corporate policy as an internal governance tool from (ii) an “undertaking” to render services to another that can trigger § 324A liability. Without evidence that Hosea or Chilelli knew of SOCSMR and accepted Signify’s safety services “in lieu of, or in addition to” their own obligations, SOCSMR remained non-tort-generative.

  4. Open-and-obvious was left undecided.

    Because the panel agreed there was no duty, it did not reach the district court’s alternative ground that the hazard was open and obvious.

  5. Page-limit ruling fell comfortably within discretion.

    Under Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A. and Stenson v. Edmonds, the panel upheld the denial of extra pages, emphasizing equal application of the rule and the absence of prejudice—Chilelli ultimately filed within the limit and did not identify any foregone argument.

C. Impact

  • Reinforces owner defenses in contractor-injury suits under Kansas law.

    The decision underscores that, where a hazard is produced by or inseparable from the contracted work (demolition, repair, deconstruction), Aspelin v. Mounkes remains a powerful limitation on duty, particularly when the owner lacks pre-incident knowledge of the specific condition.

  • Limits “internal policy” theories absent evidence of reliance.

    Corporate safety manuals, minimum requirements, and post-incident acknowledgments of safety gaps will not, standing alone, establish duty. Plaintiffs will need evidence that the owner actually undertook safety services for the contractor and that the contractor accepted or relied on that undertaking as required by Gooch v. Bethel A.M.E. Church and the § 324A framework recognized in Honeycutt ex rel. Phillips v. City of Wichita.

  • Signals what future plaintiffs must prove.

    Future cases are likely to focus on: documented owner knowledge (inspections, reports), the degree of owner direction over work methods (not merely stop-work authority), and affirmative evidence of § 324A “undertaking” plus acceptance/reliance.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Duty”
A legal obligation to act with reasonable care toward someone. Kansas negligence claims fail at the outset if duty is not established.
Actual vs. constructive knowledge
Actual knowledge means the owner truly knew of the hazard. Constructive knowledge means the hazard existed long enough (or was so discoverable) that reasonable care would have revealed it.
Independent contractor “intimately connected” rule
If the danger is bound up with the work the contractor was hired to do (e.g., the opening created/exposed by removing components), the owner generally has no duty to protect the contractor from that very risk.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (“assumed duty” / “negligent undertaking”)
If someone undertakes to provide services to another (often safety-related) and performs negligently, they can be liable to third persons—but Kansas cases require that the recipient accepted the services in lieu of, or in addition to, its own duty (often shown through knowledge, reliance, and integration of the undertaking into the recipient’s practices).
Summary judgment
A pretrial ruling that ends the case when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to win as a matter of law.

5. Conclusion

Chilelli v. Signify North America Corporation affirms that, under Kansas law, a landowner is not liable for an independent contractor’s injury when the hazard is intimately connected with the contracted work and the owner lacks pre-accident knowledge of the specific dangerous condition. It also tightens the boundary between internal safety policies and tort duty: absent evidence of an accepted, relied-upon undertaking under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (as articulated in Honeycutt ex rel. Phillips v. City of Wichita and Gooch v. Bethel A.M.E. Church), corporate safety requirements do not themselves create a duty. In practical terms, the opinion steers future litigation toward concrete proof of knowledge, control over work methods, and reliance-based undertakings—rather than post-incident safety narratives or generalized stop-work authority.