In re Z.G.: Termination of Parental Rights Requires Both Adoptability and a Statutory “Sufficient Basis” (Services Terminated or Properly Bypassed)

Introduction

In re Z.G. (Cal. Apr. 27, 2026) is a consolidated Supreme Court of California decision arising from San Bernardino County dependency proceedings involving two siblings, Z.G. (born 2020) and A.G. (born 2021). The respondent was San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the Department). The appellant/petitioner was A.G. (Mother).

The case presented two tightly linked issues:

1. Statutory termination standard at a section 366.26 hearing: Whether parental rights may be terminated under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) solely upon a finding that the child is likely to be adopted, even when the parent did not receive reunification services and was not properly bypassed for services.
2. Ineffective assistance of counsel in dependency: Whether Mother’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert Mother’s entitlement to reunification services for A.G. at disposition, and for failing to prosecute a writ challenge to the order terminating services and setting the section 366.26 hearing.

The procedural posture mattered: Mother filed a notice of intent to seek writ review after the May 2023 disposition order, but trial counsel filed no writ petition, resulting in default; later, the juvenile court terminated parental rights at the April 2024 section 366.26 hearing; Mother appealed and also filed habeas corpus.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed. It held:

• A juvenile court may not terminate parental rights merely by finding adoptability. Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), termination requires (1) a likelihood-of-adoption finding and (2) one of the statute’s listed “additional findings” establishing a “sufficient basis” for termination (e.g., reunification services were terminated under section 366.21 or 366.22, or services were bypassed under section 361.5).
• Mother’s counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to assert Mother’s statutory entitlement to reunification services for A.G. at the May 2023 disposition hearing and by failing to pursue writ review after filing a notice of intent.
• The error was not harmless: the record did not show Mother would likely have been subject to bypass under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)(A).
• Parental rights termination as to Z.G. was also reversed, given the sibling relationship and the likelihood that termination as to one sibling would substantially interfere with the other’s sibling relationship. The Department did not contest that argument.

Remedies included reversing termination orders, vacating the May 2023 orders terminating services as to A.G. and setting the section 366.26 hearing as to both children, and directing a new disposition hearing to determine an appropriate remedy with consideration for Mother’s entitlement to services for A.G.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Dependency structure and the role of reunification services

The Court relied on high-court dependency “architecture” cases to situate section 366.26 within the larger process:

• Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609 supplied the staged framework (jurisdiction, disposition, reunification, permanency) and emphasized that reunification services are offered to qualifying parents to address the causes of removal.
• In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45 and In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295Marilyn H. also framed reunification services as a “significant safeguard” balancing parental fairness with a child’s need for permanency.
• In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 reinforced that once the matter reaches the section 366.26 stage, the question is no longer whether the parent may resume custody—reflecting the assumption that reunification services have ended and underlying problems remain unresolved.

These precedents supported the Court’s interpretive premise: section 366.26 cannot be read as a stand-alone “adoptability-only” trigger because it is embedded in a reunification-first statutory scheme.

2) How appellate courts have treated the “exceptions” to termination

To show that a literal reading of the first sentence (“shall terminate”) cannot be the whole story, the Court cited cases reflecting uniform practice: after adoptability is found, courts still analyze statutory exceptions.

• In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45 (sibling relationship exception).
• In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339 (parental benefit exception), disapproved of on other grounds in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614.
• In re Jamie R. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 766 (parental benefit exception).
• In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942 (sibling relationship and parental benefit exceptions).

The Court used these decisions not to redefine the exceptions, but to demonstrate that “shall terminate” is textually and doctrinally qualified—so the statute must be read as an integrated whole.

3) Statutory interpretation canons and avoiding surplusage

The Court invoked People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015 for the principle that the Legislature is not presumed to enact language that renders other provisions “nugatory.” This supported rejecting the Department’s reading that would make the “additional findings” in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) effectively optional.

4) The Department’s legislative-history argument and the DeLonnie S. debate

The Department contended that legislative amendments had abrogated In re DeLonnie S. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1109, which had read section 366.26 as requiring both adoptability and an additional statutory basis.

The Supreme Court carefully examined the 1998 and 2007 amendments and rejected the Department’s narrative:

• The 1998 amendment (Assembly Bill No. 2310 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.)) primarily added what is now the second sentence of subdivision (c)(1), clarifying that lack of a preadoptive placement does not defeat adoptability. The Court reasoned that deletion of connecting phrases likely reflected drafting around the inserted sentence—not an intent to dismantle the “additional findings” requirement—and noted the absence of legislative discussion suggesting a major shift.
• The Court explained that the Department’s reading would have created internal statutory incoherence post-1998 because the exceptions language then sat within the “additional findings” sentence—implying exceptions might not apply if only adoptability mattered, an outcome contradicted by uniform case practice.
• The 2007 restructuring (Senate Bill No. 703 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.), incorporating Assembly Bill No. 298 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.)) was described as aimed at adjusting how exceptions function—especially creating/recognizing a relative guardianship pathway—not as altering the relationship between adoptability and a “sufficient basis.”

The legislative analysis thus reinforced, rather than undermined, the Court’s reading: adoptability plus an additional statutorily defined basis is required.

5) Bypass, “reasonable effort,” and relapse

On harmlessness and the possibility of bypass under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)(A), the Court leaned on several authorities:

• In re Jayden M. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1261 for evaluating “reasonable effort” over an “entire time span,” and for considering duration, extent/context, and “quality and quantity” of efforts.
• Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1450 for the principle that the inquiry is not whether the parent “cured” the problem but whether they made reasonable efforts to treat it—and for rejecting selective hindsight.
• In re B.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 932 to recognize relapse as a normal part of recovery and to caution against treating relapse as proof that services are necessarily fruitless.
• Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87 for contrasting “reasonable effort” with “lackadaisical or half-hearted” engagement.
• In re D.H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 807 to confine the bypass inquiry to “the problems that led to removal,” not later-arising issues like housing instability or medical crises.

Applying these authorities, the Court found the record inconsistent with bypass: Mother had extensive negative tests, completed key services, separated from Father (the source of later DV/substance concerns), safely parented the children for 18+ months, and remained “willing to do her case plan” even when the Department sought termination of services.

6) Habeas corpus, ineffective assistance, diligence, and defaulted writs

The Court’s ineffectiveness analysis relied most directly on:

• In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234 for: (i) habeas as a vehicle in custody/dependency matters; (ii) the deficient-performance and prejudice framework; and (iii) the “promptness and diligence” requirement tied to the child’s interest in finality.
• In re S.D. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068 to reject the notion that a client must override counsel’s legal judgment (here, counsel’s decision not to file a writ brief after the notice of intent).
• In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143 and In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198 as examples of finality/jurisdictional doctrines limiting later challenges—but distinguished because (among other reasons) counsel’s deficiency prevented meaningful writ review in the first place and the Supreme Court’s reversal reduced finality concerns.

The Court also referenced Truck Ins. Exchange & Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 67 to justify addressing the bypass sufficiency question at the Supreme Court level given the record-based, fully briefed nature of the issue and the need to avoid delay.

Legal Reasoning

1) The new rule: adoptability is necessary but not sufficient

The Court parsed section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) into three functional components: (i) adoptability; (ii) “additional findings” that “shall constitute a sufficient basis” for termination; and (iii) exceptions. Rejecting a single-sentence, “adoptability-only” approach, the Court held that termination is authorized only when the juvenile court finds:

1. By clear and convincing evidence, the child is likely to be adopted; and
2. A statutorily defined “sufficient basis” for termination exists, namely one of the specified findings in the statute (including that reunification services were terminated under section 366.21 or 366.22, or that services were bypassed under section 361.5).

This reading harmonized the subdivision’s internal structure and aligned section 366.26 with the dependency system’s reunification-first design (including section 16000’s stated legislative intent).

2) Why the Department’s reading failed

The Court rejected the Department’s view for several reasons:

• Whole-text interpretation: the Department conceded exceptions qualify the first sentence; once that concession is made, the first sentence cannot be treated as a complete rule by itself.
• Surplusage avoidance: the Department’s approach drained meaning from the “additional findings” clause—contrary to People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015.
• System coherence: permitting termination where a parent was never provided services and was never bypassed clashes with the core statutory design and with section 366.26, subdivision (c)(2)(A)’s command not to terminate when reasonable efforts/services were found lacking.
• Legislative history realism: amendments in 1998 and 2007 were explained as solving different problems (preadoptive placement “vicious circle”; relative guardianship prioritization), not as silently eliminating the requirement of a statutory basis beyond adoptability.

3) Harmlessness and bypass under section 361.5(b)(10)(A)

The Department argued that even if the statutory standard was violated, the outcome was harmless because services for A.G. could have been bypassed (prior failure to reunify with a sibling and no “reasonable effort” thereafter). The Court rejected this on two levels:

• Record of the juvenile court’s reasoning: the juvenile court’s colloquy showed it believed Mother was “out of time statutorily,” not that it was making a bypass finding based on lack of reasonable effort.
• Insufficient evidentiary basis for bypass: considering the whole period, Mother’s sustained engagement and demonstrated progress meant the record did not support, to a clear and convincing standard, that she failed to make “reasonable effort” to treat the problems that led to Z.G.’s removal.

4) Spillover to Z.G. via sibling relationship

Having reversed as to A.G., the Court reversed as to Z.G. as well because termination as to one sibling would likely cause “substantial interference” with the sibling relationship (section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v)). The Court emphasized that the siblings had lived together their entire lives and that ongoing contact would be in Z.G.’s best interest; the Department did not dispute the point.

5) Ineffective assistance: failure to assert the right to services and failure to prosecute writ review

Applying In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, the Court found:

• Deficient performance: counsel’s failure to assert Mother’s entitlement to reunification services for A.G. at the May 2023 disposition hearing was a “clear oversight.”
• Prejudice: the asserted lack of prejudice depended on a bypass theory the Court rejected.
• Diligence: Mother’s diligence was satisfied where she filed a notice of intent to seek writ review, counsel then failed to prosecute the writ, and Mother later filed habeas concurrently with a timely appeal. The Court refused to impose on indigent parents an expectation of immediate independent action against counsel’s decisions.
• Jurisdiction/finality: habeas relief was available despite writ-deadline doctrines because counsel’s deficiency denied the opportunity for meaningful writ review, and reversal of the termination order reduced the finality concerns underlying cases like In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143 and In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198.

Impact

1) Doctrinal clarification at section 366.26

In re Z.G. establishes a clear statutory rule of decision: adoptability alone does not authorize termination. Courts must also identify and rely on a statutorily enumerated “sufficient basis” within section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) (e.g., termination of reunification services or a valid bypass finding). This materially constrains any practice of treating section 366.26 as an “automatic termination” proceeding once adoptability is shown.

2) Stronger procedural accountability for service errors

The decision reinforces reunification services as a structural prerequisite—not merely a discretionary feature—of lawful termination, except when bypass is properly found. County agencies and juvenile courts can expect increased scrutiny of:

• whether reunification services were provided to each child individually;
• whether a bypass provision was actually pleaded, litigated, and found under the correct burden; and
• whether the record shows the juvenile court understood and applied the correct statutory pathway.

3) Litigation consequences: writ practice and habeas backstops

By granting habeas relief where counsel filed a notice of intent but then defaulted the writ, the Court signals that ineffective assistance can reopen otherwise foreclosed challenges when counsel’s failures prevented the parent from accessing the statutory writ mechanism (section 366.26, subdivision (l)). Practically, this increases the stakes of competent writ practice at the “set 366.26” stage and may encourage earlier identification of service-entitlement errors.

4) Sibling relationship as a remedial driver

The Court’s willingness to reverse termination as to Z.G. based on the sibling relationship exception logic underscores that sibling-bond considerations can affect remedy and appellate prejudice analysis, not only the merits of an exception at the section 366.26 hearing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reunification services

Court-ordered services (e.g., counseling, treatment, parenting programs, testing) designed to remedy the issues that led to removal so the child can safely return home. They are time-limited but central to the dependency scheme.

Section 366.26 hearing (permanency planning)

The final-stage hearing where the court selects a permanent plan (often adoption) after reunification efforts have ended. Termination of parental rights is the gateway to adoption.

“Sufficient basis” for termination under section 366.26(c)(1)

A statutorily specified procedural posture (such as a valid bypass of services or termination of reunification services) that makes termination legally authorized once adoptability is found.

Bypass of services (section 361.5(b)(10)(A))

A statutory mechanism allowing denial of reunification services in certain circumstances, including when the parent previously failed to reunify with a sibling and has not made a “reasonable effort” to treat the problems that led to the sibling’s removal.

Extraordinary writ after setting a section 366.26 hearing (section 366.26(l))

A fast-track appellate procedure required to challenge the order setting the permanency planning hearing; if not timely pursued, later appellate review is generally barred—unless counsel’s ineffectiveness deprived the parent of that opportunity.

Habeas corpus in dependency

A collateral proceeding that can address custody-related unlawful restraint and is used to litigate ineffective assistance claims when the record or procedural posture makes direct review inadequate.

Conclusion

In re Z.G. reshapes the termination analysis at section 366.26 by holding that a likelihood-of-adoption finding is necessary but not sufficient: termination also requires a statutorily enumerated “sufficient basis” (such as prior termination of services or a proper bypass). The Court further strengthens dependency procedural fairness by recognizing ineffective assistance where counsel fails to assert a parent’s entitlement to reunification services for a particular child and fails to prosecute writ review after a notice of intent—while clarifying that diligence is satisfied when habeas is pursued alongside a timely appeal.

The broader significance is twofold: it reinforces reunification services as a foundational safeguard of the dependency system, and it tightens statutory compliance at the precise moment when the system pivots from reunification to permanency and adoption.