Interlocutory Appellate Jurisdiction Limits: A “Motion to Modify” Cannot Re-Litigate a Preliminary Injunction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)

1. Introduction

In CFPB v. Blust Family 2019 Irrevocable Tr. (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 2026) (summary order), the Second Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction where a relief defendant trust attempted—through a purported motion to “modify” a preliminary injunction—to re-attack core features of an earlier asset freeze and receivership already reviewed on interlocutory appeal.

The underlying enforcement action was brought by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and multiple States (New York, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Wisconsin) against entities and individuals connected to a debt-relief enterprise. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, the Telemarketing Sales Rule, the Consumer Financial Protection Act, and state laws, focusing on allegedly illegal advance fees and disproportionate charges to consumers. A court-appointed receiver was installed and assets were frozen, including assets associated with the Blust Family 2019 Irrevocable Trust (the “Trust”), named as a Relief Defendant based on allegations it received consumer-traceable funds.

After the district court denied the Trust’s request to “modify” the injunction (seeking removal from the receivership, limits on spending receivership assets, and easier access to trust funds for attorney’s fees) and approved the receiver’s first fee application, the Trust appealed. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss, arguing there was no interlocutory appellate jurisdiction.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit granted the motion to dismiss. It held that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), appellate jurisdiction over an order denying modification of an injunction does not extend to attempts to revisit the validity or scope of the original preliminary injunction. The court concluded the Trust’s “modification” request was, in substance, an effort to relitigate issues previously raised (and rejected) in an earlier interlocutory appeal from the preliminary injunction.

The court also rejected alternative jurisdictional theories (subject-matter-jurisdiction framing, the collateral order doctrine, and mandamus). Finally, it declined to exercise jurisdiction over the appeal from the receiver’s fee order because the Trust did not argue that order was independently appealable if § 1292(a)(1) did not apply.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Weight Watchers International, Inc. v. Luigino's, Inc., 423 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2005)
    The panel treated Weight Watchers as the controlling jurisdictional boundary: in an appeal from the denial of a motion to modify, “we do not inquire into the validity of the underlying preliminary injunction.” This principle was decisive because the Trust’s arguments attacked the original receivership/asset-freeze architecture rather than any genuine post-injunction change warranting modification.
  • Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. StratFS, LLC, No. 24-cv-40, 2024 WL 911518 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2024) (“CFPB I”)
    CFPB I supplied the operative preliminary injunction framework: an asset freeze, a receivership over relevant entities and assets (including the Trust), and authority for the receiver to manage accounts and preserve consumer interests. The Second Circuit’s order treated these features as “prominent part[s]” of the injunction—making them improper targets for a later “modification” appeal that functioned as a second bite at the same apple.
  • Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Sasson, No. 24-697, 2025 WL 1554514 (2d Cir. June 2, 2025) (summary order) (“CFPB II”)
    CFPB II was critical procedurally: the Trust had already appealed the preliminary injunction and lost. The panel emphasized that the Trust’s present challenges—authority and evidentiary basis to include Trust assets in the freeze/receivership—were previously raised and rejected, confirming that the new “modification” appeal was an impermissible attempt to relitigate.
  • Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. StratFS, LLC, No. 24-cv-40, 2024 WL 2020327 (W.D.N.Y. May 7, 2024) (“CFPB III”)
    The appealed “modification” denial. The Second Circuit read CFPB III narrowly on attorney’s fees: the district court did not “modify” the injunction by establishing a binding new prospective procedure; it addressed a specific release request and encouraged counsel to work out logistics, using redacted invoices to substantiate the particular request.
  • Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. StratFS, LLC, No. 24-cv-40, 2024 WL 2315291 (W.D.N.Y. May 22, 2024) (“CFPB IV”)
    The receiver’s first fee application order. The panel refused to treat the fee order as independently appealable in this posture because the Trust did not develop an argument for interlocutory appealability separate from § 1292(a)(1).
  • Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1999)
    Used to explain why the collateral order doctrine did not apply: the Trust’s objections were not “effectively unreviewable” later because the Trust already had an opportunity to appeal those issues in the earlier preliminary injunction appeal.
  • Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009)
    Cited to reinforce that collateral-order review is for significant issues that are otherwise unappealable—not for re-litigation of matters already appealable through ordinary interlocutory routes.
  • United States v. Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2016)
    Applied to deny mandamus: mandamus requires “no other adequate means” to obtain relief, which was not satisfied where the Trust had an earlier path (and used it) to seek appellate review of the relevant injunction provisions.
  • 16 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3924.2 (3d ed. 2002, updated Sept. 2025)
    Treated as an articulation of the governing appellate-administration policy: the modification-appeal mechanism cannot “resurrect an expired time for appeal” or provide a vehicle to revisit the initial injunction decision.
  • 65 Am. Jur. 2d Receivers § 152 (2d ed. 1962, updated Feb. 2026)
    Used descriptively to support the proposition that paying receivership expenses from receivership assets is a “standard aspect” of receiverships—highlighting that the Trust’s spending objection was not a novel post-injunction issue but an attack on the original structure.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning is best understood as a jurisdictional “substance-over-label” approach to § 1292(a)(1). While § 1292(a)(1) permits interlocutory review of orders “refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions,” the Second Circuit polices the boundary between:

  • true modifications (prompted by new facts, changed circumstances, or materially new legal conditions affecting ongoing injunction terms), and
  • disguised reconsideration (attempts to attack the original injunction’s merits, scope, or evidentiary foundation after an earlier appeal opportunity has passed or been exhausted).

Applying that framework, the panel found each of the Trust’s three requested outcomes—(i) removing Trust assets from receivership, (ii) prohibiting the receiver from using Trust assets to pay receivership expenses, and (iii) unfreezing assets for counsel fees without submitting invoices to Plaintiffs—either duplicated prior arguments or depended on challenging the original injunction’s equitable authority.

The court also disposed of the Trust’s attempt to identify “new developments” supporting modification:

  • Misidentification of the Trustee in the complaint: the panel found no explained “rational connection” between the naming error and any newfound “independence” of the current trustee that would undermine the receivership’s basis, especially without showing the independence was previously unknown at the injunction stage.
  • Receiver’s bank account opened in San Diego, not within W.D.N.Y.: the panel treated this as a compliance/administration issue regarding the receiver, not a fact bearing on whether the receivership should exist or whether receivership expenses may be paid from receivership assets (the core of the Trust’s appeal).

On attorney’s fees, the panel rejected the premise that the district court “modified” the injunction by imposing a new mandatory process. It read the direction to provide redacted invoices as tied to a specific release request and as a facilitative step toward counsel agreement, not as a new injunction term triggering § 1292(a)(1) review. It also noted mootness concerns as to the specific $100,000 request because the parties later reached agreement and funds were released.

Finally, the court foreclosed end-runs around § 1292(a)(1) via alternative doctrines. It rejected (i) recharacterizing the dispute as subject-matter jurisdiction, (ii) the collateral order doctrine because the Trust already had an effective appellate opportunity, and (iii) mandamus because adequate means existed (and were used) through the earlier preliminary-injunction appeal.

3.3. Impact

Although issued as a nonprecedential summary order, the decision is practically important in three ways:

  • Gatekeeping against serial interlocutory appeals: it reinforces that a “motion to modify” cannot be used to repackage arguments against the original injunction, particularly after an earlier interlocutory appeal (here, CFPB II) has already resolved them.
  • Receivership administration disputes vs. receivership validity: it draws a functional line between (a) objections to a receiver’s execution errors and (b) challenges to the existence/scope of the receivership itself—only the latter were at issue, and they were treated as already decided.
  • Interlocutory strategy discipline: parties seeking immediate review must squarely fit within § 1292(a)(1) (or another recognized basis) and develop any independent appealability theory (e.g., for fee orders), or risk dismissal/waiver at the threshold.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Preliminary injunction: a temporary court order entered early in a case to preserve the status quo and prevent harm while litigation proceeds.
  • Asset freeze: a form of injunctive relief preventing parties (and sometimes non-party holders of disputed funds) from moving or spending assets that may be needed for consumer redress or other relief.
  • Receiver / receivership: a court-appointed fiduciary empowered to take custody of assets, manage businesses/accounts, and preserve value under court supervision.
  • Relief Defendant: a person/entity not accused of wrongdoing but alleged to possess property traceable to unlawful conduct; the remedy sought is typically return/preservation of that property rather than liability for misconduct.
  • Interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1): a limited right to appeal certain non-final orders involving injunctions; it does not authorize repeated appeals to re-argue the same injunction’s merits.
  • Collateral order doctrine: a narrow exception allowing appeal of a small class of orders that conclusively decide important issues separate from the merits and would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment.
  • Mandamus: an extraordinary appellate writ used only when a party has no adequate ordinary route to relief and the district court’s error is clear.
  • Mootness: if the specific dispute has been resolved (e.g., the requested funds were released by agreement), an appellate court may no longer be able to grant meaningful relief on that issue.

5. Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s dismissal in CFPB v. Blust Family 2019 Irrevocable Tr. underscores a strict jurisdictional principle: § 1292(a)(1) permits interlocutory review of genuine injunction modifications, not attempts to re-litigate an original preliminary injunction—especially after the same party already pursued (and lost) a prior interlocutory appeal. The decision also signals that collateral-order and mandamus doctrines will not be used to bypass these limits when adequate appellate avenues existed. In complex CFPB/state enforcement cases involving asset freezes and receiverships, the order functions as a practical warning that appellate courts will scrutinize “modification” appeals for substance, procedural history, and true changed circumstances.