Intermittent Treatment and Defiance of Court Orders Justify Denial of an Improvement Period and Termination Where Domestic Violence Exposure Causes Serious Emotional Injury

1. Introduction

In re J.C. and E.C. (W. Va. Jan. 29, 2026) is a memorandum decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirming the Circuit Court of Nicholas County’s termination of Mother K.F.’s parental and custodial rights to J.C. and E.C.. The case centers on whether the mother—against a backdrop of domestic violence, prior court-order violations, and later-initiated mental-health treatment—was entitled to a post-adjudicatory improvement period and whether termination was necessary and lawful.

The children’s father is described as nonabusing, and the permanency plan is for the children to remain in his custody. The mother’s appeal raised two principal issues: (1) whether the circuit court abused its discretion by denying an improvement period under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), and (2) whether the circuit court erred in terminating parental rights under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) given the evidence of the mother’s claimed progress.

A notable procedural backdrop is that these same proceedings previously came before the Court. In In re B.H., No. 23-599, 2024 WL 4382118 (W. Va. Sept. 24, 2024), the Court vacated earlier adjudicatory and dispositional orders as to J.C. and E.C. and remanded for proper adjudication because the record at that time did not establish their exposure to domestic violence. On remand, the case returned with forensic-interview disclosures directly linking the children to domestic violence in the mother’s home.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the March 3, 2025 dispositional order terminating the mother’s parental and custodial rights. It held that the circuit court acted within its discretion in denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period because the mother did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that she was likely to fully participate, particularly in light of her intermittent therapy participation, minimal engagement with DHS, and history of violating court orders.

The Court further held that termination was supported by findings that there was no reasonable likelihood the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future and that termination served the children’s welfare and best interests, especially given evidence of serious emotional injury (including PTSD) associated with domestic violence exposure.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • In re B.H., No. 23-599, 2024 WL 4382118 (W. Va. Sept. 24, 2024)
    Role in this decision: This earlier appeal established the case’s procedural reset: the prior adjudication/disposition as to J.C. and E.C. was vacated because the record did not show their exposure to domestic violence. On remand, DHS addressed that evidentiary gap via the second amended petition and forensic interviews. The current decision reflects how remedial pleading and proof on remand can cure an appellate-identified deficiency and support renewed adjudication and disposition.
  • Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)
    Rule applied: Sets the appellate standard of review in abuse and neglect cases: factual findings are reviewed for clear error; conclusions of law de novo. The Court used this framework to defer to the circuit court’s credibility determinations and fact-bound assessments of the mother’s participation and progress.
  • In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002)
    Rule applied: Reinforces that granting an improvement period lies within the circuit court’s discretion and need not be granted when no improvement is likely. The Court invoked this to uphold denial where the record suggested limited engagement and ongoing risk.
  • In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 216, 599 S.E.2d 631, 639 (2004)
    Rule applied: A parent is not “unconditionally entitled to an improvement period.” This case supported the Court’s rejection of an entitlement-style argument based on the mother’s claimed recent compliance.
  • State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 669 n.9, 461 S.E.2d 163, 175 n.9 (1995)
    Rule applied: Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence; that is the trier of fact’s role. The Court used this to dispose of the mother’s claim that the circuit court was “dismissive” of her mental-health efforts.
  • In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, --, 914 S.E.2d 701, 706, 707 (2025) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177(1996))
    Rule applied: The reviewing court does not reweigh evidence and must affirm if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record. This “plausibility” and deference principle anchored the affirmance on both the improvement-period and termination rulings.
  • Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980))
    Rule applied: Termination may be ordered without less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood that conditions of abuse/neglect can be substantially corrected. The Court applied this to uphold termination based on serious emotional injury and insufficient remediation.
  • Syl. Pt. 4, in part, In re N.H., 241 W. Va. 648, 827 S.E.2d 436 (2019) (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, in part, In re B.H., 233 W. Va. 57, 754 S.E.2d 734 (2014))
    Rule applied: The controlling standard in disposition remains the child’s best interests. This framed the Court’s emphasis on permanency, stability, and the children’s expressed desire not to see the mother.
  • Syl. Pt. 8, in part, In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129
    Rule applied: “The welfare of the [child] is the polar star” guiding custody decisions. The Court invoked this principle to validate the circuit court’s focus on the children’s emotional safety and continuity of care.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Post-adjudicatory improvement period: discretion plus a participation showing

The improvement-period dispute turned on W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), which permits (but does not require) a post-adjudicatory improvement period when the parent demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is likely to fully participate.

The mother emphasized favorable testimony: a nurse practitioner described her as stable and medication-compliant, and a therapist described several sessions and the mother’s expressed remorse. But the circuit court credited countervailing indicators of limited commitment and ongoing noncompliance: a five-month gap in therapy, minimal contact with the CPS worker, child-support arrears, a history of disregarding court orders, and a then-recent allegation of violating a no-contact directive.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning is less about whether the mother showed some improvement, and more about appellate posture and statutory design: improvement periods are not a right, and when the circuit court’s assessment is “plausible in light of the record,” the Supreme Court will not second-guess the weighing of evidence. The decision therefore reinforces that recent compliance—particularly if late, short-lived, or not corroborated by records (as with the Ohio therapy history)—may be insufficient to compel an improvement period.

B. Termination: “no reasonable likelihood” and serious emotional injury from domestic violence exposure

The termination analysis focused on W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), which authorizes termination upon findings that (1) there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future, and (2) termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

The Court highlighted W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(5), which describes circumstances constituting “no reasonable likelihood,” including where an abusing parent has repeatedly or seriously injured the child emotionally and the degree of family stress and the risk of further abuse are so great that resources would be ineffective to resolve the family problems.

The record on remand contained direct evidence of the children’s exposure to domestic violence in the mother’s home (forensic interview statements) and professional testimony connecting that exposure to trauma: E.C. had PTSD; the therapist described emotional harm and that the children unequivocally did not want contact with the mother. Against that, the mother offered a narrative of change and stability, but the circuit court found it too little, too late, and too inconsistent to overcome the established pattern and the children’s demonstrated needs.

Importantly, the Court also grounded its affirmance in the enduring dispositional touchstone: the best interests of the child. Even where a nonabusing parent already provides a stable home, termination can still be justified to secure permanence and emotional safety where the abusive/neglectful parent’s conduct and noncompliance show that continued legal ties and potential contact threaten the child’s welfare.

3.3 Impact

  • Domestic violence exposure as emotional injury: The decision underscores that children’s exposure to domestic violence can support adjudication and termination through serious emotional injury findings, even absent physical injury to the child, particularly when the child expresses fear and clinicians identify trauma symptoms (e.g., PTSD).
  • Late-stage progress may not compel an improvement period: Mental-health stabilization and short-term therapy engagement can be credited as positive, but this case illustrates that circuit courts may still deny an improvement period when participation is intermittent, the parent’s engagement with DHS is minimal, and there is a history of disregarding court orders.
  • Appellate deference is decisive: By leaning heavily on State v. Guthrie and In re D.S./In re Tiffany Marie S., the Court signals that many improvement-period and disposition appeals will turn on whether the circuit court’s narrative is “plausible,” not whether a different view of the evidence was possible.
  • Remand strategy matters: After In re B.H., No. 23-599, 2024 WL 4382118 (W. Va. Sept. 24, 2024), DHS supplemented the pleadings and proof with forensic interviews to establish exposure. Practitioners should note how evidentiary deficiencies identified on appeal may be cured through amended petitions and targeted testimony on remand.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Post-adjudicatory improvement period
A court-supervised opportunity (after the court has found abuse/neglect) for a parent to complete services—therapy, classes, evaluations, compliance steps—to remedy the problems. It is discretionary and requires a strong showing the parent will participate.
Clear and convincing evidence
A heightened burden of proof—more than “more likely than not,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Here, the parent must strongly persuade the court she is likely to fully participate.
Stipulation at adjudication
The parent agrees that allegations are true (or agrees the evidence is sufficient) so the court can adjudicate without a contested evidentiary hearing on those points. In this case, the mother stipulated to the allegations in the second amended petition.
No reasonable likelihood conditions can be substantially corrected
A statutory conclusion that the parent is unlikely to fix the problems in a timeframe compatible with the child’s needs. West Virginia law expressly includes serious emotional injury to the child and high ongoing family stress/risk as grounds for this conclusion.
Less restrictive alternatives
Options short of termination (e.g., guardianship, custody to a relative, or continued improvement periods). Under the cited syllabus points, if “no reasonable likelihood” exists, termination may proceed without trying those alternatives.
Standards of review: clear error vs. de novo
“Clear error” is deferential to the trial judge’s fact-finding; “de novo” means the appellate court gives fresh review to legal questions. This case largely turned on deference to the circuit court’s fact-bound evaluation of participation, credibility, and risk.

5. Conclusion

In re J.C. and E.C. reaffirms a practical rule of West Virginia abuse-and-neglect jurisprudence: a parent’s recent strides in mental-health treatment do not compel an improvement period, nor prevent termination, when the circuit court reasonably finds intermittent engagement, limited cooperation with DHS, prior court-order violations, and—most critically—serious emotional injury to the children arising from domestic violence exposure.

The decision’s broader significance lies in its synthesis of (1) discretionary improvement-period doctrine, (2) statutory “no reasonable likelihood” findings rooted in emotional harm, and (3) the paramount “best interests of the child” standard—applied here to prioritize permanence and psychological safety for children already placed with a stable, nonabusing parent.