Individualized Threat Evidence Required: Generalized Gang Violence and Country Conditions Alone Do Not Establish Asylum, Withholding, or CAT Relief

Case: Erika Urquilla-Pereira v. Attorney General United States of America (3d Cir. Jan. 22, 2026) (not precedential)
Agency: BIA affirming IJ Shana W. Chen (A208-377-341)
Disposition: Petition for review denied (asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection denied)

I. Introduction

Erika Evelin Urquilla-Pereira, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2015 as an unaccompanied minor, later giving birth to a son. She sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), alleging fear of MS-13 and gang-related violence.

The factual core of her claim was fear based on (i) her cousin Milton’s disappearance (she suspected MS-13 involvement but conceded uncertainty about whether he was alive or dead and whether MS-13 was responsible), (ii) MS-13’s extortion of her father, and (iii) an incident where masked men (possibly gang members) questioned her sister about her father. Critically, Urquilla testified that MS-13 never harmed, threatened, or even spoke to her before she left El Salvador, and her family remained in her hometown without further disturbance.

The key legal issues were whether these facts amounted to (1) past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution for asylum, (2) a clear probability of persecution for withholding, and (3) a likelihood of torture with government acquiescence for CAT—under deferential substantial-evidence review of the agency’s factual findings.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusions:

• Asylum: No past persecution and no objectively reasonable well-founded fear because Urquilla had no individualized harm or threats from MS-13 and lacked evidence that she would be targeted upon return.
• Withholding: Because withholding requires a more demanding “more likely than not” showing of persecution, failure to meet asylum necessarily defeated withholding.
• CAT: Country conditions evidence of danger in El Salvador, without specific evidence that Urquilla herself was more likely than not to be tortured (and with official involvement or acquiescence), was insufficient.

The court also narrowed the scope of review: it declined to address issues not relied upon by the BIA—specifically, arguments about the IJ’s reliance on then-vacated Attorney General decisions and arguments about particular social groups (PSGs) that the BIA did not reach as dispositive.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Scope of review when BIA affirms an IJ in part

• Myrie v. Att'y Gen., 855 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2017): The court applied Myrie for the proposition that when the BIA affirms and partially reiterates the IJ, the reviewing court looks to both decisions—but only to the grounds the BIA actually relied on. This was decisive in rejecting Urquilla’s attempt to litigate issues the BIA expressly disclaimed (e.g., reliance on certain Attorney General decisions).
• Sandie v. Att'y Gen., 562 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2009): Cited through Myrie to reinforce the “look to both decisions” approach when the BIA adopts or reiterates IJ reasoning.
• Chukwu v. Att'y Gen., 484 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2007): Cited through Myrie for the limiting principle: when the BIA relies only on some grounds, judicial review is confined to those grounds. This constrained the panel from reaching PSG disputes and the IJ’s references to vacated AG decisions.

2. Standard of review: substantial evidence

• Thayalan v. Att'y Gen., 997 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2021): The opinion invokes Thayalan to emphasize the “highly deferential” substantial-evidence standard: factual findings are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. This framing mattered because the court did not reweigh fear or country conditions; it asked only whether the BIA’s conclusions were permissible on this record.

3. Asylum framework: persecution and well-founded fear

• Espinosa-Cortez v. Att'y Gen., 607 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 2010): Provided the two-pronged asylum route: past persecution on a protected ground or a well-founded fear of future persecution on such a ground; also supplied the “subjectively and objectively reasonable” requirement for well-founded fear. The panel used this structure to affirm denial because the record lacked individualized harm/threats and thus lacked objective reasonableness.
• Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2008): Cited (via Espinosa-Cortez) for the definition of persecution as including “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.” The panel contrasted that level of severity with Urquilla’s testimony that she was never harmed or threatened.

4. Withholding standard: “clear probability” and its relationship to asylum

• S.E.R.L. v. Att'y Gen., 894 F.3d 535 (3d Cir. 2018): Used for the rule that withholding requires showing it is “more likely than not” the applicant would suffer persecution, a standard more demanding than asylum—so asylum failure generally forecloses withholding.
• Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att'y Gen., 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011): Quoted through S.E.R.L. for the “clear probability” formulation.

5. CAT standard: individualized likelihood of torture and insufficiency of generalized country conditions

• Quinteros v. Att'y Gen., 945 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2019): Provided the CAT elements: the applicant must show it is more likely than not she would be tortured if removed and that public officials will commit or acquiesce in the torture.
• Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2003): The panel relied on Tarrawally for the principle that country conditions evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to show a particular civilian is more likely than not to be tortured.
• Hernandez Garmendia v. Att'y Gen., 28 F.4th 476 (3d Cir. 2022): Reinforced the individualized-proof requirement: the “specter of torture” must be supported by specific evidence the applicant is more likely than not to be singled out.

6. Attorney General decisions referenced (and why they did not matter on review)

• Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) and Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019): Urquilla challenged the IJ’s reliance on these decisions, noting they were “subsequently vacated.” The panel refused to engage because the BIA “expressly disclaimed any reliance” on them, making the issue outside the scope of review under Myrie.
• Matter of S-S-F-M-, 29 I&N Dec. 207 (A.G. 2025) and Matter of R-E-R-M-, 29 I&N Dec. 202 (A.G. 2025): The panel added that the Justice Department had “restored the vacated decisions,” but treated this as unnecessary to the outcome because, again, the BIA did not rely on the disputed authorities.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Asylum: no past persecution; no objectively reasonable future fear

The court’s reasoning turned on the mismatch between generalized danger and individualized targeting. Even crediting (as the IJ did) Urquilla’s credibility and the dangerous presence of MS-13, the court emphasized these record points:

• No direct interaction: Urquilla testified she was not harmed, threatened, or even spoken to by MS-13 before leaving.
• Speculative inference regarding cousin: She suspected MS-13 killed her cousin but conceded uncertainty about whether he was alive/dead and whether MS-13 was responsible, let alone the motive.
• Extortion aimed at father, not her: The gang allegedly demanded money from her father, but she was not threatened with extortion or retaliation.
• Family remained without further harm: The continued presence of her family in the same town without additional disturbance undercut an inference of individualized risk to her.

On those facts, the BIA could reasonably find neither past persecution nor an objectively reasonable well-founded fear as described in Espinosa-Cortez v. Att'y Gen. The Third Circuit, constrained by substantial-evidence deference, found no basis to compel a contrary conclusion.

2. Issues the court refused to reach: PSG framing and vacated AG decisions

The opinion illustrates a procedural discipline with substantive consequences. Urquilla argued on appeal that she faced persecution as a member of “El Salvadoran females” and “El Salvadoran single mothers.” The panel declined to address this because the BIA did not affirm the IJ on PSG cognizability; instead it denied for lack of persecution and lack of well-founded fear. Under Myrie v. Att'y Gen., the reviewing court examines only the grounds the BIA relied upon.

Similarly, even if the IJ referenced Matter of A-B- and Matter of L-E-A-, the BIA’s disclaimer severed those issues from the petition for review.

3. Withholding of removal: asylum failure is typically fatal

Applying S.E.R.L. v. Att'y Gen., the court treated withholding as rising and falling with asylum here. Because Urquilla did not show an objectively reasonable well-founded fear for asylum, she necessarily could not meet the higher “more likely than not” persecution probability required for withholding.

4. CAT: generalized danger does not satisfy individualized likelihood + official acquiescence

For CAT, the court reiterated that harsh country conditions are not enough. Under Tarrawally v. Ashcroft and Hernandez Garmendia v. Att'y Gen., an applicant must provide specific evidence that she is more likely than not to be tortured, and Quinteros v. Att'y Gen. adds the requirement of official involvement or acquiescence. Because Urquilla reported no prior torture, no threats of torture, and no individualized evidence that she would be singled out, the CAT claim failed.

C. Impact

1. Practical impact on gang-based claims

The decision reinforces a recurring theme in Third Circuit immigration review: fear arising from pervasive gang violence must be anchored to individualized facts demonstrating targeting (or a concrete, applicant-specific probability of harm). Claims grounded primarily in:

• a relative’s disappearance without corroborated attribution or motive,
• extortion directed at a family member without spillover threats, and
• general country conditions,

are vulnerable when the applicant cannot show direct threats, past harm, or other specific indicators she will be singled out.

2. Impact on appellate strategy: issues “beyond our purview”

The opinion underscores that petitioners must engage the BIA’s actual rationale. Even potentially substantial disputes (e.g., PSG definition, vacated/restored AG precedents) may be unreviewable if the BIA did not rely on them. This channels advocacy toward:

• challenging the BIA’s persecution/fear/torture findings directly, and
• ensuring disputed legal frameworks are actually preserved as grounds the BIA adopts.

3. Nonprecedential but clarifying

Although not binding, the decision is a clear demonstration of how the Third Circuit applies (i) substantial-evidence deference, (ii) individualized-risk requirements in asylum/CAT contexts, and (iii) scope-of-review limits under Myrie v. Att'y Gen.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Persecution (asylum): More than general fear or hardship; it typically involves serious harm or threats (e.g., death threats, torture, severe confinement, or life-threatening economic deprivation).
• Well-founded fear: Must be subjective (the applicant genuinely fears harm) and objective (a reasonable person in the applicant’s circumstances would fear harm). The court accepted fear as understandable but found the objective component lacking.
• Particular social group (PSG): A protected “group” category in asylum law. Here, the panel did not decide whether proposed groups like “El Salvadoran females” or “El Salvadoran single mothers” qualify, because the BIA did not base its denial on PSG defects.
• Withholding of removal: A higher standard than asylum—requires showing persecution is “more likely than not,” not merely a reasonable possibility.
• CAT protection: Requires showing it is “more likely than not” the applicant will be tortured (a severe form of harm) and that government officials will do it or allow it (acquiesce). General violence in the country is usually insufficient without applicant-specific risk evidence.
• Substantial evidence review: On petition for review, the court does not decide the case anew; it asks whether the BIA’s factual conclusions are supported by enough evidence that a reasonable adjudicator could agree.

V. Conclusion

Erika Urquilla-Pereira v. Attorney General United States of America reaffirms that, even in countries facing severe gang violence, asylum and CAT relief ordinarily require individualized evidence of targeting, threats, or specific likelihood of harm—beyond generalized danger and tragic but uncertain events affecting others. Procedurally, it also highlights that federal appellate review is tethered to the BIA’s stated grounds; arguments aimed at issues the BIA did not rely on are frequently “beyond our purview,” regardless of their broader doctrinal importance.