Inevitable Discovery via Mandatory Tow-Triggered Inventory Search Despite Incomplete Inventory Paperwork

Case: United States v. Arsenio Clayton (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2026) (not recommended for publication)
Posture: Appeal from denial of motion to suppress in a felon-in-possession prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

1. Introduction

The case arose from a family dispute outside an apartment complex in Shelby County, Tennessee. Deputies responded to a report that a man matching Arsenio Clayton’s clothing had fired shots into the air. At the scene, Clayton’s vehicle was stalled in the roadway, and deputies located a spent shell casing behind the car. After witnesses (Clayton’s nephew and sister) confirmed that Clayton fired a gun, deputies arrested him.

A deputy then examined a gray plastic grocery bag that Clayton had placed on the roof of the car and recovered a loaded handgun. Clayton moved to suppress the gun as the product of an unlawful search. The central issue on appeal was whether suppression was required, or whether the gun would have been discovered anyway through a lawful inventory search associated with towing the vehicle.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of suppression. Assuming (without deciding) that the bag search was unlawful, the court held that the firearm was admissible under the inevitable-discovery doctrine because deputies would have inevitably discovered it during a required inventory search once they towed the vehicle. The court further rejected Clayton’s attempts to defeat inevitability based on (i) the timing of his tow preference, (ii) alleged coercion by an officer, and (iii) incomplete inventory paperwork.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963): Cited for the exclusionary rule’s general principle—evidence obtained through unlawful searches is ordinarily excluded. The Clayton panel uses Wong Sun as the baseline from which exceptions (like inevitable discovery) operate.
• Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984): Supplies the governing inevitable-discovery standard: unlawfully obtained evidence may be admitted if it would have been acquired through lawful means. The opinion also relies on Nix’s admonition that inevitability cannot be “speculative” (467 U.S. at 444 n.5).
• United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 498, 500-01 (6th Cir. 1995): Provides the Sixth Circuit’s operational test: ask what would have happened if the challenged search had not occurred, and look to “routine procedure, policy, and practice” to avoid speculation. Kennedy also supports the proposition that inventory-search policies commonly make discovery “generally” inevitable for items covered by the policy.
• Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1987): Cited for the caretaking purposes and legitimacy of inventory searches following vehicle seizure—protecting against theft claims, safeguarding property, and addressing dangerous items. The court later uses Bertine again (479 U.S. at 369-70) to reject the argument that imperfect inventory paperwork undermines the search.
• United States v. Hockenberry, 730 F.3d 645, 659, 660-61 (6th Cir. 2013): Used for two points: (i) officers may use “practical judgment” to open containers when contents cannot be determined; (ii) failure to document some items during an inventory does not necessarily invalidate the inventory search.
• United States v. Kimes, 246 F.3d 800, 804 (6th Cir. 2001): Reinforces that when a vehicle is seized under a policy authorizing inventory, evidence subject to that inventory would typically be inevitably discovered.
• United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 602-03 (6th Cir. 2001): Cited for the district court’s de novo review of a magistrate judge’s findings in this suppression context.
• Survey of other circuits on paperwork imperfections (cited in footnote 2): The opinion cites decisions recognizing that missing or incomplete inventory forms do not automatically invalidate an otherwise lawful inventory search or defeat its reasonableness:
  • United States v. Trullo, 790 F.2 d 2 05, 2 06 (1st Cir. 1986)
  • United States v. Mundy, 621 F.3d 283, 293 (3d Cir. 2010)
  • United States v. Richardson, 229 F.3d 1145 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision)
  • United States v. Loaiza-Marin, 832 F.2d 867, 869 (5th Cir. 1987)
  • United States v. Cartwright, 630 F.3d 610, 616 (7th Cir. 2010)
  • United States v. Mayfield, 161 F.3d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1998)
  • United States v. Magdirila, 962 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2020)
  • United States v. Ulibarri, 149 F.4th 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 2025)
  • United States v. Westerman, 418 F. App'x 822, 823 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1534 (11th Cir. 1985))
  Collectively, these citations bolster the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that “inevitable discovery doesn’t depend on perfect paperwork.”

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeds in a structured sequence consistent with Nix v. Williams and United States v. Kennedy:

1. Assume arguendo illegality, then test inevitable discovery. The panel explicitly declines to decide whether the bag search was lawful, and instead asks whether the firearm would have been found by lawful means regardless.
2. Identify independent, policy-based grounds for towing. The court reads the Sheriff’s Office policy as authorizing/encouraging towing when:
   • the vehicle is needed for evidentiary purposes (probable cause of evidence in the car),
   • the vehicle obstructs traffic, and/or
   • post-arrest, the owner does not authorize release to a third party and the vehicle cannot be legally parked.
   The opinion finds all three plausibly supported by the facts—particularly that the car was stalled “in the middle of a public road,” and witnesses indicated the gun was “more than likely” in the car.
3. Link towing decision to a mandatory inventory search. The pivotal factual/legal connector is policy language: “Vehicles shall be inventoried whenever they are towed.” Because “shall” denotes a mandatory step, the court treats the inventory as a routine, non-speculative consequence of towing.
4. Define the inventory’s scope to include accessible areas and containers. The policy required inventory of accessible areas, including closed/locked compartments. The court reasons that the deputies had “access to the car’s exterior where the plastic bag was located,” and that a property-protection purpose would naturally prompt attention to a personal bag left on the vehicle. Under United States v. Hockenberry, officers may use “practical judgment” to open containers when contents are indeterminate—supporting the conclusion that the bag would have been inspected during the inventory.
5. Reject attempts to defeat “inevitability.”
   • Timing/knowledge argument: Clayton contended he agreed to towing only because the gun was already found. The court reads the recorded conversation as showing he did not know whether the gun had been found and that his tow preference was driven by fear/hostility toward his sister, not the discovery of the weapon.
   • Coercion argument: The court finds the officer’s tone and options offered were non-coercive; indeed, the officer cut Clayton off to avoid eliciting incriminating statements.
   • Policy-compliance/paperwork argument: Although the deputy did not itemize property on the form, the court holds that imperfect documentation does not negate the inevitability of a policy-mandated inventory, citing Colorado v. Bertine and United States v. Hockenberry, as well as multi-circuit authority in footnote 2.

3.3 Impact

Although unpublished, the opinion is a clear roadmap for litigating inevitable discovery in vehicle contexts within the Sixth Circuit:

• Policy language (“shall”) matters. Departments with mandatory inventory provisions tied to towing provide the government a strong inevitability argument, especially when towing is justified independently of the challenged search.
• Inventory scope can reach “external” containers when accessible and functionally part of the vehicle’s contents. By emphasizing access to the vehicle’s exterior and the caretaking objective of protecting property, Clayton strengthens arguments that bags left on a car may be inventoried with the vehicle.
• Paperwork defects are usually not case-dispositive. Clayton underscores that incomplete inventory forms, standing alone, will not defeat inevitable discovery (or the reasonableness of an inventory) absent evidence of bad faith or a non-inventory investigatory motive.
• Defense challenges may shift from “form errors” to “policy reality.” After Clayton, suppression arguments are more likely to succeed by contesting whether towing was truly justified under policy, whether inventory was actually routine in practice, or whether officers selectively deviated in a way showing investigatory pretext—rather than focusing primarily on missing itemization.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Exclusionary rule: A judge-made rule (grounded in Fourth Amendment enforcement) that can bar the government from using evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches.
• Inevitable discovery (from Nix v. Williams): Even if police obtained evidence unlawfully, it may still be admitted if the government proves the police would have found it anyway through lawful, routine steps.
• Inventory search (from Colorado v. Bertine): A standardized caretaking search of a lawfully seized/towed vehicle to record and safeguard property and protect police and the public. It is not supposed to be a pretext to look for evidence, but it may incidentally uncover contraband.
• “Non-speculative” prediction: Courts require concrete support—written policy, customary practice, and ordinary procedures—to show the lawful discovery would really have happened, not just “could have happened.”
• “Practical judgment” with containers (from United States v. Hockenberry): During an inventory, officers may open containers when they cannot otherwise determine what is inside, consistent with inventory policy and caretaking purposes.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Arsenio Clayton affirms that, in the Sixth Circuit, inevitable discovery is strongly supported when (1) towing is justified on independent grounds and (2) agency policy mandates an inventory whenever a vehicle is towed. The court further emphasizes that an inventory’s inevitability is not undermined merely by incomplete inventory documentation. The decision thus consolidates a practical, policy-focused approach: if routine towing and mandatory inventory would have occurred, suppression will generally fail even when the initial search is assumed unlawful.