Relinquishment Defeating a Reunification Goal Constitutes “Changed Circumstances,” and Omission of the Words “Clear and Convincing” Does Not Require Reversal Where Findings Show the Standard Was Applied

Introduction

In In re X.D. and D.D., Juveniles (T.L., Father*) (Vt. Mar. 11, 2026) (entry order), the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Caledonia Unit, Family Division’s termination of a father’s parental rights to two young children, D.D. (born 2019) and X.D. (born 2020). The case arose after CHINS petitions were filed while father faced serious sex-offense charges; father later pled guilty and was incarcerated. The principal issues on appeal were (1) whether father could raise arguments on mother’s behalf and/or leverage mother’s reunification posture to defeat termination of his own rights, (2) whether due process defects in earlier merits and disposition proceedings could be raised in the termination appeal, (3) whether “changed circumstances” were shown where the original plan focused on reunification with mother, and (4) whether termination must be reversed because the written order did not expressly state that the best-interests findings were made by clear and convincing evidence.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed termination. It held that father’s attempts to litigate issues related to mother’s rights and reunification were unpreserved because mother relinquished her rights and the trial court therefore did not litigate termination merits as to mother. The Court rejected father’s reliance on In re A.W., 2020 VT 34, 212 Vt. 225 because the State here moved to modify disposition in connection with the termination petitions and father received a hearing.

The Court further held that father’s due-process challenges to the merits and disposition orders were impermissible collateral attacks on final orders absent a showing that the judgments were “void” under V.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). Finally, the Court concluded (a) that changed circumstances were established—at minimum—because mother, the only reunification parent, relinquished her rights, making the original reunification goal unattainable, and (b) that reversal was not warranted merely because the termination order did not repeat the words “clear and convincing,” where the record and the trial court’s unequivocal findings demonstrated application of the correct standard.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • In re B.M., 165 Vt. 331 and In re K.F., 2004 VT 40, 176 Vt. 636 (mem.)
    These cases supply the governing two-step framework for termination after initial disposition: (1) determine whether “changed circumstances” warrant modifying disposition under 33 V.S.A. § 5113(b); then (2) decide best interests under the four factors in 33 V.S.A. § 5114(a). The Court used them to structure its review of the family division’s analysis.
  • In re R.W., 2011 VT 124, 191 Vt. 108
    Cited for (a) the State’s burden to prove both stages by clear and convincing evidence and (b) harmless-error principles in termination cases (reversal only if a substantial right is affected). The Court relied on In re R.W. to distinguish this case from situations where a trial court expressly applies the wrong standard and to emphasize the need for prejudice.
  • In re D.M., 162 Vt. 33, In re J.B., 167 Vt. 637, 639 (1998) (mem.), and In re S.B., 174 Vt. 427, 429 (2002) (mem.)
    These authorities ground the appellate posture: termination decisions are discretionary; findings stand unless clearly erroneous; the Supreme Court does not reweigh evidence. They frame why father’s fact-bound challenges faced a steep standard of review.
  • In re C.H., 170 Vt. 603, 604 (2000) (mem.)
    Used for issue preservation: arguments not raised in the family court are generally not reviewed on appeal. This supported the Court’s refusal to entertain father’s (and purportedly mother’s) new theories.
  • Doe v. Camacho, 2024 VT 72, 220 Vt. 226
    Invoked for judicial notice of docket entries in a separate related appeal (mother’s pending case). The Court used it to clarify the procedural landscape while keeping its analysis focused on father’s appeal.
  • In re A.W., 2020 VT 34, 212 Vt. 225
    Father argued In re A.W. made termination improper. The Court distinguished it because A.W. turned on an unauthorized procedure: no stipulation and no motion to modify disposition before termination. Here, by contrast, the State sought modification in connection with the termination petitions, father objected, and the court held the required hearing—so the statutory defect in A.W. was absent.
  • In re M.M., 2024 VT 28, 219 Vt. 252
    Cited to underscore finality and appeal timing: CHINS merits issues may be appealed after disposition; once final orders go unappealed, later challenges are constrained. This supported the Court’s conclusion that father’s merits/disposition complaints were untimely.
  • In re K.G., 2023 VT 51, 218 Vt. 419 and In re C.L.S., 2020 VT 1, 211 Vt. 344
    These cases establish the narrow pathway for collateral attacks on final judgments: V.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) relief requires showing the judgment is “void,” typically for lack of jurisdiction or action inconsistent with due process. The Court used them to reject father’s attempt to relitigate merits/disposition errors through a termination appeal.
  • In re H.T., 2020 VT 3, 211 Vt. 476
    Father analogized to H.T. (two-and-a-half-year delay between merits and disposition). The Court distinguished it as a direct appeal and emphasized that even in H.T. reversal required prejudice; father did not show prejudice as to his own termination.
  • In re H.A., 153 Vt. 504
    Cited for due-process notice requirements in termination proceedings and the need to show prejudice from any notice violation. The Court applied that prejudice requirement to reject father’s “unspoken divorce requirement” theory.
  • In re D.M., 2004 VT 41, 176 Vt. 639 (mem.) and In re D.C., 2012 VT 108, 193 Vt. 101
    These cases refine “changed circumstances.” In re D.M. (2004) describes the common stagnation paradigm (failure to progress as expected despite time). In re D.C. clarifies that “changed circumstances” is the statutory touchstone and can be shown in ways other than stagnation. The Court leaned on D.C. to uphold a changed-circumstances finding grounded in the practical impossibility of the original reunification goal after mother’s relinquishment.
  • In re R.W., 2011 VT 124, 191 Vt. 108 (again)
    The Court cited R.W. to differentiate this case from one where the court expressly applied a preponderance standard to a termination element (a reversible error in R.W.).
  • In re C.L., 151 Vt. 480, In re D.P., 147 Vt. 26, and In re C.W., 148 Vt. 282
    These decisions support a pragmatic rule on standards of proof: appellate courts prefer explicit articulation of “clear and convincing,” but will not reverse for omission if the findings’ language and substance demonstrate the correct standard was applied (e.g., the court was “convinced,” described a “clear case,” found “no likelihood” of timely parenting). The Court applied that doctrine to affirm.
  • In re D.S., 2014 VT 38, 196 Vt. 325 and In re C.P., 2012 VT 100, 193 Vt. 29
    These cases emphasize that the “most important” best-interests factor is the likelihood of resuming parental duties within a reasonable time (33 V.S.A. § 5114(a)(3)), and that “reasonable time” is measured from the child’s perspective, including age and special needs. The Court used them to validate the family division’s forward-looking focus on father’s incarceration, treatment failure, and the children’s urgent permanency needs.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Preservation and scope control the appeal.
    The Court assumed, without deciding, that father might have standing to press certain arguments related to mother, but it held the arguments were unpreserved and mismatched to how mother litigated: she relinquished, the court did not take termination evidence as to mother, and father did not timely ask the court to weigh reunification with mother as an alternative to terminating his rights once mother sought to withdraw her relinquishment.
  2. In re A.W. does not bar termination where a modification motion and hearing occurred.
    The statutory defect in In re A.W.—termination following an unauthorized disposition modification—was absent because the State moved to modify disposition in connection with the termination petitions and father received a contested hearing on modification and best interests. The Court also noted the children and DCF supported mother’s relinquishment, undercutting the policy concern in A.W. (children objecting to parents’ agreements).
  3. Collateral attacks on merits and disposition are constrained by finality and V.R.C.P. 60(b)(4).
    Father’s due-process complaints about delays and alleged burden-shifting at disposition were treated as attacks on final, unappealed orders. Under In re K.G. and In re C.L.S., father had to show the orders were “void,” not merely wrong. He did not attempt to meet that standard. On the substance, the Court also read the disposition transcript as reflecting a best-interests safety assessment (not an improper importation of the § 5113(b) modification standard).
  4. No prejudicial notice defect from the “divorce” theory.
    Even accepting father’s claim that divorce was an “unspoken” expectation, the Court found no prejudice because the family division’s focus on father parenting alone flowed from mother’s relinquishment, not from a surprise divorce requirement. Under In re H.A., prejudice is necessary for reversal based on notice.
  5. Changed circumstances existed even if the trial court described them as “stagnation.”
    Father argued that because the case plan’s goal was reunification with mother, his individual “readiness to parent alone” should be irrelevant. The Court responded with In re D.C.: “changed circumstances” is broader than stagnation. Mother’s relinquishment itself “alone” constituted changed circumstances because it rendered the original reunification goal unattainable and warranted modification of disposition.
  6. Omitting “clear and convincing” from the written best-interests section was not reversible error where findings show it.
    The Court contrasted this case with one where the wrong standard is explicitly applied (In re R.W.). Here, the trial court informed mother at the hearing that the State’s burden was clear and convincing evidence, suggesting the correct lens. More importantly, the written findings used emphatic, conclusive language—e.g., “no” ongoing relationship, “unlikely, if not impossible” for stability, and urgent permanency needs—and heavily weighted § 5114(a)(3). Under In re C.L., In re D.P., and In re C.W., the Supreme Court refused to “elevate form over substance.”

Impact

  • Reunification-plan collapse can itself establish changed circumstances.
    The Court’s analysis reinforces that “changed circumstances” under 33 V.S.A. § 5113(b) can be shown by a structural change that defeats the existing plan (here, mother’s relinquishment), not solely by classic “stagnation” measured against service-plan steps. Practically, when the only reunification parent exits the case, the modification threshold is likely met, clearing the way for a § 5114(a) best-interests determination as to the remaining parent.
  • Strong reaffirmation of finality and the limited role of termination appeals.
    The decision underscores that unappealed merits/disposition orders are not a second front to be reopened during termination litigation. Unless a party can meet the “void judgment” criteria of V.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), the termination stage is not a vehicle to relitigate earlier procedural and evidentiary complaints.
  • Clear-and-convincing articulation remains preferred, but omission alone is not fatal.
    Trial courts are again encouraged to specify the standard of proof. But appellate review will focus on substance: whether the order’s findings and conclusions reflect the heightened certainty required by 33 V.S.A. § 5231(c). This discourages purely technical appeals where the factfinding is unmistakably decisive.

Complex Concepts Simplified

CHINS (Child in Need of Care or Supervision)
A juvenile-court determination that state intervention is necessary because a child is at risk of harm or lacks proper care.
Disposition Order
The post-merits order that sets custody and a case plan (e.g., reunification) and is a final appealable order. See 33 V.S.A. § 5318(d).
Conditional Custody Order (CCO)
An order returning custody to a parent subject to court-imposed conditions. See 33 V.S.A. § 5318(a)(1).
Changed Circumstances vs. Stagnation
“Changed circumstances” is the statutory threshold to modify disposition (33 V.S.A. § 5113(b)). “Stagnation” is one common way to prove it (no expected progress over time), but not the only way. See In re D.C., 2012 VT 108.
Clear and Convincing Evidence
A high civil standard of proof, higher than “preponderance,” required for termination decisions. See 33 V.S.A. § 5231(c). A written order should state it, but appellate courts may uphold an order if the findings show the court actually applied it.
Collateral Attack / “Void” Judgment (V.R.C.P. 60(b)(4))
An attempt to undo a final order outside a direct appeal. The bar is high: the judgment must be “void” (e.g., no jurisdiction or fundamental due-process failure), not simply mistaken.
Best-Interests Factors (33 V.S.A. § 5114(a))
The court weighs statutory factors to decide whether termination serves the child’s welfare; the “most important” is whether the parent can resume parenting within a reasonable time from the child’s perspective. See In re D.S., 2014 VT 38.

Conclusion

In re X.D. and D.D., Juveniles affirms three practical principles in Vermont termination litigation: (1) appellate review is constrained by preservation and by the finality of unappealed merits/disposition orders; (2) “changed circumstances” is a flexible threshold that may be satisfied when the operative reunification plan becomes impossible—here, because the reunification parent relinquished rights; and (3) while trial courts should expressly state the “clear and convincing” standard in termination orders, the Supreme Court will not reverse for a purely verbal omission when the findings and record demonstrate the correct, heightened level of certainty and a child-centered assessment of timely permanency.