Introduction
Shabazz v. State of Indiana (Ind. Feb. 23, 2026) squarely addresses the limits of remote testimony in criminal jury trials under
Interim Administrative Rule 14(C), a rule adopted in the wake of the COVID-19 era’s rapid expansion of virtual court practices.
The case arose from a murder prosecution in Allen County in which the State—over the defendant Ajaylan M. Shabazz’s objection—was allowed to present
one key witness, Miquan Jones, by live two-way video.
The practical impetus was familiar: Jones was incarcerated in a facility roughly four hours away, and the State represented that the county jail lacked
resources to transport him. The legal question was not whether remote proceedings are generally beneficial, but whether the State had demonstrated
“good cause” (as Rule 14(C) requires) to dispense with the default expectation of in-person testimony in a testimonial proceeding—especially
where remote testimony intersects with a criminal defendant’s confrontation interests.
The Indiana Supreme Court used this case to announce a heightened, criminal-case-specific “good cause” standard when the
State seeks remote testimony from a prosecution witness at trial. Even though the Court ultimately affirmed Shabazz’s conviction on
harmless-error grounds, the decision meaningfully reshapes the evidentiary showing prosecutors must make before a trial court may allow remote witness
testimony in a criminal jury trial.
Summary of the Opinion
The Court held that when the State seeks to present remote testimony from a witness in a criminal trial under Interim Administrative Rule 14(C),
the State must present case-specific evidence showing that remote testimony is necessary to prevent a
concrete and substantial harm that would otherwise likely occur and that could not be adequately addressed through in-person testimony.
Applying that standard, the Court found the State’s showing deficient: the State offered only attorney representations (not evidence) about logistics and
resource limits, and it did not demonstrate a concrete harm or show it had exhausted available means to secure the witness’s in-person attendance.
Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Jones to testify virtually.
Nevertheless, the Court affirmed because the error was harmless under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(A)’s probable impact test.
Shabazz’s constitutional confrontation arguments were deemed waived for inadequate briefing, so the Court did not apply the
harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
Analysis
Precedents Cited
B.N. v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 199 N.E.3d 360 (Ind. 2022)
B.N. supplied the Court’s starting point for interpreting Interim Administrative Rule 14(C): in the civil context, “good cause”
demands “particularized and specific factual support.” The Shabazz Court adopted that evidentiary rigor as a baseline but held that
criminal trials require a heightened version of the concept because remote testimony uniquely pressures the fairness values protected
by confrontation principles. In other words, Shabazz does not discard B.N.; it builds on it and differentiates criminal prosecution witness testimony
as a category warranting greater caution.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)
While the Court emphasized it was not deciding a preserved constitutional question, it drew a central structural idea from
Maryland v. Craig: departures from face-to-face confrontation in criminal testimony have been tolerated (in many jurisdictions) only
when supported by case-specific necessity tied to an important public policy interest.
Shabazz imports one prong of Craig’s framework into Rule 14(C)’s “good cause” analysis: the State must show, with evidence, that remote testimony is
necessary to avert a real and identifiable harm—not merely that remote testimony is convenient or economical.
This is the doctrinal engine of the decision: “good cause” in this setting is not generic administrative good cause; it is necessity-based good cause.
Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1991)
Brady v. State is used to demonstrate that Indiana’s own confrontation tradition under Article 1, Section 13 has recognized that
some departures from in-person confrontation may be permissible when needed to avert serious harm. Shabazz uses Brady to show that
Indiana law already contains the conceptual ingredients for a necessity-and-harm approach; Shabazz simply operationalizes those ingredients as a
heightened “good cause” requirement under Rule 14(C) when the State is the proponent of remote testimony at a criminal trial.
State v. Tate, 985 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 2023)
State v. Tate is cited for two related propositions: (1) many jurisdictions rely on Craig-like reasoning in remote-testimony
disputes, and (2) a concrete risk (e.g., transmission of a highly contagious illness in a confined courtroom) can qualify as a harm that might justify
remote testimony. Tate thus functions as a modern, post-pandemic example of the type of specific risk that can satisfy a necessity
framework—contrasted with the non-specific resource arguments the State offered in Shabazz.
United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2006)
The Court quoted United States v. Yates for the commonsense proposition that video confrontation is not identical to physical,
face-to-face confrontation. This citation supports the Court’s underlying policy judgment: remote testimony carries qualitative differences that can
affect credibility assessment and the perceived gravity of the proceeding, which justifies treating remote testimony as an exception requiring a
strong, fact-driven justification.
Newson v. State, 526 P.3d 717 (Nev. 2023) and State v. Rogerson, 855 N.W.2d 495 (Iowa 2014)
These cases are cited for a limiting principle: efficiency, logistics, and expense—standing alone—are insufficient to justify remote
testimony against a criminal defendant. Shabazz aligns Indiana with jurisdictions that refuse to equate governmental convenience with necessity.
The citations reinforce the Court’s bottom line that “resources” and “distance” are not self-proving good cause.
G.W. v. Madison State Hosp., 245 N.E.3d 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024)
The Court analogized to G.W. v. Madison State Hosp. (an involuntary commitment context) as an example of what “case-specific evidence”
can look like: evidence addressing how an in-person courtroom proceeding would concretely harm the person involved. G.W. is used to illustrate the
evidentiary method—not to equate civil commitment with criminal prosecution—but to show the type of individualized record required.
Gajdos v. State, 462 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. 1984)
Gajdos v. State supplies a crucial evidentiary rule applied with real bite here: unsworn attorney statements are not evidence.
In Shabazz, the State’s “good cause” proffer was essentially attorney representations about transport difficulties and resources; the Court treated that
as legally inadequate support for a Rule 14(C) finding.
Garner v. State, 777 N.E.2d 721 (Ind. 2002)
Garner v. State is cited for the proposition that the record must reflect meaningful efforts to secure a witness’s attendance.
Shabazz uses Garner to criticize the State’s thin record of diligence: although it referenced a transport order, the record contained no documentation,
and the State did not demonstrate it pursued compulsory tools (including those referenced by statute).
Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483 (Ind. 2023) and B.N. v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 199 N.E.3d 360 (Ind. 2022)
These authorities frame the harmless-error analysis. Hayko v. State provided the articulation of Indiana’s “probable impact” test
under Appellate Rule 66(A): the appellant must show how the error’s probable impact undermines confidence in the outcome when viewed through the lens
of a reasonable, average jury. The Court also noted that the more demanding constitutional harmlessness standard is reserved for preserved constitutional
claims—linking harmlessness doctrine to waiver and issue preservation.
Keller v. State, 549 N.E.2d 372 (Ind. 1990)
Keller v. State is used to justify the Court’s refusal to develop Shabazz’s confrontation arguments for him. It reinforces the
institutional principle that appellate courts are adjudicators, not advocates; a party must present developed, cogent analysis.
Legal Reasoning
1) Rule 14(C) creates a presumption of in-person testimony—and demands more than convenience
The Court treated Interim Administrative Rule 14(C) as establishing a default for testimonial proceedings: in-person testimony “remains
of utmost importance” (as the rule’s commentary underscores). Remote testimony is thus an exception, not an equal alternative.
The Court’s key move was to interpret “good cause” contextually. In civil cases, “particularized and specific factual support” may suffice. In criminal
trials, however, Rule 14(C)’s explicit requirement that remote proceedings “comply with constitutional and statutory guarantees” means “good cause” must
be informed by the minimum values embedded in confrontation rights, even when (as here) the defendant fails to preserve a constitutional claim.
2) The new “good cause” standard for prosecution remote witness testimony at criminal trial
The Court announced a clear, necessity-based standard:
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The State must present case-specific evidence;
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showing remote testimony is necessary to prevent a concrete and substantial harm;
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that would otherwise likely occur;
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and that could not be adequately addressed if the witness testified in person.
Two features are especially important:
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Evidence, not assurances: A trial court cannot responsibly balance defendant rights and asserted necessity on a record comprised only
of prosecutor representations. The decision insists on an evidentiary basis (testimonial or documentary) suitable for adversarial testing.
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Necessity, not convenience: Resource constraints, distance, and expense are not categorically irrelevant, but they must be tied to a
concrete, substantial harm and shown to be unavoidable through reasonable alternatives. The Court also emphasized the State’s responsibility to use
available compulsory and logistical mechanisms rather than default to remote testimony.
3) Application: why the State’s showing failed in this record
The Court identified two independent failures:
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No evidence presented: The State’s “transport order” was not in the record; the remainder was unsworn attorney narrative, which
cannot substitute for evidence under Gajdos v. State.
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No concrete and substantial harm shown: Even if the representations were accepted, they established at most inconvenience and cost.
The State did not identify what specific resources were lacking, why that deficiency created an unavoidable risk, or why Jones’s in-person testimony
could not be secured through other steps. The Court also noted the State failed to demonstrate it exhausted tools to compel attendance (referencing
Ind. Code § 35-37-5-3 and the record’s lack of diligence as in Garner v. State).
Critically, the Court warned against a rule that would allow remote testimony whenever an incarcerated witness is far away and transport is burdensome.
That would invert Rule 14(C)’s presumption and normalize remote testimony in precisely the setting where the Court viewed the risks as heightened.
4) Waiver of confrontation claims and the choice of harmless-error standard
The Court separated two inquiries:
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Rule compliance (whether good cause existed under Rule 14(C)); and
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Constitutional compliance (whether confrontation rights were violated).
Shabazz lost the second inquiry due to waiver: he did not develop a cogent confrontation argument under Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), prompting reliance
on Keller v. State. As a result, the Court reviewed harmlessness under Appellate Rule 66(A)’s “probable impact” test (per
Hayko v. State), not under the stricter harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard reserved for preserved constitutional error.
5) Harmlessness: why affirmance followed despite error
The Court treated Jones’s remote testimony as largely cumulative in a case with substantial independent evidence:
Terry’s eyewitness account, Dustin’s testimony about Shabazz’s admission and threat, forensic evidence (blood DNA on Shabazz’s shoes), and an
incriminating letter. Jones’s credibility was also impeached by his deal-seeking motive (offering testimony for home detention).
On that record, Shabazz did not meet his burden to show the error’s probable impact undermined confidence in the verdict.
Impact
1) A practical recalibration: remote criminal trial testimony becomes harder to justify
Shabazz’s most significant doctrinal contribution is converting “good cause” from a flexible administrative standard into a
necessity-and-harm standard when the State seeks to offer remote testimony at a criminal trial. The decision signals that remote
testimony is not a routine solution to scheduling problems, incarceration logistics, or county budget pressures.
2) Evidence creation and record-building will become central
The Court effectively instructs prosecutors and trial courts: if remote testimony is sought, the proponent must build a record.
That likely means documentation of transport efforts, affidavits or testimony from transport officials, details on safety or staffing constraints, and
proof that alternatives were explored (rescheduling, securing additional personnel, enforcing transport orders, subpoenas, or other lawful means).
3) Incentives for diligence in securing in-person testimony
By emphasizing the State’s obligation to exhaust available means and the risk of normalizing convenience-based remote testimony for incarcerated
witnesses, Shabazz incentivizes earlier and more robust trial preparation. A thin “we can’t transport him” explanation is unlikely to satisfy Rule 14(C)
after this decision.
4) Doctrinal spillover: guidance without deciding constitutionality
Although the Court avoided a direct constitutional holding due to waiver, its reasoning is steeped in confrontation values and Craig-like necessity
analysis. Future litigants who properly preserve confrontation challenges may find Shabazz’s Rule 14(C) framework an important predictor of how Indiana
courts will evaluate constitutional questions involving two-way video testimony.
5) Litigation strategy: preservation matters
Shabazz also serves as a cautionary tale: even where a defendant wins on a procedural rule interpretation, waiver of constitutional arguments can alter
the harmless-error framework and make affirmance more likely. Defendants opposing remote testimony should develop both:
(a) a Rule 14(C) objection, and (b) a specific confrontation analysis under Article 1, Section 13 and the Sixth Amendment, supported by authority.
Complex Concepts Simplified
“Testimonial proceeding”
A proceeding where the court receives sworn oral testimony (for example, a jury trial). Rule 14(C) treats these as especially important
to hold in person.
“Good cause” under Interim Administrative Rule 14(C)
After Shabazz, when the State wants a prosecution witness to testify remotely in a criminal trial, “good cause” is not satisfied by general logistical
difficulty. The State must prove—using evidence specific to the witness and circumstances—that remote testimony is necessary to prevent a
concrete and substantial harm likely to occur with in-person testimony.
“Case-specific evidence”
Evidence tailored to the particular witness and situation (documents, sworn testimony, factual details), not broad assertions like “we don’t have
resources.”
“Unsworn statements of attorneys are not evidence”
Lawyers’ representations can frame an issue, but they are not proof. Courts generally require sworn testimony or admissible documentation to support
factual findings—especially when a procedural exception depends on those facts.
Confrontation rights
The Sixth Amendment and Indiana’s Article 1, Section 13 protect a criminal defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses. Remote testimony can
implicate these rights because physical face-to-face testimony may affect demeanor evaluation and the perceived seriousness of testifying.
Shabazz did not decide the constitutional question (because it was waived) but used confrontation principles to shape the meaning of “good cause.”
“Abuse of discretion”
A deferential appellate review standard. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
law. Here, the abuse occurred because the trial court allowed remote testimony without the required evidentiary and necessity showing.
Harmless error: “probable impact” vs. “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”
Indiana’s Appellate Rule 66(A) asks whether an error likely affected the jury’s verdict (probable impact). The stricter “harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt” test typically applies to preserved constitutional errors. Because Shabazz waived his constitutional confrontation claim, the Court used the
probable-impact standard and found the error harmless given the strength of other evidence.