In re Zaczyk: Intent to Complete Work Later Mitigates but Does Not Excuse Knowing False Billing

Supreme Court of Kansas · No. 130,454 · November 6, 2026 · Per curiam

1. Introduction

In In re Zaczyk, the Supreme Court of Kansas imposed a one-year suspension on attorney Cynthia J. Zaczyk for knowingly billing clients for work she had not performed. The case concerned approximately 270 unfinished documents, predominantly client letters, and false charges that led her former firm, Cordell & Cordell, to refund $85,434.

The disciplinary violations were undisputed. Zaczyk stipulated that her conduct violated Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 1.5(a), requiring reasonable fees, and KRPC 8.4(c), prohibiting dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. The central question was the appropriate sanction: how should the court weigh prolonged false billing and attempted concealment against inexperience, difficult working conditions, health problems, remorse, and rehabilitation?

The opinion does not announce a new categorical sanction for false billing. Its significance lies in its application of established disciplinary principles: an intention to perform the work eventually does not excuse knowingly false charges, but a supported finding of that intention can affect the sanction. The court also distinguished meaningful rehabilitation from the limited mitigating value of self-reporting undertaken only after discovery and an employer’s ultimatum.

2. Background and Procedural History

The practice setting and billing misconduct

Zaczyk began working at Cordell & Cordell’s Wichita office as an intern in June 2020 and became an associate after receiving her Kansas license in October 2020. Her initial caseload of approximately 35 to 40 matters increased to 50 to 60 active cases. Attorney departures, four changes in management, and geographically remote supervision contributed to a difficult working environment.

The firm expected 1,500 billable hours annually and required several categories of client letters, including initial, 30-day, 60-day, and monthly updates. Clients were charged for those letters. After falling behind, Zaczyk began recording charges for letters she neither prepared nor sent, generally billing one hour per nonexistent letter. She also billed for motions, orders, discovery, and other work before performing it. Some work was completed later without further billing, but approximately 270 documents remained uncompleted.

The audit identified fictitious billing spanning July 2021 through August 2023. Although Zaczyk intended to catch up, her workload never improved sufficiently for her to do so. When a client questioned a charge for an undelivered letter, she would prepare and send it and stop billing that client for further nonexistent letters.

Discovery and concealment

A client’s complaint about a billed but unfiled motion prompted management scrutiny. Zaczyk initially claimed she had drafted the motion and was awaiting a court date. She forwarded an email purportedly supporting that explanation and initially insisted it was authentic before admitting otherwise. File metadata also indicated that the motion had been created only around the time management began asking questions.

Zaczyk initially denied similar billing involving other clients. A broader audit revealed additional instances, and she ultimately admitted the false billing. Given the choice between resigning and self-reporting or being terminated, she resigned and reported the misconduct to disciplinary authorities in September 2023. She thereafter cooperated with the firm’s audit and the disciplinary investigation.

The disciplinary proceedings

The Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal complaint on March 17, 2025. Zaczyk answered and later stipulated to both charged violations. Following a June 3, 2025 hearing, the disciplinary panel recommended a 90-day suspension without a reinstatement hearing.

The Disciplinary Administrator sought a two-year suspension, with eligibility to seek reinstatement after nine months and a required reinstatement hearing. Zaczyk requested a 30- or 60-day suspension, followed by reinstatement without a hearing and a subsequently agreed probation plan. No exceptions were filed to the panel’s factual findings or legal conclusions.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court found clear and convincing evidence of both stipulated violations and concluded that the short suspensions proposed by Zaczyk and the panel substantially understated the misconduct’s seriousness.

  • Violations: Charging for unperformed work violated KRPC 1.5(a); the dishonest billing violated KRPC 8.4(c).
  • Sanction: A one-year suspension, effective November 6, 2026.
  • Reinstatement: Zaczyk may apply under Supreme Court Rule 232 after the suspension without undergoing a reinstatement hearing. Reinstatement is not automatic.
  • Additional obligations: Compliance with Rule 231’s post-suspension notice requirements and payment of disciplinary proceeding costs.

A minority would have imposed a two-year suspension, stayed after one year if the Disciplinary Administrator approved an oversight plan. That alternative was not the court’s operative order.

4. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion reproduces the panel’s discussion before presenting the Supreme Court’s own analysis. That distinction matters: several authorities supported the panel’s recommendation or procedural observations, while others supplied the court’s governing framework. Adoption of the violations did not mean acceptance of the panel’s proposed sanction or every aspect of its commentary.

Proof, factual findings, and disciplinary authority

In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 375 (2011)

The court cited this decision for the requirement that attorney misconduct be established by clear and convincing evidence. Together with Rule 226(a)(1)(A), it supplied the governing burden of proof, notwithstanding Zaczyk’s admissions.

In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 (2009)

Quoting In re Dennis, this decision defined clear and convincing evidence as evidence making the asserted facts “highly probable.” It clarified the degree of confidence required to establish professional misconduct.

In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 (2008)

This authority served two functions. It supplied the underlying definition of clear and convincing evidence and supported the court’s refusal to reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility. The second function was especially important: the panel had accepted Zaczyk’s testimony that she intended to complete the work later, and the court respected that factual determination when selecting the sanction.

In re Hodge, 307 Kan. 170, 231, 407 P.3d 613 (2017)

The court relied on this case for the four-part sanctions framework: the ethical duty violated, the lawyer’s mental state, actual or potential injury, and aggravating or mitigating circumstances. This framework organized the move from established misconduct to an individualized disciplinary response.

In re Long, 315 Kan. 842, 853, 511 P.3d 952 (2022)

This decision established that the Supreme Court was not bound by the parties’ or panel’s recommendations. It supported the court’s authority to impose a one-year suspension even though none of the three recommendations proposed that precise disposition.

Comparable misconduct and individualized sanctions

In re Kupka, 311 Kan. 193, 458 P.3d 242 (2020)

This was the principal factual comparison. As the panel described it, the case involved a recently graduated attorney facing demanding firm expectations, insufficient mentorship and support, increased caseloads following colleagues’ departures, and associated mental-health difficulties. The attorney created documents to make it appear that work had been completed. The sanction was a two-year suspension with eligibility to apply for reinstatement after nine months.

The Disciplinary Administrator relied on those parallels. The panel identified an important distinction: In re Kupka did not involve billing clients for unperformed work. The Supreme Court treated it as a useful comparator, but not as a binding sentencing template.

In re Miller, 282 Kan. 689, 147 P.3d 150 (2006)

The panel described a nine-year practice of billing the Workers Compensation Fund inflated, unearned, and unreasonable fees, resulting in a two-year suspension. Both the panel and the court cited the case. It demonstrated the seriousness of dishonest fee practices, while its substantially longer duration limited direct comparison with Zaczyk’s conduct.

In re Scimeca, 265 Kan. 742, 760, 962 P.2d 1080 (1998)

The panel cited this decision as an example of indefinite suspension in a case involving billing for time not spent representing a client. It showed that false billing can justify sanctions more severe than a fixed short suspension. The supplied opinion does not provide enough additional facts to make a closer comparison.

In re Orrick, 290 Kan. 727, 233 P.3d 257 (2010)

The Supreme Court included this decision among similar cases imposing two-year suspensions. Because the opinion does not describe its underlying facts, its stated relevance is limited to that comparative sanction.

In re Jordan, 316 Kan. 501, 550, 518 P.3d 1203 (2022)

Both the panel and the Supreme Court invoked the principle that each sanction depends on the particular violations and aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court’s observation that past sanctions provide “little guidance” explains why the two-year comparator cases did not dictate the outcome.

In re Williams, 302 Kan. 990, 1003, 362 P.3d 816 (2015)

Cited by the panel alongside In re Jordan, this decision reinforced the individualized nature of disciplinary sanctions. It supported using prior cases as context rather than treating them as a rigid schedule of penalties.

Probation and reinstatement procedure

In re Stockwell, 296 Kan. 860, 868, 295 P.3d 572 (2013)

The panel cited this authority in stating that probation was inappropriate for dishonest conduct. Zaczyk’s counsel acknowledged that concern while proposing probation after a short suspension. The citation supported the panel’s rejection of that proposed approach; the Supreme Court ultimately ordered suspension without adopting the suggested probation arrangement.

In re Daniels, 320 Kan. 365, 380–81, 568 P.3d 846 (2025)

This decision supplied a separate procedural objection. Rule 227 requires a proposed probation plan to be submitted to and reviewed by the hearing panel. The panel therefore declined to recommend a plan to be developed after the hearing. The lesson is procedural as well as substantive: a party seeking probation must present a compliant plan at the required stage.

In re Janoski, 316 Kan. 370, 389, 516 P.3d 125 (2022)

The panel relied on this case to recognize that reinstatement proceedings take time and can extend the practical interruption of practice beyond a nominal suspension period. That concern supported its recommendation to dispense with a reinstatement hearing. The Supreme Court likewise waived the hearing, although it did not expressly adopt the panel’s administrative-delay rationale.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Admissions resolved liability, but not the sanction

Under Rule 228(g)(1) and (2), the absence of exceptions meant the panel’s findings and conclusions were deemed admitted. Along with the stipulation and record evidence, this established the two violations by clear and convincing evidence. The court nevertheless retained responsibility for deciding the appropriate discipline.

This separates two questions that are sometimes conflated: whether professional misconduct occurred and what response it warrants. Agreement on the first does not constrain the court’s independent judgment on the second.

2. The false charges violated distinct professional duties

KRPC 1.5(a) addresses the reasonableness of fees. The panel’s conclusion was direct: fees for work not performed were “patently unreasonable.” KRPC 8.4(c) separately addressed the dishonesty involved in presenting unperformed work as billable work already done.

The decision concerns fictitious billing entries, not a general prohibition on legitimate advance-fee arrangements. Its core problem was the knowing misrepresentation of work performed. An intention to do the work later did not make those representations accurate when made.

The attempted cover-up further informed the sanction. Although the fabricated email itself was not billed to the client, the court emphasized the false explanation, backdated email, and initial insistence on authenticity as evidence of the misconduct’s seriousness.

3. Knowing misconduct and substantial injury favored suspension

The panel applied ABA Standard 3.0’s factors and found that Zaczyk knowingly violated duties to charge reasonable fees and maintain professional integrity. ABA Standard 4.62 identifies suspension as generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client and causes injury or potential injury.

Zaczyk testified that she knew of no resulting harm or prejudice to clients’ underlying cases. That did not eliminate the financial injury from improper charges. Refunds corrected the charges but did not erase the misconduct or the injury originally caused.

4. Aggravation made a brief suspension inadequate

The panel identified a selfish motive—preserving employment—and a pattern of misconduct involving numerous clients. The Supreme Court particularly emphasized:

  • Approximately 270 documents over two years, rather than an isolated mistake.
  • Knowing false billing followed by efforts to conceal it.
  • Self-reporting only after discovery and an employer’s ultimatum.

These considerations explain the court’s rejection of both the proposed 30- or 60-day suspension and the panel’s 90-day recommendation. Later cooperation remained relevant, but it did not transform the initial disclosure into an entirely voluntary act.

5. Mitigation justified less than the two-year comparator sanctions

The panel recognized substantial mitigation: no prior disciplinary record; inexperience; bereavement and serious family illness; overwhelming work demands; ADHD and narcolepsy; treatment compliance; cooperation; favorable character evidence; and genuine remorse. Zaczyk also described concrete rehabilitation efforts and a desire to continue serving rural and low-income clients through Kansas Legal Services.

The Supreme Court expressly emphasized two considerations. First, the panel had found that Zaczyk intended to complete the work when time permitted. Second, her presentation at oral argument demonstrated genuine remorse and rehabilitation efforts.

The resulting distinction is important: intent to perform later did not negate knowing dishonesty, but it affected the court’s assessment of the appropriate sanction. Deference to the panel’s credibility assessment preserved that mitigating finding without requiring acceptance of its recommended 90-day suspension.

6. Workplace criticism did not displace personal responsibility

The panel strongly criticized the firm’s supervision, billing pressures, and mandatory client letters. It questioned whether many letters provided tangible client benefit and whether management prioritized billing and collections over substantive support.

Those observations explain the context and mitigation; they do not establish disciplinary liability against the firm or its supervisors. Nor did the Supreme Court hold that a 1,500-hour requirement, remote supervision, or standardized client correspondence is inherently improper. Zaczyk remained responsible for her own compliance with the professional rules.

7. Restitution to the firm remained unresolved

Cordell & Cordell refunded the affected clients. Zaczyk cooperated in identifying them and expressed willingness to reimburse the firm. The panel initially identified financial harm to the firm but later questioned characterizing the entire refund amount as the firm’s loss, reasoning that the firm was not entitled to collect unearned fees.

The panel expressly stated that restitution was not before it, and the Supreme Court imposed no reimbursement condition. The decision therefore does not resolve any private obligation Zaczyk may have to the firm. Client reimbursement, disciplinary mitigation, and civil liability are separate questions.

C. Potential Impact

  • False billing remains serious despite plans to catch up. Future disciplinary respondents cannot treat intended later performance as a defense to knowingly inaccurate charges.
  • Concealment can materially worsen the sanction assessment. Fabricated records and false explanations may undermine arguments for a brief interruption of practice.
  • The circumstances of self-reporting matter. Cooperation after discovery can mitigate misconduct, but its weight differs from unprompted disclosure.
  • Credible rehabilitation can affect both duration and reinstatement procedure. The court’s approach shows that a substantial suspension can coexist with waiver of a separate reinstatement hearing.
  • Workplace conditions warrant attention without excusing misconduct. The panel’s discussion offers a practical warning about inadequate support, unmanaged caseloads, and billing-driven supervision, but establishes no independent rule of employer liability.
  • The one-year term is not a presumptive tariff. The court’s insistence on individualized sanctions limits any argument that similar billing misconduct must receive the same penalty.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

Clear and convincing evidence

Evidence strong enough to make the asserted facts highly probable. It is the burden used here to establish attorney misconduct.

Knowing misconduct versus an intention to repair it later

A lawyer may know a bill is false when issued while genuinely intending to perform the work later. That future intention does not remove the present dishonesty.

Aggravating and mitigating circumstances

Aggravating circumstances support greater discipline, such as repeated misconduct. Mitigating circumstances support less severe discipline, such as credible remorse, treatment, and lack of prior discipline.

Deemed admitted findings

Because no exceptions were filed, the panel’s findings and legal conclusions were accepted under the applicable rule. The court still independently selected the sanction.

Probation versus suspension

Probation generally permits practice subject to conditions; suspension prohibits practice for the specified period. The proposed post-suspension probation arrangement was not adopted.

Reinstatement without a hearing

Waiving a hearing removes that procedural step. It does not authorize an automatic return to practice: Zaczyk must still apply and comply with Rule 232.

Reimbursement versus exoneration

Refunding improper charges can repair financial consequences, but it does not undo the original ethical violations.

6. Conclusion

In re Zaczyk demonstrates that sustained false billing and attempted concealment require a serious disciplinary response even when clients are refunded and the lawyer presents substantial mitigation. At the same time, the court treated credible intent to complete the work, genuine remorse, and rehabilitation as meaningful to the sanction.

The one-year suspension reflects that balance. Its broader significance is not a fixed penalty for false billing, but a clear separation between responsibility and mitigation: difficult circumstances and future intentions may influence discipline without making dishonest billing permissible.