Incompetency-Based Due Process Challenges Can Defeat Summary Judgment in Tax-Lien Quiet Title Actions Without Proof of Purchaser’s Knowledge

1. Introduction

In BR Madison, LLC v McCord (2026 NY Slip Op 01178), the Appellate Division, Second Department reviewed a quiet title action brought under RPAPL article 15 involving residential property in Hempstead. The plaintiff, BR Madison, LLC, claimed title through a municipal tax lien sale and a subsequently issued treasurer’s deed. After the original owner, Estelle Y. McCord, died, her heir, Paris J. Woods, appeared and contested the sufficiency of due process on the ground that McCord was an unadjudicated incompetent (allegedly suffering from dementia/Alzheimer’s disease) when the key statutory notices were sent.

The core issue was whether the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment quieting title when the record showed facial compliance with mailing and publication requirements, but the heir raised evidence suggesting the owner’s incompetency at the time notice was provided.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • The court dismissed the direct appeal from the March 7, 2022 order because it was superseded by the later order and judgment.
  • The court reversed the March 23, 2022 order and judgment and denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
  • The court held that, although the plaintiff’s proof of mailing/publication was facially sufficient to satisfy due process, Woods raised a triable issue of fact as to whether McCord was incompetent and thus deprived of due process.
  • The appeal from the April 6, 2023 order denying renewal was dismissed as academic given the reversal on summary judgment.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Matter of Aho , 39 NY2d 241, 248

The court relied on Matter of Aho for the appellate procedure principle that the right to directly appeal from an intermediate order terminates upon entry of a final judgment (or an order and judgment), with the issues reviewable on appeal from the final paper. This citation explains the dismissal of the appeal from the March 7, 2022 order while still permitting review of its substance.

Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. , 339 US 306, 314

Mullane supplied the foundational due process test: notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,” to apprise interested parties and allow objections. The Second Department treated this as the governing constitutional standard for notice in proceedings that may terminate property rights, including tax-lien enforcement culminating in a treasurer’s deed.

BR Madison, LLC v Novas , 234 AD3d 907 , 909-910

The panel used BR Madison, LLC v Novas to frame and apply the due process inquiry in a similar tax-lien context: routine statutory notice methods (mailing/publication) can be facially adequate. But adequacy is still assessed “under all the circumstances,” leaving room for individualized factors—such as incompetency—that may make otherwise standard notice constitutionally insufficient.

Matter of Harner v County of Tioga , 5 NY3d 136, 140

Matter of Harner v County of Tioga supported the proposition that mailing/publication evidence can satisfy due process on its face in tax enforcement matters. The court cited it to acknowledge that the plaintiff made a strong prima facie showing.

Matter of Roslyn Jane Holdings, LLC v Jefferson , 144 AD3d 1041 , 1043

Like Harner, Matter of Roslyn Jane Holdings, LLC v Jefferson reinforced that adherence to statutory notice channels generally supports due process compliance. The citation underscored why the plaintiff’s initial evidentiary showing was sufficient to shift the burden on summary judgment.

Matter of Blum v Scaduto , 127 AD2d 549, 553

Matter of Blum v Scaduto was pivotal for rejecting the plaintiff’s attempt to impose an additional burden on the challenger. The Second Department quoted it for the rule that there is no requirement that the party seeking to divest title (or those involved in the divestiture process) have actual or constructive knowledge of the owner’s incapacity before an incompetency-based due process challenge can create a factual issue.

Covey v Town of Somers , 351 US 141, 146-147

Covey v Town of Somers supplied the constitutional backbone of the incompetency doctrine: notice may be constitutionally inadequate if directed to a person known (or effectively unable) to understand it due to mental incapacity, even if statutory notice steps were followed. The Second Department invoked Covey to confirm that incompetency can undermine the constitutional sufficiency of notice in proceedings that forfeit property interests.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Plaintiff’s prima facie showing: The plaintiff produced proof of (i) first-class mailing of the notice of tax lien sale to the owner’s address of record, (ii) publication in the Village’s official newspaper, and (iii) mailing of the redemption notice by both first-class and certified mail, followed by a treasurer’s deed. Under the cited due process precedents, this was facially adequate and sufficient to support summary judgment unless rebutted.
  2. Rebuttal creating a triable issue: Woods submitted an affidavit and hospital discharge instructions close in time to the notice of tax lien sale, reflecting dementia/Alzheimer’s-related information. The court treated this as sufficient to raise a factual question whether McCord was incompetent when notice was sent and therefore whether the notice was “reasonably calculated” to apprise her, as due process requires.
  3. No “knowledge” prerequisite: The court expressly rejected the argument that Woods had to show the plaintiff or municipality knew or should have known of McCord’s incapacity. Relying on Matter of Blum v Scaduto and Covey v Town of Somers, the court held that incompetency evidence can itself create a triable issue about constitutional adequacy of notice, making summary judgment inappropriate.
  4. Disposition: Because summary judgment was denied, the renewal appeal became academic; the merits would proceed with factual development on competency and due process.

C. Impact

  • Heightened litigation risk in tax-lien title cases: Even where municipalities and purchasers have meticulous proof of statutory mailings and publications, challengers may defeat dispositive motions by producing competent evidence suggesting the owner’s mental incapacity at the critical notice periods.
  • Summary judgment becomes harder when incapacity is credibly raised: The decision signals that courts should treat incompetency allegations—supported by medical documentation near the notice dates—as fact-intensive, often requiring a trial or evidentiary hearing.
  • No safe harbor based on lack of knowledge: The court’s explicit rejection of a “knowledge” requirement means purchasers cannot rely on the argument that they were unaware of incapacity to obtain summary judgment. Practically, this may incentivize more robust pre-foreclosure due diligence and more careful handling when a property owner’s capacity appears questionable.
  • Broader due process framing: The opinion reinforces that due process is not merely a checklist of statutory steps; it remains a circumstance-specific constitutional inquiry under Mullane.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

RPAPL article 15 (quiet title)
A lawsuit used to determine and declare who has valid title to real property, clearing competing claims.
Tax lien sale / treasurer’s deed
A municipality may sell a lien for unpaid taxes; after statutory steps (including a redemption period), a deed may issue transferring title.
Due process notice “reasonably calculated”
The Constitution requires notice methods that are likely, in the real world and under the circumstances, to inform the affected person.
Unadjudicated incompetent
A person who may lack mental capacity even without a formal court determination or guardianship order.
Summary judgment / triable issue of fact
Summary judgment ends a case without trial only when no material facts are genuinely disputed. A “triable issue” means the dispute must be resolved with evidence, typically at trial.
Academic appeal
An appeal becomes academic when the appellate court’s ruling on another issue makes it unnecessary to decide the appealed order.

5. Conclusion

BR Madison, LLC v McCord reinforces a constitutional limit on tax-lien-based title claims: facial compliance with statutory mailing and publication requirements may not warrant judgment as a matter of law where credible evidence suggests the owner was mentally incompetent when notice was provided. Crucially, the Second Department confirmed—consistent with Matter of Blum v Scaduto and Covey v Town of Somers—that a challenger need not show the divesting party’s knowledge of incapacity to raise a triable due process issue. The decision thus pushes tax-lien quiet title litigation toward fact development on capacity whenever incapacity evidence is timely and concrete.