Date: Sep 25, 2026

Intentional Assistance in Leading or Restraining a Victim Supports Complicity to First-Degree Sodomy

Case: Demaurion Moore v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky

Date: September 24, 2026

Disposition: Judgment affirmed.

Introduction

This case arose from a violent riot at the Adair Youth Development Center. After detained juveniles overpowered and severely injured staff members, inmates were released from their cells and attacked other residents. During the disorder, seventeen-year-old A.L. was taken into an empty cell and sexually assaulted by multiple inmates.

Demaurion Moore, who was a juvenile when the offenses occurred but was certified for trial as an adult, admitted having intercourse with A.L. but maintained that it was consensual. Witnesses testified that Moore and M.P. led A.L. into the cell, that she resisted and begged her attackers to stop, and that participants held her down. DNA recovered from Moore’s underwear matched both Moore and A.L.

A jury convicted Moore of first-degree rape, complicity to first-degree sodomy, promoting a sexual performance by a minor, first-degree riot, and two counts of fourth-degree assault. He received a total sentence of twenty-five years. His appeal as a matter of right presented four issues:

Whether he was entitled to a directed verdict on complicity to first-degree sodomy;
Whether the complicity instruction improperly merged complicity with criminal facilitation;
Whether a nurse could testify that A.L. reported anal penetration; and
Whether a prospective juror’s reference to Moore’s “past” required a mistrial.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Kentucky unanimously affirmed Moore’s convictions and sentence.

Sufficiency of the evidence: The evidence permitted a reasonable jury to find that another person committed first-degree sodomy and that Moore intentionally assisted in that offense by helping lead A.L. into the cell or holding her down.
Jury instructions: The instruction properly required the jury to find both assistance and an intent that M.P. or D.P. engage in deviate sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion. The court was not required to add that Moore led A.L. into the cell “against her will.”
Medical-treatment testimony: A.L.’s statement to Nurse Perkins that she had been anally penetrated was independently admissible under KRE 803(4) as a statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment. Any deficiency in laying a foundation for a prior inconsistent statement was therefore immaterial.
Mistrial: The prospective juror’s brief reference to Moore’s “past” and “Tyree Smith” did not create manifest necessity for a mistrial. The juror was removed, and the trial court promptly admonished the remaining venire.

Analysis

1. Complicity to First-Degree Sodomy

First-degree sodomy under KRS 510.070 includes deviate sexual intercourse accomplished by forcible compulsion. Under KRS 510.010(3), deviate sexual intercourse includes sexual contact between one person’s sex organs and another person’s mouth or anus, as well as anal penetration by a body part or manipulated object.

Kentucky complicity law requires proof that another person committed the underlying offense and that the defendant intentionally participated in it. Participation is broadly defined and may include assistance, encouragement, agreement, incitement, or other conduct forming part of a course of concerted criminal activity.

The Commonwealth presented evidence that Moore and M.P. knocked A.L. down, led her into an empty cell, and participated in the sexual assault. A.L. stated that the first two boys held her down while others assaulted her. D.R. likewise testified that attackers held her legs so she could not resist. M.P. forced oral sex on A.L., and anal swabs contained D.P.’s DNA as a major contributor. Moore’s own effort to remove A.L.’s clothing and rape her supported the inference that his assistance was intentional rather than accidental or indifferent.

Applying the directed-verdict standard, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could find both commission of first-degree sodomy by another participant and Moore’s intentional assistance. The evidence therefore exceeded a “mere scintilla.”

2. Complicity Versus Facilitation

The disputed instruction required the jury to find that Moore aided M.P. or D.P. by leading A.L. into the cell or holding her down and that he intended for the principal to commit deviate sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion.

Moore argued that “leading” A.L. into the cell could describe conduct that merely supplied an opportunity to commit the offense and thus amounted only to facilitation. He requested language requiring a finding that he led her there “against her will.”

The court rejected that argument because the instruction separately required criminal intent. Facilitation applies when a person knowingly provides a means or opportunity but remains indifferent to whether the crime is completed. Complicity requires an intent that the principal offense occur. The instruction’s intent element therefore prevented conviction based on mere facilitation.

The surrounding circumstances also supported an inference of intentional complicity. Moore helped take A.L. into the cell and then attempted to remove her clothing and raped her while other assaults were occurring. His independent purpose to rape A.L. reinforced the conclusion that he also intended to assist M.P.’s forcible sodomy.

3. Statements Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment

At trial, A.L. testified that she had not been anally penetrated or could not remember whether such penetration occurred. Nurse Perkins later testified that, during the hospital examination and rape-kit collection, A.L. reported vaginal and anal penetration by multiple people.

Moore contended that the Commonwealth had not complied with KRE 801A and KRE 613, which regulate the use of prior inconsistent statements. Because the issue was unpreserved, he sought palpable-error review under RCr 10.26.

The court held that the prior-inconsistent-statement rules were not controlling because the statement was independently admissible under KRE 803(4). Information about recent vaginal or anal penetration is reasonably pertinent to the medical diagnosis and treatment of an alleged sexual-assault victim. An out-of-court statement need satisfy only one applicable hearsay exception.

Because the testimony was admissible on that independent basis, its admission was not error and necessarily did not amount to palpable error or manifest injustice.

4. The Prospective Juror’s Reference to Moore’s Past

During voir dire, a prospective juror stated that he knew about Moore’s “past” and then referred to “Tyree Smith” and “the incident.” The juror did not explain the reference before the court intervened. He was excused for cause, and the court instructed the venire to disregard the remark and emphasized that no one knew whether Moore had any prior history.

A mistrial is an extraordinary remedy reserved for a fundamental defect that cannot be cured by any less drastic measure. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge acted within his discretion. The remark was brief, unexplained, and promptly addressed. Moreover, because the charged offenses occurred in a detention facility, the jury would already understand that Moore had previously been detained. The court presumed that the venire followed the admonition.

Precedents Cited

Directed Verdict and Complicity

Commonwealth v. Benham: Established that a directed verdict is improper unless it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt. Courts must accept the Commonwealth’s evidence as true and draw reasonable inferences in its favor, while requiring more than a mere scintilla of proof.
Acosta v. Commonwealth: Explained that sufficiency is measured by the statutes defining the offense rather than solely by the wording of the jury instructions.
Ray v. Commonwealth: Noted because it overruled Acosta v. Commonwealth on grounds unrelated to the proposition used here.
Parks v. Commonwealth: Required proof that another person committed the underlying offense and that the defendant participated in it. It also recognized that an accomplice bears the same criminal status as the principal.
Young v. Commonwealth: Characterized KRS 502.020 as broad enough to encompass acts, words, agreements, encouragement, incitement, and other forms of participation in concerted criminal activity.
Finney v. Commonwealth: Explained that the statutory forms of complicity are definitional rather than separate substantive theories.
Hibbard v. Commonwealth: Identified as having overruled Finney v. Commonwealth on grounds unrelated to the proposition applied in Moore’s case.
Mills v. Commonwealth: Recognized that accomplice liability may arise from a continuum of events rather than from one precisely isolated act.
Wilson v. Commonwealth: Supported the rule that an accomplice occupies the same status as the person guilty of the principal offense.
Bills v. Commonwealth: Held that penetration is unnecessary when sodomy consists of sexual contact involving one person’s sex organs and another person’s mouth or anus; contact alone may satisfy the statute.

Jury Instructions, Intent, and Facilitation

Webster v. Commonwealth: Defined the function of jury instructions as stating what the jury must believe from the evidence to return a verdict for the party bearing the burden of proof.
Lee v. Commonwealth: Required instructions on each theory supported to any extent by the indictment and evidence.
Thompkins v. Commonwealth: Supplied the central distinction between complicity and facilitation: complicity requires an intent that the offense be committed, while facilitation involves knowing assistance without that intent.
Skinner v. Commonwealth: Explained that facilitation concerns providing a means or opportunity, whereas complicity involves solicitation, conspiracy, or assistance coupled with the necessary intent.
Perdue v. Commonwealth: Described a facilitator as “wholly indifferent” to whether the principal crime is completed.
Stieritz v. Commonwealth: Recognized that intent may be inferred from surrounding circumstances and that complicity can be shown through conspiracy, assistance, counsel, or failure to act when a legal duty exists.
Commonwealth v. Wolford: Supported the proposition that criminal intent may be inferred circumstantially.
Dean v. Commonwealth: Was especially influential because it recognized that a defendant may independently intend to commit one sexual offense while also intending to assist another person’s sexual offense. The court regarded Moore’s conduct as a similarly strong example of complicity.

Palpable Error and Hearsay

Brewer v. Commonwealth: Defined palpable error as an error that is plain, obvious, and readily noticeable.
Martin v. Commonwealth: Required a probability of a different result or an error so fundamental that it threatens due process. The defect must be shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable.
Edmonds v. Commonwealth: Established that an out-of-court statement may be admitted if it satisfies any applicable hearsay exception, even if it does not satisfy the requirements for a prior consistent or inconsistent statement. It also approved medically pertinent statements about anal sexual activity under KRE 803(4).
Colvard v. Commonwealth: Provided the two-part medical-treatment inquiry: whether the statement is of a type reasonably relied upon for diagnosis or treatment and whether it was made for the purpose of promoting treatment.

Mistrial and Curative Admonitions

Woodard v. Commonwealth: Confirmed that mistrial rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and that a mistrial requires manifest necessity.
Bray v. Commonwealth: Reinforced that a mistrial is an extreme remedy appropriate only for a fundamental defect in the proceedings.
Gould v. Charlton Co., Inc.: Required prejudice of such character and magnitude that the litigant cannot receive a fair trial and no alternative remedy can remove the harm.
Lampkins v. Commonwealth: Supported the presumption that jurors follow a trial court’s admonition and that an effective admonition ordinarily cures potential prejudice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Complicity: Intentionally helping, encouraging, or participating in another person’s crime. The accomplice may be punished as though he committed the principal offense himself.
Facilitation: Knowingly supplying an opportunity or means to commit a crime while remaining indifferent to whether the crime actually occurs.
Directed verdict: A ruling that removes a charge from the jury because the prosecution’s evidence is legally insufficient. The evidence is viewed in the prosecution’s favor.
Forcible compulsion: The use or threatened use of physical force sufficient to overcome a person’s resistance or compel submission.
Hearsay exception: A rule allowing certain reliable out-of-court statements to be admitted. Statements reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment fall within KRE 803(4).
Palpable error: An obvious, unpreserved error so serious that it probably changed the result or made the proceeding fundamentally unfair.
Manifest necessity: A compelling need for a mistrial because prejudice cannot be cured through an instruction, removal of a juror, or another less drastic remedy.

Potential Impact

Although nonprecedential, the opinion offers persuasive guidance on several recurring issues in Kentucky criminal practice:

A defendant’s participation in moving or restraining a victim may support accomplice liability when surrounding circumstances establish an intent that the principal offense occur.
A complicity instruction need not attach nonconsent language to every assisting act if it separately requires intent that the principal commit the offense by forcible compulsion.
Medical-treatment statements may remain admissible even when the prosecution has not satisfied the foundation for using them as prior inconsistent statements.
Brief, unexplained remarks during voir dire generally will not require a mistrial when the court acts promptly, removes the juror, and gives a clear admonition.

The decision also illustrates the breadth of Kentucky complicity law in group sexual-assault cases. Liability does not depend on proving that the defendant personally performed every act constituting the charged offense; intentional participation in the collective assault may suffice.

Conclusion

Demaurion Moore v. Commonwealth of Kentucky affirms that intentional assistance in bringing a victim to the place of assault or restraining the victim can support complicity to first-degree sodomy. The required intent distinguishes complicity from mere facilitation. The opinion also confirms the independent admissibility of medically pertinent statements under KRE 803(4) and the effectiveness of prompt curative admonitions during voir dire.

Its practical significance is limited by its unpublished status, but its reasoning provides useful guidance on accomplice liability, sexual-assault evidence, jury instructions, and mistrial standards in Kentucky.