Individualized Findings Required for U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) “Sophisticated Means”; Leadership May Establish “Caused” Conduct

1. Introduction

This consolidated sentencing appeal arises from an unemployment-insurance fraud scheme in which the defendants used victims’ personal identifying information to apply for benefits across multiple states, using multiple email accounts and a third party’s former residence as a mailing address.

Parties. The United States (Plaintiff-Appellee) versus codefendants Betsy Cacho Medina (Defendant-Appellant) and Rodney Choute (Defendant-Appellant).

Key issues.

• Whether the district court properly applied an aggravating-role enhancement to Cacho Medina under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).
• Whether the district court properly applied the sophisticated-means enhancement to both defendants under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), including the requirement of individualized findings.
• Whether Cacho Medina’s within-guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable, including alleged unwarranted disparities and inadequate consideration of mitigation.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit:

• Affirmed Cacho Medina’s sentence (including the § 3B1.1(c) aggravating-role enhancement and the § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) sophisticated-means enhancement), and rejected her substantive-reasonableness challenge.
• Vacated Choute’s sentence and remanded because the record did not support applying the sophisticated-means enhancement to him absent evidence of what he personally did or caused; the district court had not made individualized findings.

Although unpublished, the decision is a useful application of Eleventh Circuit doctrine—particularly the post-Buchanan requirement that sophisticated-means enhancements be tied to the individual defendant’s intentional conduct or causation.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review and sentencing framework

• United States v. Dimitrovski: supplies the general review framework—Guidelines interpretation/application reviewed de novo, factual findings for clear error. The panel uses this to separate legal questions (what the guideline requires) from factual sufficiency (what the record shows).
• United States v. Osorio-Moreno: establishes abuse-of-discretion review for substantive reasonableness, anchoring the deferential posture in the final section.

2) Aggravating-role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c)

• United States v. Ramirez: supports that a § 3B1.1 enhancement is appropriate when the defendant has decision-making authority and exercises control over another participant.
• United States v. Martinez: limits the enhancement where a defendant merely acts “in concert” with co-conspirators; also supplies the clear-error review framing for role determinations.
• United States v. Jiminez: critical proposition—control or influence over only one individual can support § 3B1.1(c).
• United States v. Lozano: illustrates that instructing a co-conspirator and being “intricately involved” can justify the enhancement even without formal decision-making authority.
• United States v. Ndiaye: reinforces that recruiting and instructing co-conspirators shows authority supporting an aggravating role.

3) Sentencing evidence: hearsay, PSR reliance

• United States v. Baptiste: allows sentencing courts to consider hearsay if it bears sufficient indicia of reliability; used to reject Cacho Medina’s challenge to reliance on Kimberly Johnson’s statement.
• United States v. Smith: confirms courts may rely on undisputed PSR statements. Here, Johnson’s account and corroborating mail/debit cards in the residence were treated as reliable and undisputed.

4) Sophisticated-means enhancement: scheme-level sophistication and defendant-level attribution

• United States v. Sosa: provides clear-error review for the “offense involved sophisticated means” finding.
• United States v. Buchanan: central precedent. It requires courts to address two questions: (1) whether the overall offense involved sophisticated means, and (2) whether the defendant “intentionally engaged in or caused” the sophisticated conduct. It also demonstrates that scheme-level sophistication does not automatically transfer to a minor participant.
• United States v. Uscinski and United States v. Bradley: together create the “meaningful appellate review” doctrine—district courts should make specific findings, but remand is unnecessary if the record clearly reflects the enhancement’s basis.
• United States v. Moran: defines “sophisticated means” by quoting the guideline commentary (especially complex/intricate execution or concealment; examples include shells and offshore accounts).
• United States v. Bane: supplies a functional test: repetitive, coordinated conduct designed to execute fraud and evade detection can be sophisticated even if individual steps are not.
• United States v. Ghertler: rejects a requirement that each individual action be sophisticated; the “totality of the scheme” can suffice.
• United States v. Feaster: emphasizes the relevance of scheme duration and loss size; a scheme may be designed to be hard to detect even without affirmative concealment acts.
• United States v. Presendieu and United States v. Campbell: comparators the panel uses to place this unemployment-benefits scheme on the spectrum of “sophisticated” frauds previously upheld.
• United States v. Bell: crucial bridge case for Cacho Medina—holds that findings of scheme-level sophistication plus that the defendant was an organizer/leader can be sufficient to apply § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C).
• United States v. Askew: assigns the burden to the Government to prove enhancement facts by a preponderance; used to justify vacatur for Choute due to evidentiary insufficiency.

5) Substantive reasonableness, disparities, mitigation

• United States v. Azmat and United States v. Docampo: articulate the “apples to apples” rule—no unwarranted disparity where codefendants are not similarly situated.
• United States v. Johnson: differences in criminal history categories and enhancements mean codefendants are not similarly situated for disparity purposes.
• United States v. Butler: the court need not discuss all mitigation in detail; acknowledgment of § 3553(a) factors and arguments is often sufficient.
• United States v. Irey: underscores extreme deference; a sentence need only be “reasonable,” not best.
• United States v. Hunt: within-guidelines sentences are ordinarily expected to be reasonable (without a formal presumption).

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Why the aggravating-role enhancement was affirmed for Cacho Medina

The panel treated leadership as a factual determination reviewed for clear error and found adequate indicia of control/influence:

• Physical evidence in the shared residence (notebook with victims’ PII, devices containing relevant emails, unemployment mail).
• Kimberly Johnson’s statement (accepted as reliable at sentencing under United States v. Baptiste and supported by undisputed PSR facts under United States v. Smith) that her former residence was used to receive scheme-related mail delivered to Cacho Medina.
• A text in which Cacho Medina provided an email username/password and instructed co-conspirator Nelson Garcia Medina to “check the status,” evidencing direction and supervision.

Invoking United States v. Jiminez, the court reiterated that control over even one participant is enough for § 3B1.1(c). The evidence showed more than acting “in concert” (the limitation described in United States v. Martinez); it showed instruction and influence.

2) Why the overall scheme qualified as “sophisticated”

The court synthesized United States v. Moran (definition), United States v. Bane (repetitive coordinated conduct to evade detection), United States v. Ghertler (totality approach), and United States v. Feaster (duration/loss relevance) to hold that the scheme’s architecture was sufficiently intricate:

• 33 victims’ identities; at least 47 applications; multiple email addresses; 16 states; use of a third-party prior residence; five-month operation; $169,825 obtained; undetected for about a year until discovered during an unrelated investigation.

Even if each step was “simple,” the combination of multi-jurisdiction targeting, repetition, coordination, and sustained operation supported sophistication under Eleventh Circuit standards, consistent with the upheld fraud structures in United States v. Presendieu and United States v. Campbell.

3) The key doctrinal move: individualized attribution is required, but can be satisfied by record proof of leadership “causing” the conduct

The opinion’s most consequential sentencing analysis is its enforcement of the second prong emphasized in United States v. Buchanan: beyond finding the scheme sophisticated, the court must address whether the defendant “intentionally engaged in or caused” the sophisticated conduct (§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)).

District court error. The district court made no explicit individualized finding for either defendant; it applied the enhancement based on the scheme’s sophistication alone.

Appellate cure (Cacho Medina). Applying United States v. Uscinski and United States v. Bradley, the panel affirmed because the record “clearly reflects the basis”:

• Given the affirmed leadership finding under § 3B1.1(c) and the affirmed conclusion that the scheme was sophisticated, Cacho Medina necessarily “caused” the sophisticated conduct through direction and orchestration.
• United States v. Bell was used as direct support for the proposition that scheme sophistication plus organizer/leader status can be sufficient to sustain § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C).

Mandatory remand (Choute). The same “record clearly reflects” pathway was unavailable for Choute. The panel identified only:

• His co-residence where evidence was found (circumstantial); and
• A message about a “Payment Protection Program” loan unrelated to the unemployment fraud.

Because the guilty-plea proffer and PSR described collective conduct without specifying Choute’s role, and because the district court rejected an aggravating-role enhancement for him, the record could not support a finding that he personally “intentionally engaged in or caused” sophisticated means. Under United States v. Askew, the Government failed to carry its burden; thus vacatur and remand followed, much like United States v. Buchanan.

4) Substantive reasonableness (Cacho Medina)

The panel rejected two challenges:

• Disparity. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) and cases like United States v. Azmat and United States v. Docampo, disparity arguments fail unless defendants are similarly situated. Differences in criminal history (Cacho Medina category IV vs. others lower) and enhancements (aggravating-role applied to her) meant no “apples to apples” comparison, consistent with United States v. Johnson.
• Mitigation. The district court explicitly addressed traumatic history and medical conditions; and under United States v. Butler, it was not required to exhaustively discuss every point. Deference under United States v. Irey and the expectation of reasonableness for within-guidelines sentences under United States v. Hunt supported affirmance of her 89-month sentence.

C. Impact

Practically, the opinion reinforces (and operationalizes) a two-step sentencing discipline for § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) in the Eleventh Circuit:

• No automatic transfer from “scheme sophistication” to “defendant sophistication.” Post-United States v. Buchanan, courts must connect sophisticated means to the individual defendant’s intentional conduct or causation.
• Leadership can supply the “caused” element. Where a defendant is properly found to be an organizer/leader and the scheme is sophisticated, United States v. Bell supports treating leadership as sufficient evidence that the defendant “caused” the sophisticated conduct—even if the defendant did not personally execute each sophisticated step.
• Evidence specificity matters for non-leaders. For defendants without a role enhancement (or other concrete proof of direction), generalized “collective” proffers and PSR narratives may be insufficient; absent particularized facts, the Government risks vacatur under United States v. Askew.

The remand for Choute signals to prosecutors and probation offices that plea proffers and PSRs should clearly attribute actions and decision-making to each defendant when seeking sophisticated-means enhancements.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Aggravating-role enhancement” (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c)). A guidelines increase for defendants who organized, led, managed, or supervised at least one other participant.
• “Sophisticated means” (U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)). Fraud carried out in an especially complex or intricate way, often through coordinated steps that make detection harder; the scheme can qualify even if each step seems simple.
• “Intentionally engaged in or caused.” The enhancement applies only if the defendant either personally performed sophisticated conduct or intentionally directed/triggered it (causation), not merely because they were associated with a sophisticated scheme.
• “Clear error” vs. “de novo.” “Clear error” is highly deferential to the trial court’s factfinding; “de novo” means the appellate court decides the legal question fresh.
• Hearsay at sentencing. Sentencing courts can consider hearsay if it is sufficiently reliable (e.g., consistent with other evidence and undisputed in the PSR).
• “Unwarranted disparity.” Different sentences are not “unwarranted” when defendants differ in criminal history, role, or guideline enhancements—courts compare “similarly situated” defendants only.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Betsy Alexandra Medina (and Choute) underscores a critical sentencing requirement in sophisticated-means cases: a court must do more than label a fraud scheme “sophisticated.” Under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) as applied through United States v. Buchanan, the enhancement must be tethered to the defendant’s own intentional conduct or causation.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Cacho Medina’s enhancements because her organizer/leader status, combined with a sophisticated scheme, established that she “caused” the sophisticated conduct (consistent with United States v. Bell). By contrast, it vacated Choute’s sentence because the record lacked individualized evidence of what he did or caused—illustrating that, for non-leaders, the Government must build a defendant-specific factual foundation or risk remand.