Interlocutory Qualified-Immunity Appeals Exclude § 1983 “Color of Law” Review; “Obvious Clarity” Defeated by Contrary Circuit Vehicle-Crash Precedent

1. Introduction

Case: Denise Hughes v. Monique Locure, No. 23-10954 (11th Cir. Jan. 29, 2026).
Parties: Denise Hughes, administrator of the Estate of Edwin Dewayne Moss (plaintiff-appellee), sued Darian K. Locure, a Macon County deputy sheriff, later substituted by Monique N. Locure as administratrix of his estate (defendant-appellant).
Background alleged: Deputy Locure, allegedly off-duty, became intoxicated after visiting the sheriff’s office to care for his police dog, drove a police truck home at extreme speed in a dark vehicle without headlights or emergency lights, collided with a vehicle, and fled, resulting in Moss’s death.

Key issues on appeal: (1) whether the Eleventh Circuit could review (at the interlocutory stage) the district court’s determination that Locure acted “under color of state law,” and (2) whether Locure was entitled to qualified immunity from a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 substantive due process claim premised on a “right to life/bodily integrity.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and remanded. The panel held that it lacked interlocutory jurisdiction to review the “under color of state law” element because that issue concerns the existence of a § 1983 claim, not the immunity defense. Proceeding on the required assumption that Locure acted under color of state law, the court concluded that—even assuming a substantive due process violation—the alleged unconstitutionality was not clearly established in light of Eleventh Circuit precedent treating police-caused vehicle collisions (even grossly negligent ones) as non-constitutional torts.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Appellate jurisdiction and interlocutory review

  • English v. City of Gainesville, 75 F.4th 1151 (11th Cir. 2023): reiterated the court’s “threshold obligation” to confirm jurisdiction.
  • Jackson v. City of Atlanta, 97 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2024): confirmed interlocutory jurisdiction exists to review whether a complaint alleges a violation of clearly established law sufficient to overcome qualified immunity.
  • Spencer v. Benison, 5 F.4th 1222 (11th Cir. 2021): cited for the availability of interlocutory review of qualified-immunity denials.
  • Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686 (11th Cir. 2021): used to frame “under color of state law” as an element of § 1983 a plaintiff must prove.
  • Est. of Cummings v. Davenport, 906 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 2018): noted as signaling limits on interlocutory jurisdiction over whether a complaint states a § 1983 claim.
  • Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1994), and Sturdivant v. Fine, 22 F.4th 930 (10th Cir. 2022): the opinion expressly “join[s]” these circuits in holding that “color of law” is not reviewable on interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal because it does not bear on immunity and instead goes to § 1983’s applicability.
  • Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2000), and Hamrick v. Partsfleet, LLC, 1 F.4th 1337 (11th Cir. 2021): applied to reject pendent appellate jurisdiction because qualified immunity can be resolved without reaching the color-of-law merits.

Doctrinal upshot: The panel’s most concrete “new law” is jurisdictional: in the Eleventh Circuit, the “under color of state law” element generally cannot be reviewed in an interlocutory appeal from a qualified-immunity denial, absent true “inextricable intertwining.”

B. Qualified immunity framework and “clearly established” law

  • Brooks v. Miller, 78 F.4th 1267 (11th Cir. 2023), and Wilson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 54 F.4th 652 (11th Cir. 2022): supplied the burden-shifting structure (discretionary authority; then violation + clearly established law).
  • Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009): used to assume a constitutional violation without deciding it.
  • Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), and Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011): provided the “fair warning” and “beyond debate” standards for clearly established law.
  • Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912 (11th Cir. 2022), and King v. Pridmore, 961 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2020): supplied the three methods to show clearly established law (materially similar precedent; broader principle; “obvious clarity”), and stressed the rarity of obvious-clarity cases.
  • Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2005): used for the key proposition that when precedent injects uncertainty, conduct cannot be treated as “so obviously” unconstitutional.
  • Gilmore v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 144 F.4th 1246 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc): invoked to clarify that persuasive out-of-circuit authority may be considered in “obvious clarity” analysis, but a consensus alone does not constitute clearly established law.

C. Substantive due process and vehicle-crash § 1983 claims

  • Davis v. Carter, 555 F.3d 979 (11th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987): used to define substantive due process as prohibiting conscience-shocking government conduct.
  • County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998): central to the majority’s conceptual separation of (i) “shocks the conscience” (culpability threshold for a substantive due process violation) from (ii) “obvious clarity” (the qualified-immunity notice inquiry).
  • United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997): used to explain how general constitutional rules can apply with “obvious clarity” in some cases.
  • Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 947 (11th Cir. 1986), and Rooney v. Watson, 101 F.3d 1378 (11th Cir. 1996): pivotal Eleventh Circuit vehicle-crash cases indicating that negligent or grossly negligent police driving does not constitutionalize into a § 1983 due process claim. The majority treated these cases as undercutting any assertion that Locure’s alleged conduct was “obviously” unconstitutional in this circuit.
  • Wilcox v. Fenn, 380 F. App'x 837 (11th Cir. 2010), and Barnwell v. Douglas County, 390 F. App'x 862 (11th Cir. 2010): unreported decisions used (per Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2019)) to show the right was not clearly established.
  • Browder v. City of Albuquerque, 787 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2015), Williams v. City & County of Denver, 99 F.3d 1009 (10th Cir. 1996), vacated, 140 F.3d 855 (10th Cir. 1997), and Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2009): cited to illustrate that other circuits have been more receptive to substantive due process liability for reckless police driving, but that divergence reinforced (rather than cured) the lack of clearly established Eleventh Circuit law.
  • Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), plus Loftus v. Clark-Moore, 690 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2012), and Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2019): used to reiterate the boundary between constitutional wrongs and state tort remedies.

D. The separate writings

  • WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Concurring: expressed skepticism that Locure acted under color of law, relying on Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2013), and the principle that “personal pursuits” are not under color of law.
  • JORDAN, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part: would have affirmed denial of qualified immunity on an “obvious clarity” theory, emphasizing County of Sacramento v. Lewis and analogizing to Browder v. City of Albuquerque; distinguished Cannon v. Taylor and Rooney v. Watson and treated intoxication as the critical aggravator.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Jurisdiction: qualified immunity is appealable; “color of law” is not (interlocutorily)

The court treated the denial of qualified immunity as an appealable “abstract issue of law,” but held that “under color of state law” is a merits element of § 1983—not part of the qualified-immunity defense. Following Nelson v. Streeter and Sturdivant v. Fine, the panel reasoned that if an officer was not acting under color of law, there is no § 1983 claim and thus no need for official immunity; conversely, asserting official immunity assumes the defendant is being sued as an official actor. Because the “color of law” issue was not “inextricably intertwined” with qualified immunity under Hudson v. Hall and Hamrick v. Partsfleet, LLC, pendent jurisdiction was unavailable.

Practical consequence: For purposes of the interlocutory appeal, the court “must assume” the defendant acted under color of law even while acknowledging a serious dispute (highlighted by the concurrence).

B. Merits: qualified immunity granted because the right was not clearly established

The panel accepted (due to abandonment on appeal) that Locure acted within discretionary authority and then proceeded directly to the “clearly established” prong. It assumed (without deciding) a substantive due process violation, but held Hughes failed to show clearly established law—especially because she relied solely on “obvious clarity” (the third Powell v. Snook method).

The majority’s central move was to treat Eleventh Circuit vehicle-collision precedent—Cannon v. Taylor and Rooney v. Watson, reinforced by unreported decisions like Wilcox v. Fenn and Barnwell v. Douglas County—as creating substantial doubt that even egregious police driving is constitutional in character. Under Mercado v. City of Orlando, that doubt is fatal to “obvious clarity”: where existing cases suggest the conduct may not violate the Constitution, officials cannot have the “beyond debate” notice required by Ashcroft v. al-Kidd.

The court also rejected the argument that “shocks the conscience” automatically implies “obvious clarity.” Relying on County of Sacramento v. Lewis, it insisted these are different inquiries: one is about culpability on a tort-like spectrum (what conduct is sufficiently egregious), and the other is about notice from constitutional law (whether the unlawfulness was clearly established at the time).

3.3 Impact

A. A meaningful jurisdictional rule for Eleventh Circuit interlocutory practice

By “join[ing]” Nelson v. Streeter and Sturdivant v. Fine, the Eleventh Circuit establishes a clear procedural constraint: defendants cannot use a qualified-immunity interlocutory appeal to obtain immediate appellate review of the district court’s “under color of state law” determination (absent a rare, truly intertwined situation). This will shape litigation strategy:

  • Defendants seeking immediate review must focus on clearly established law (and other immunity-linked legal issues), not § 1983 elements.
  • Plaintiffs should anticipate that “color of law” disputes will often remain in district court until final judgment, even if they are case-dispositive.

B. Substantive due process claims arising from police driving remain difficult in this circuit

On the merits, the decision signals that Eleventh Circuit precedent like Cannon v. Taylor and Rooney v. Watson will continue to function as a strong barrier to “clearly established” showings in police-vehicle misconduct cases—particularly when plaintiffs proceed on an “obvious clarity” theory rather than identifying materially similar binding precedent.

C. Increased salience of state-law remedies

The opinion underscores (via Daniels v. Williams and Paul v. Davis) a familiar structural message: grievous wrongs by officials may be actionable primarily through state tort law rather than federal constitutional doctrine. That emphasis may channel more litigation into wrongful death and negligence/wantonness frameworks, and away from substantive due process theories, unless and until binding precedent more squarely recognizes such claims.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“under color of state law”): A federal civil remedy against a person who violates federal rights while exercising power made possible by state authority. Purely private conduct—even by a government employee—usually does not qualify.
  • Qualified immunity: A defense that blocks damages liability unless the official violated a constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time. It is designed to prevent liability where the law did not give fair notice.
  • Interlocutory appeal: An appeal taken before the case ends. Qualified immunity denials are often immediately appealable because immunity is partly an entitlement not to stand trial.
  • Pendent appellate jurisdiction: A narrow doctrine allowing review of an otherwise non-appealable issue only when it is truly inseparable from an appealable one.
  • Substantive due process / “shocks the conscience”: A constitutional backstop against the most arbitrary, egregious executive conduct. Not every serious tort qualifies.
  • “Clearly established” / “obvious clarity”: Even if conduct is unconstitutional, qualified immunity can still apply unless prior binding decisions (or a rare “obvious” case) would have made the unlawfulness apparent to every reasonable official. The court stressed that “shocks the conscience” (how bad the conduct is) does not automatically equal “obvious clarity” (how clear the law was).

5. Conclusion

Hughes v. Locure delivers two significant lessons. First, it establishes a jurisdictional rule in the Eleventh Circuit: in an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity, the court will not review whether the defendant acted “under color of state law,” because that is a § 1983 element rather than an immunity question. Second, it reinforces a stringent approach to “obvious clarity” in substantive due process claims arising from police vehicle misconduct: where circuit precedent like Cannon v. Taylor and Rooney v. Watson suggests such incidents do not amount to constitutional deprivations, qualified immunity will typically bar damages even for highly egregious allegations. The concurrences and dissent highlight that the hardest questions may not be moral but doctrinal—where the Constitution ends, tort law begins, and when appellate courts may intervene midstream.