Inconsistent (or Hung) Verdicts Do Not Undermine Sufficiency Review of a § 1512(c)(2) “Corrupt” Attempt to Induce a Witness to Recant

Introduction

In United States v. Singh (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 2026) (summary order), the Second Circuit affirmed Parwinder Singh’s convictions for attempted obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) and escape from custody under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a), following a jury trial in the Eastern District of New York (Chen, J.). The underlying factual backdrop involved alleged violent conduct toward Sadaf Anwar and subsequent federal kidnapping charges. The jury, however, did not return a verdict on kidnapping, while it did convict on obstruction and escape.

The central appellate issue was narrow but recurring: whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Singh acted “corruptly” in attempting to influence Anwar’s testimony, particularly given the jury’s failure to convict on the kidnapping count. Singh framed his communications as mere efforts to have Anwar “tell the truth,” contending the obstruction verdict could not stand in light of the unresolved kidnapping count.

Important procedural note: this decision is a SUMMARY ORDER and expressly “DO[ES] NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.” Even so, it is a useful synthesis of how the Second Circuit applies settled sufficiency standards, and it illustrates how courts separate obstruction liability from the fate of the underlying substantive charge.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed. It held that (1) sufficiency review of the obstruction conviction is independent of the jury’s inability to reach a verdict on kidnapping, and (2) the trial evidence permitted a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Singh corruptly attempted to persuade Anwar to recant falsely—both through his own recorded calls and through outreach by associates (including alleged offers of money to “drop the charges”).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is anchored in familiar Second Circuit sufficiency doctrine and the Supreme Court’s instruction on inconsistent verdicts. The cited authorities perform distinct roles:

  • United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011): cited for the standard of review—denial of a Rule 29 motion is reviewed de novo. This frames the appellate lens: the court does not “retry” the case but independently assesses whether the evidence could support a rational conviction.
  • United States v. Requena, 980 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2020): cited for the canonical instruction that the reviewing court views evidence “in the light most favorable to the Government” and draws reasonable inferences in the Government’s favor. This matters in obstruction cases, where intent is often inferential.
  • United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015): cited for the “rational trier of fact” test—whether any rational juror could find the elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The panel applies this to the “corruptly” element and the “attempt” component.
  • United States v. Best, 219 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.1998)): relied upon to emphasize that the government need not exclude every hypothesis of innocence and that the jury resolves testimonial conflicts, credibility disputes, and competing inferences. This directly rebuts Singh’s “I was just asking for the truth” narrative.
  • United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2010): reinforces that, on sufficiency review, the appellate court assumes the jury resolved credibility and inference disputes in the prosecution’s favor. This is pivotal where the record contains recorded calls, witness testimony, and surveillance video that a jury could weigh differently than a defendant urges.
  • United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984): the doctrinal centerpiece for Singh’s main gambit. The panel quotes Powell to distinguish sufficiency review from “problems caused by inconsistent verdicts.” The key takeaway is that a jury’s result on one count does not control whether evidence is sufficient on another count; sufficiency review must be “independent of the jury’s determination that evidence on another count was insufficient.” Here, the unresolved kidnapping count could not, as a matter of law, negate the obstruction conviction.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Step One: Define the review posture (Rule 29 / sufficiency). Applying Persico, the court reviewed the Rule 29 denial de novo. Under Requena and Valle, it asked whether—viewing the record favorably to the Government—any rational juror could find each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
  2. Step Two: Neutralize the “hung kidnapping count” argument. Singh relied on the absence of a kidnapping conviction to argue lack of corrupt intent. The court rejected that move categorically using Powell: the evidentiary sufficiency for obstruction is not diminished by the jury’s inability (or unwillingness) to convict on another count. Put differently, obstruction can be proved even if the underlying alleged crime is not.
  3. Step Three: Identify evidence supporting “corrupt” persuasion and “attempt.” The panel highlighted recorded calls in which Singh coached Anwar to adopt a narrative inconsistent with her trial testimony and other evidence (e.g., the circumstances of her shoes, and whether she asked to be put in the car). The court treated these inconsistencies as permitting a jury inference that Singh was not seeking “truth,” but rather urging false recantation.

    The panel also relied on third-party outreach evidence: recorded discussions with associates about “getting [Singh] out,” including advice to feign affection toward Anwar until release, and testimony that an associate offered Anwar $5,000 to “drop the charges.” The court treated this as further circumstantial proof of a coordinated effort to influence her dealings with law enforcement and anticipated testimony.
  4. Step Four: Defer to the jury on credibility and inferences. Invoking Best, Morrison, and Abu-Jihaad, the panel stressed that disputes such as whether Singh told Anwar not to speak with his associate, or what inferences to draw from the timing and content of calls, were for the jury. The appellate court’s role was limited to assessing whether the jury’s chosen inferences were rational—not whether other inferences were possible.

Impact

Although nonprecedential, the order signals several practical points likely to influence how obstruction cases are investigated, charged, tried, and defended:

  • Obstruction is chargeable and provable independently of the “main” offense. The decision underscores that obstruction exposure is not contingent on a conviction for the underlying alleged crime; defendants cannot rely on a hung or inconsistent verdict to defeat sufficiency on obstruction.
  • Recorded “coaching” of a witness is powerful circumstantial evidence of “corrupt” intent. The court treated detailed scripting—especially where contradicted by other evidence—as a basis for inferring an intent to procure false statements.
  • Third-party pressure and inducements can be attributed to a defendant’s obstructive effort. The panel did not require that Singh personally offer money; evidence that associates acted after communicating with him, coupled with recorded strategizing, supported the jury’s inference of an obstructive campaign.
  • Defense framing as “truth-seeking” faces an inference battle, not a categorical defense. Where the record supports competing stories, sufficiency review will rarely overturn a jury’s choice between them.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Sufficiency of the evidence”
A narrow appellate test: not whether the appellate judges believe the defendant is guilty, but whether any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when evidence is viewed in the prosecution’s favor.
Rule 29 motion (judgment of acquittal)
A defendant’s request for the trial judge to enter a not-guilty judgment because the evidence is legally insufficient. Denial is reviewed de novo on appeal, but under the highly deferential “rational juror” framework.
“Corruptly” (in obstruction statutes)
In plain terms, acting with an improper purpose—such as trying to cause a witness to lie, recant falsely, or withhold truthful information from the government—rather than legitimately urging truthful cooperation.
“Attempt”
A crime can be complete even if the desired result does not occur. For attempted obstruction, the government must show purposeful steps toward obstructing justice—even if the witness does not ultimately change their story.
“Inconsistent verdicts” / “hung count”
Juries can acquit (or fail to reach a verdict) on one count and convict on another, even if the outcomes seem logically mismatched. Under United States v. Powell, that mismatch does not control sufficiency review of the count of conviction.

Conclusion

United States v. Singh reinforces a settled but frequently litigated point: a defendant cannot leverage a jury’s failure to convict on a substantive charge to collapse a separate obstruction conviction on sufficiency review. Applying United States v. Powell and standard Second Circuit sufficiency principles, the panel held that recorded witness coaching, inconsistencies with other evidence, and coordinated third-party pressure provided a rational basis for the jury to find a “corrupt” attempt to influence testimony under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).