3.1. Precedents Cited
In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)
The Court reiterated the standard of review in abuse-and-neglect appeals: factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and legal conclusions de novo. This framing mattered because Mother’s appellate arguments largely attacked evidentiary sufficiency and credibility—areas where deference to the circuit court is substantial.
Syl. Pt. 1, In re S.C., 168 W. Va. 366, 284 S.E.2d 867 (1981)
In re S.C. supplied the governing principle that DHS must prove conditions existing at the time of the petition by clear and convincing evidence, while clarifying that the statute does not require a particular “manner or mode” of proof. The Court used this to reject any suggestion that DHS’s case failed for want of a specific evidentiary formality.
In re F.S., 233 W. Va. 538, 759 S.E.2d 769 (2014) (quoting Cramer v. W. Va. Dep't of Highways, 180 W. Va. 97, 375 S.E.2d 568 (1988))
The Court relied on In re F.S. (and Cramer) to define “clear and convincing” as an intermediate burden—more than a preponderance, less than beyond a reasonable doubt. This matters in abuse/neglect adjudication: it is demanding, but it does not require criminal-level certainty.
In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025)
In re D.S. anchored the appellate restraint principle: the Supreme Court does not reweigh evidence or make credibility determinations. The circuit court credited testimony from W.S.’s father and the CPS worker over Mother’s account (including her claimed support/visitation), and the Supreme Court refused to revisit those credibility calls.
In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002)
In re Tonjia M. establishes that granting an improvement period is discretionary and may be refused when “no improvement is likely.” The Court used this principle to affirm denial where Mother’s record showed minimal participation and poor prospects for meaningful engagement.
In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013) (quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004))
These cases supplied a central doctrinal lever: failure to acknowledge the problem makes it “untreatable,” turning an improvement period into “an exercise in futility at the child’s expense.” The Court applied that maxim directly to Mother’s testimony that she did not “see” abuse/neglect and treated the domestic assault as merely “in the past.”
3.2. Legal Reasoning
(a) Adjudication: Clear and convincing proof of abuse/neglect
The Court upheld adjudication by tying the evidence to statutory definitions. Under W. Va. Code § 49-1-201, neglect includes a present refusal, failure, or inability to provide necessary shelter and supervision; abuse includes harm or threat to welfare by domestic violence (as defined by W. Va. Code § 48-27-202).
On neglect, the record showed Mother was not providing shelter/supervision and had little contact; she did not know where W.S. lived and could not contact A.P. due to a protective order. On abuse/domestic violence, Mother’s guilty plea to domestic assault against A.P. was powerful evidence of qualifying conduct, particularly given the statutory inclusion of reckless physical harm within “domestic violence.”
The Court also treated Mother’s refusal to drug screen—even when offered during the hearing—as a relevant credibility and risk indicator, especially in a petition that included substance allegations and where she admitted alcohol use at the time of the domestic assault incident.
(b) Improvement period: Likelihood of full participation
Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), the parent bears the burden to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, a likelihood of fully participating in the improvement period. The circuit court found Mother failed that burden because she had not meaningfully engaged in services for over a year (drug/alcohol screening and parenting), offered reasons that did not persuade the court, refused recommended inpatient treatment for alcohol abuse (despite liver failure and a history of daily drinking), and did not acknowledge abuse/neglect.
The Supreme Court’s affirmance reflects a consistent theme in West Virginia abuse-and-neglect jurisprudence: an improvement period is not awarded to create motivation; it is awarded when the evidence shows the parent is already prepared and willing to participate in remediation.
(c) Termination: No reasonable likelihood of correction and necessity for welfare
W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d) permits a “no reasonable likelihood” finding where the parent demonstrates an inadequate capacity to solve the problems on their own or with help; W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) authorizes termination when that finding is coupled with the child’s welfare necessity.
The Court upheld termination based on Mother’s sustained non-participation and refusal of recommended treatment, combined with the children’s stated desire not to communicate with her. The circuit court also emphasized permanency and continuity of care, concluding the children needed stable placements and that further delay was inconsistent with their welfare.
(d) A notable takeaway: criminal conduct at adjudication
Mother argued her domestic assault conviction could not be the “sole basis” for adjudication. The Court did not adopt any categorical limitation on considering criminal convictions; instead, it emphasized that adjudication rested on multiple grounds and noted Mother cited no authority barring consideration of criminal conduct. Practically, the decision signals that guilty pleas/convictions for family violence can be probative at adjudication—especially when paired with other neglect evidence.