Interlocutory Immunity Appeals Must Present Legal Questions; Pendent Cross-Appeals Limited to Inextricably Intertwined Issues

I. Introduction

In Kary Jarvis v. City of Daytona Beach (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a non-final (interlocutory) order denying in part police officers’ summary-judgment motions asserting qualified immunity (federal) and Florida statutory sovereign immunity (state), while also addressing the plaintiff’s attempt to cross-appeal adverse portions of the same summary-judgment order.

The case arises from a traffic stop initiated after an anonymous tip. After the officers completed the stop and issued a warning, they sought consent to search Jarvis’s vehicle; Jarvis declined; the officers allegedly attempted to search anyway. Jarvis then drove off during the attempted search, an officer reportedly hung from the moving vehicle, and the vehicle crashed. Jarvis was arrested and charged with multiple offenses; evidence was later suppressed, and the prosecution terminated in Jarvis’s favor.

Jarvis filed a multi-claim civil action against Officers Marville Tucker and James Mackenzie and the City of Daytona Beach. At summary judgment, the district court granted the City’s motion, denied Jarvis’s motion, and granted in part and denied in part the officers’ motion. The officers appealed the denial of immunity on certain counts; Jarvis cross-appealed broadly.

The central issues on appeal were (1) the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from denials of qualified immunity and Florida statutory sovereign immunity, (2) whether pendent appellate jurisdiction allowed consideration of Jarvis’s cross-appeal, and (3) on the merits, whether the officers were entitled to immunity on Jarvis’s Fourth Amendment unlawful detention/search claim (Count 5) and Florida malicious prosecution (Count 12).

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Interlocutory jurisdiction: The court held it had interlocutory jurisdiction to review denials of immunity only as to:
    • Count 5 (Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure/search) because the officers raised reviewable legal issues (no constitutional violation and/or not clearly established).
    • Count 12 (Florida malicious prosecution) because the officers framed Florida statutory sovereign immunity as a legal issue grounded in probable cause.
    It held it lacked jurisdiction over the officers’ appeal regarding Count 15 (conversion) because the argument was essentially evidence-sufficiency (i.e., Jarvis failed to prove elements), not a legal immunity question.
  • Pendent appellate jurisdiction over Jarvis’s cross-appeal: The court exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction only over Jarvis’s cross-appeal as to Count 5, because it was “inextricably intertwined” with the officers’ Count 5 immunity appeal; it declined pendent jurisdiction over Jarvis’s other issues.
  • Merits—Count 5: The court affirmed denial of qualified immunity because genuine disputes of material fact existed as to whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop after its traffic-related mission ended; under Rodriguez v. United States and Florida v. J.L., the asserted right was clearly established on Jarvis’s version of disputed facts.
  • Merits—Count 12: The court affirmed denial of Florida statutory sovereign immunity on Jarvis’s Florida malicious prosecution claim, emphasizing the district court’s reasoning that the officers failed to show probable cause for all charges and that lack of probable cause may support an inference of malice under Gallucci v. Milavic.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Finality, Collateral Order Doctrine, and Interlocutory Review

The opinion begins with orthodox federal appellate jurisdiction principles: appellate review generally follows a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, with finality framed by CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, Acheron Cap., Ltd. v. Mukamal, and Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant. It then turns to the collateral order doctrine as articulated in Plaintiff A v. Schair.

Crucially, the court reaffirms that denials of qualified immunity are immediately appealable only to the extent they present legal questions, citing Behrens v. Pelletier and the Eleventh Circuit’s own synthesis in English v. City of Gainesville. It also relies on Cottrell v. Caldwell for the proposition that “whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all” is a legal issue reviewable interlocutorily.

Equally important is the boundary: purely evidence-sufficiency disputes are not reviewable on interlocutory immunity appeal. The panel invokes Behrens v. Pelletier again, and uses Bryant v. Jones to capture the principle as: an interlocutory appeal cannot be merely “I didn’t do it.” Yet it preserves a route to jurisdiction where an appeal mixes legal and factual elements tied to “core qualified immunity issues,” leaning on Johnson v. Clifton, English v. City of Gainesville, and Moniz v. City of Fort Lauderdale.

2. Florida Statutory Sovereign Immunity and Interlocutory Appeals

For state-law immunity, the court anchors its analysis in Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) and the Eleventh Circuit’s view that the statute confers immunity from suit, making denials appealable under the collateral order doctrine. This comes from Butler v. Gualtieri. However, the court adds a limiting condition: Florida sovereign immunity interlocutory review must still “turn on a question of law,” relying on Aguirre v. Seminole County.

That framework drives the split treatment of Counts 12 and 15: the court accepts jurisdiction over Count 12 because the officers presented a legal argument—probable cause as a matter of law defeats malicious prosecution and thus supports statutory immunity. It rejects jurisdiction over Count 15 because the officers’ challenge was framed as failure of proof on conversion elements, i.e., an evidence sufficiency dispute rather than a legal entitlement to immunity.

3. Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction and Cross-Appeals

The court treats pendent appellate jurisdiction as issue-by-issue, guided by Jones v. Fransen and further refined by Smith v. LePage and the “critical inquiry” from In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rts. Litig.: can the appealable issue be resolved without reaching the nonappealable issue? It emphasizes the Supreme Court’s caution that pendent appellate jurisdiction should be rare, via King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., and notes the discretionary nature of the doctrine per Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, with judicial economy considerations from Hond. Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Gov't of Hond.

The court’s principal comparator is Hudson v. Hall, where pendent jurisdiction was exercised over a plaintiff’s cross-appeal because the legality of the stop and car search was intertwined with the consent analysis for the search of persons. The Hudson passage itself (including references to United States v. Garcia, United States v. Valdez, and United States v. Miller) illustrates how “totality of circumstances” and “taint” analysis can tie issues together.

Applying that template, the Jarvis panel holds only Jarvis’s Count 5 cross-appeal is intertwined with the officers’ Count 5 immunity appeal. His other cross-appeal issues did not affect meaningful review of the two properly appealable immunity issues (Counts 5 and 12).

4. Fourth Amendment Traffic Stops, Reasonable Suspicion, and Anonymous Tips

On the merits of Count 5, the court builds from the Supreme Court’s traffic-stop and seizure jurisprudence: Whren v. United States (traffic stops are Fourth Amendment seizures), Heien v. North Carolina (traffic violations can supply reasonable suspicion), and Rodriguez v. United States (a stop may not be prolonged beyond its mission absent reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity). It supplements with Eleventh Circuit authority that a stop extension may be permissible if supported by reasonable suspicion: United States v. Perkins.

The court then re-states the minimum “objective justification” threshold from Illinois v. Wardlow (quoting United States v. Sokolow), and the “totality of the circumstances” approach from United States v. Arvizu (quoting United States v. Cortez), while warning that a mere hunch is insufficient under Wardlow (quoting Terry v. Ohio).

For anonymous tips, the panel draws a clear doctrinal line: Alabama v. White (anonymous tips alone are insufficient), Florida v. J.L. (anonymous tip must carry indicia of reliability), and Navarette v. California (911 calls may have indicia of reliability when details/location are corroborated and contemporaneous). In applying these, the court stresses the tip’s mismatch with Jarvis’s appearance (dashcam showed different clothing) and the officers’ limited corroboration.

5. Qualified Immunity Framework

The opinion’s qualified-immunity section largely quotes (and applies) the Eleventh Circuit’s then-recent discussion in Aguirre v. Seminole Cnty. (itself collecting leading authority): Harlow v. Fitzgerald, Foy v. Holston, Mitchell v. Forsyth, Alcocer v. Mills, Bowen v. Warden, Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, Cottone v. Jenne, and Pearson v. Callahan. For clearly established law standards, it relies on Fuqua v. Turner (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd) and the Eleventh Circuit’s tripartite path in Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach.

At summary judgment, it emphasizes that disputed facts can block qualified immunity, drawing on Jones v. Cannon and Rich v. Dollar.

6. Florida Malicious Prosecution Elements and Probable Cause

On Count 12, the court sets out Florida malicious prosecution elements from Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, which cites Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc. and Adams v. Whitfield. It also reiterates that Florida law allows malice to be inferred from lack of probable cause, citing Gallucci v. Milavic.

The panel then leans on the U.S. Supreme Court’s multi-charge probable-cause discussion in Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon for the proposition (as the district court applied it) that malicious prosecution requires probable cause for each charge. Notably, the panel does not independently declare this as Florida law; instead it relies on waiver/abandonment doctrine: because the district court held it and the officers did not challenge that specific holding on appeal, any objection was abandoned under Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Jurisdictional Holding as a Merits-Gatekeeping Rule

A central contribution of the opinion is its disciplined separation of reviewable “legal” immunity questions from unreviewable “evidence sufficiency” disputes at the interlocutory stage. The court does not merely cite the rule; it operationalizes it:

  • Count 5 (qualified immunity): reviewable because the officers argued (a) no constitutional violation and (b) not clearly established—classic legal questions.
  • Count 12 (Florida statutory sovereign immunity): reviewable because the officers framed immunity around probable cause as a matter of law.
  • Count 15 (conversion): not reviewable because the argument reduced to “Jarvis failed to establish elements,” which the court treated as evidence sufficiency.

This framing effectively instructs litigants: the label “immunity” is not enough to secure interlocutory review; the appeal must present a legal entitlement to immunity rather than a disagreement with factfinding or sufficiency determinations.

2. Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction as Narrow and Issue-Specific

The court’s pendent-jurisdiction analysis similarly functions as a restraint. Even though the same order denied Jarvis’s motion for summary judgment across claims, the panel refused to use the officers’ immunity appeal as a vehicle to review the whole order. Only Jarvis’s Count 5 cross-appeal qualified because it mirrored the same claim and thus was “inextricably intertwined.” The court distinguished Hudson v. Hall as involving interdependence in “totality of the circumstances” analysis affecting the appealable issue; Jarvis’s other claims lacked that functional linkage.

3. Count 5: Why Qualified Immunity Was Properly Denied

The court’s merits analysis tracks the Rodriguez v. United States framework: once the traffic mission ends (license/registration/warrants check and warning issued), continuing detention must be supported by independent reasonable suspicion. The court agreed with the district court that a jury must resolve disputed facts bearing on reasonable suspicion, including:

  • whether Officer Tucker actually observed “furtive movements,” given window tinting and conflicting testimony;
  • whether Jarvis was avoiding eye contact or “target glancing,” given dashcam video showing cooperation;
  • what weight to give a knife on the console and Jarvis’s disclosures about past drug activity and having left the apartment complex.

As to the anonymous tip, the court applied Florida v. J.L. and Navarette v. California to find the tip did not, on its own, supply reliability sufficient to justify prolongation. The mismatch between the tip’s clothing description and the dashcam evidence, and the officers’ lack of independent investigation, weakened any claim of corroboration.

On “clearly established” law, the court rejected the officers’ attempt to distinguish Rodriguez v. United States, reiterating that Rodriguez’s core rule is precisely that prolongation beyond the stop’s mission requires reasonable suspicion. It paired that with Florida v. J.L. to conclude that—on Jarvis’s version of disputed facts—reasonable officers would have known they could not extend the stop on an unreliable anonymous tip and without adequate objective justification.

The court also disposed of Jarvis’s pendent cross-appeal on Count 5 by the same reasoning: because material facts were disputed on reasonable suspicion, Jarvis was not entitled to summary judgment either.

4. Count 12: Why Florida Statutory Sovereign Immunity Was Properly Denied

The court upheld denial of Florida statutory sovereign immunity under Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) as applied to malicious prosecution because, accepting the district court’s unchallenged premise (via abandonment), malicious prosecution required probable cause for each charge, and the officers failed to show probable cause for all charges. The court additionally noted that lack of probable cause can support an inference of malice under Gallucci v. Milavic, and it highlighted factual disputes about possible falsehoods (furtive movements, suspicious eye contact) as potential evidence of actual malice.

C. Impact

1. Practical Consequences for Interlocutory Appeals

Even as an unpublished decision, the opinion is a useful roadmap for how the Eleventh Circuit will police its interlocutory docket in immunity cases:

  • For defendants: to secure interlocutory review, frame the issue as a legal entitlement (no constitutional violation; not clearly established; immunity as a matter of law), not as a sufficiency challenge to the plaintiff’s evidence. Count 15 illustrates the penalty for misframing: dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
  • For plaintiffs cross-appealing: pendent appellate jurisdiction will be narrowly confined. Attempting to bootstrap broad issues into an immunity appeal is unlikely to succeed unless those issues are genuinely “inextricably intertwined” with the appealable immunity question.

2. Fourth Amendment Stop-Prolongation Litigation

On the merits, the decision reinforces (in a fact-bound way) that anonymous tips must be carefully evaluated for reliability and corroboration. It also underscores that disputed facts about officer observations (furtive movements, demeanor cues) frequently preclude immunity at summary judgment when those observations are central to the reasonable-suspicion calculus.

3. Florida Malicious Prosecution Strategy

The Count 12 discussion signals that in Florida malicious prosecution cases—at least as litigated here—defendants should directly confront whether probable cause must exist for each charge (especially after Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon) and preserve the issue on appeal. The panel’s reliance on Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster shows that failure to challenge a key legal premise can be dispositive.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualified immunity: a protection for officials sued personally, shielding them unless (1) they violated a constitutional right and (2) the right was “clearly established” at the time. Courts can decide either prong first (Pearson v. Callahan).
  • Clearly established law: law is clearly established when existing authority makes it obvious to every reasonable officer that the conduct is unlawful, assessed in a fact-specific way (see Fuqua v. Turner; Ashcroft v. al-Kidd).
  • Reasonable suspicion vs. probable cause: reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold requiring objective, articulable facts suggesting crime; probable cause is a higher threshold requiring a fair probability that a crime occurred.
  • Rodriguez rule (stop prolongation): once the traffic tasks are complete, the officer cannot keep the driver detained to investigate other crimes unless the officer has reasonable suspicion of those other crimes.
  • Collateral order doctrine: a narrow exception allowing appeals from some non-final orders if delaying review would effectively deny the right at stake. Immunity denials can qualify because immunity is meant to protect against the burdens of suit.
  • Pendent appellate jurisdiction: a rare doctrine allowing review of otherwise unappealable issues only when they are tightly bound to an appealable issue (so tightly that meaningful review would be impaired without them).
  • Florida Stat. § 768.28(9)(a): generally bars personal liability for state employees acting within the scope of employment unless they act in bad faith or with malicious purpose; because it is immunity from suit, denials can sometimes be appealed immediately if the issue is legal.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision chiefly clarifies how immunity disputes reach the court before final judgment: interlocutory review is available only for genuine legal immunity questions, not for arguments that merely contest evidence sufficiency, and pendent appellate jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s cross-appeal will be confined to issues truly “inextricably intertwined” with the appealable immunity issue.

On the merits, the court affirmed denial of qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment stop-prolongation claim due to disputed material facts on reasonable suspicion, and affirmed denial of Florida statutory sovereign immunity on the state malicious prosecution claim where probable cause (for all charges, as the case was litigated) was not established and malice could be inferred under Florida law.