Date: Mar 12, 2026

Interlocutory Qualified-Immunity Appeals Require Fact Concessions or Unambiguous Video; Otherwise the Sixth Circuit Lacks § 1291 Jurisdiction (and Pendent State-Law Review Falls Too)

Introduction

Brayton James Groth v. Nicholas Hill, Scott McIntyre, and Raymond Faes arises from a July 10, 2021 domestic-violence response at the Groths’ home in Birmingham, Michigan. After officers entered the home and a physical struggle ensued, Groth brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Fourth Amendment excessive force, and related Michigan tort claims for assault and battery and malicious prosecution.

The district court denied summary judgment and rejected qualified immunity for Officers Nicholas Hill and Raymond Faes on the excessive-force claims (and denied summary judgment on the state-law claims). The officers filed an interlocutory appeal, seeking immediate appellate review of the qualified-immunity denials and, via pendent appellate jurisdiction, the state-law rulings.

The key appellate issue was jurisdictional: whether the Sixth Circuit could review a denial of qualified immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 when the defendants refused to accept the plaintiff-favorable version of disputed facts and the body-camera video was obstructed or inconclusive at critical moments.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit dismissed the entire appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Applying Johnson v. Jones and Sixth Circuit en banc precedent (Williams v. Mehra), the court held it may review an interlocutory qualified-immunity denial only when the defendants (i) accept the plaintiff’s version of genuinely disputed facts for purposes of appeal, or (ii) rely on unambiguous video evidence that “blatantly contradict[s]” the district court’s account (Scott v. Harris; Jackson-Gibson v. Beasley). Because the officers instead argued a fact-bound narrative of “active resistance” and “violence,” and the video did not clearly resolve the disputes, the court lacked § 1291 jurisdiction.

With no independent basis for federal appellate jurisdiction, the court also declined to reach the state-law issues; and it further noted that the malicious-prosecution claim was not “inextricably intertwined” with any properly reviewable federal issue (Summers v. Leis).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Johnson v. Jones and Williams v. Mehra: The jurisdictional backbone. Together they establish that interlocutory review of a qualified-immunity denial is limited to “neat abstract issues[] of law” and is unavailable when the appeal hinges on which side’s facts are true. The opinion treats defendants’ refusal to accept plaintiff-favorable facts as dispositive because it would require the appellate court to reweigh evidence—precisely what Johnson forbids.
Scott v. Harris and Jackson-Gibson v. Beasley: These cases supply the exception: video can control only when it “blatantly contradict[s]” the district court’s fact account. Here, the court found the footage “obstructed or inconclusive at critical moments,” so the Scott pathway to jurisdiction was closed.
Heeter v. Bowers, Barry v. O'Grady, Adams v. Blount County, Thompson v. Grida: Sixth Circuit reinforcement that the court “consistently declined to exercise jurisdiction” when factual disputes are crucial. Adams v. Blount County is particularly influential because it involved the same kind of dispositive factual dispute—how much resistance occurred—and similarly resulted in dismissal for lack of interlocutory jurisdiction.
Bunkley v. City of Detroit: Supplies an important structural rule in multi-force encounters: the court should assess jurisdiction “as to each use of force.” The panel followed that method (takedown, two dart deployments, two drive stuns) and found each segment still fact-bound.
Feagin v. Mansfield Police Dep't (and Barnes v. Felix): Defendants argued Feagin allowed jurisdiction via “cascading legal questions.” The court distinguished Feagin because there the video “vividly t[old] the tale” and left few facts in dispute. Barnes is used to underscore that prior events can color an officer’s interpretation of ambiguous conduct—but that analytical point cannot be applied on interlocutory review when the prior events themselves are disputed.
Elder v. Holloway: The court used Elder to reject a forfeiture theory: a plaintiff does not lose the “clearly established” argument for failing to cite specific analogous cases at summary judgment. This matters because the panel—although ultimately jurisdiction-barred—signaled it would consider relevant authority identified on appeal and by the district court.
Reed v. Campbell County, Coffey v. Carroll, Harris v. Langley, Saalim v. Walmart, Inc., Osborn v. City of Columbus, Shumate v. City of Adrian, Goodwin v. City of Painesville, Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, Bell v. City of Southfield, Hagans v. Franklin County Sheriff's Off., Caie v. W. Bloomfield Twp., Perez v. Simpson: These cases frame the merits landscape (passive vs. active resistance; tasing reasonableness; ability to comply while pinned; warnings and opportunities to comply). But the opinion’s key move is procedural: it explains that applying these merits rules requires resolving disputed facts the court cannot touch at this interlocutory stage.
Hoover v. Due: Cited in a footnote to reject, as a “clearly established” matter, an exigency theory when the alleged victim is already outside and no one inside faces immediate harm—again emphasizing that defendants’ exigency theory depended on contested “immediate aggression.”
Hooks v. City of Warren and Summers v. Leis: These govern pendent appellate jurisdiction. Without a properly reviewable qualified-immunity issue, pendent review fails (Hooks v. City of Warren), and malicious prosecution is not “inextricably intertwined” in any event (Summers v. Leis).
Background standards also appear throughout: Pearson v. Callahan (sequencing), Wright v. City of Euclid and Romero v. City of Lansing (officer-by-officer and use-by-use analysis), Graham v. Connor (objective reasonableness), Chaney-Snell v. Young and Malley v. Briggs (clearly-established rigor).

Legal Reasoning

The § 1291 gatekeeping rule controls the case. The court began with jurisdiction, not the merits: under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity is reviewable only as a legal question, not a factual one. Because qualified-immunity analysis is fact-sensitive (especially in excessive-force cases), jurisdiction exists only if the appellate court can answer the legal question on the plaintiff-favorable facts, or if video removes factual dispute.
No factual concession; no “Scott video.” The officers explicitly refused at oral argument to concede the plaintiff-favorable factual posture. They instead argued that Groth showed “immediate aggression” and “active resistance,” even though the district court found a jury could see at most passive resistance and the video was obstructed at key moments. Since the video did not “blatantly contradict” the district court’s account, the court could not substitute its own fact findings.
Use-by-use jurisdiction still fails. Even applying Bunkley v. City of Detroit to parse the encounter into discrete uses of force (takedown; taser deployments; drive stuns), each challenged act turned on disputed factual predicates: whether Groth struck or charged Faes at the doorway; whether commands were given and heard; whether Groth was physically capable of producing his hands while pinned; and whether the “resistance” was active or merely noncompliance under physical constraint.
Merits discussion operates as a “why jurisdiction is missing” explanation. The panel’s discussion of cases like Reed v. Campbell County, Saalim v. Walmart, Inc., and Shumate v. City of Adrian functions less as a merits holding and more as a demonstration that the outcome could change depending on which factual version a jury accepts—precisely the condition that defeats interlocutory jurisdiction under Johnson v. Jones.
Pendent appellate jurisdiction collapses with the federal issue. Because the court lacked independent jurisdiction to review qualified immunity, it could not piggyback review of state-law assault and battery or malicious prosecution (Hooks v. City of Warren). And malicious prosecution failed the “inextricably intertwined” test separately (Summers v. Leis), especially as to McIntyre, who was not even part of the excessive-force appeal.

Impact

Although “not recommended for publication,” the opinion clarifies (and strongly signals) several practical rules for Sixth Circuit practice:

Appellants must choose: either concede the plaintiff-favorable version of genuinely disputed facts for interlocutory review, or demonstrate that video “blatantly contradict[s]” the district court’s account. Refusing both routes is jurisdictionally fatal.
Video evidence is not a talisman. Bodycam footage supports interlocutory jurisdiction only when it is clear on the critical disputed points; obstructed angles, darkness, low resolution, and officer-body occlusions defeat the Scott exception.
Multi-force encounters do not guarantee partial review. Even though Sixth Circuit law allows use-by-use parsing (Bunkley v. City of Detroit), defendants still need a reviewable factual posture for each discrete use of force.
Pendent state-law appeals remain tightly constrained. Without a properly reviewable qualified-immunity issue, state tort rulings will not be reviewed early—and malicious prosecution is especially unlikely to qualify as “inextricably intertwined.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified immunity: A defense shielding officers from damages unless (1) they violated the Constitution and (2) the violated right was “clearly established” at the time (i.e., existing precedent put the unlawfulness beyond debate).
Interlocutory appeal: An appeal taken before the case ends in the trial court. Denials of qualified immunity can sometimes be appealed immediately, but only as to legal questions—not to relitigate disputed facts.
“Accepting plaintiff’s facts for purposes of appeal”: A procedural stance: the officer argues, “Even if everything the plaintiff says is true, I still win on qualified immunity.” Without that stance (or dispositive video), the appellate court cannot take the case midstream.
“Blatantly contradicts” video (Scott v. Harris): A narrow rule: only when video clearly disproves the trial court’s factual view may the appellate court substitute the video’s facts. Ambiguous footage does not qualify.
Passive vs. active resistance: “Active resistance” involves physical struggle, flight, threats, or conduct that reasonably signals danger or intentional obstruction; “passive resistance” can include noncompliance, verbal اعتراض, or limited movement—especially where compliance may be impossible (e.g., while pinned). This distinction often determines whether taser force is reasonable, but here it was disputed and therefore jurisdictionally off-limits.
Dart-mode vs. drive-stun taser use: Dart-mode fires prongs to deliver neuromuscular incapacitation; drive-stun applies pain compliance by direct contact. The opinion treats each deployment as a distinct use of force for analysis and jurisdiction.
Pendent appellate jurisdiction: A limited doctrine allowing review of additional issues only when the appellate court already has jurisdiction over a primary issue and the extra issues are tightly connected (“inextricably intertwined”). Without a reviewable qualified-immunity issue, pendent review fails.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision establishes a clear procedural lesson: in interlocutory qualified-immunity appeals, defendants cannot litigate their preferred factual narrative unless they can point to video that conclusively resolves the disputes. Where officers refuse to accept the district court’s plaintiff-favorable facts and the footage is obstructed or inconclusive, Johnson v. Jones deprives the court of § 1291 jurisdiction. The consequence is sweeping: the federal qualified-immunity appeal is dismissed, and pendent review of related state-law tort rulings falls with it.