In re W.M.: Termination Affirmed Despite Mental-Health Medication Nonadherence Where Services Were Extensive and Parenting Capacity Stagnated

1. Introduction

Case: In re W.M., Juvenile (C.M., Mother*) (Vt. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2026) (three-justice panel Entry Order).
Parties: Mother (appellant) v. Department for Children and Families (DCF) and minor child W.M. (through counsel).
Context: W.M. was taken into DCF custody at birth after the State filed a CHINS petition alleging risks tied to mother’s untreated schizophrenia, delusional thinking, statements suggesting potential harm to the baby, and lack of prenatal care. The case proceeded through CHINS merits and disposition with a reunification goal, repeated extensions, and ultimately a termination petition filed by the child’s attorney (later joined by DCF).

Central issues on appeal: Whether DCF provided sufficiently tailored services regarding mother’s schizophrenia—especially medication adherence—to support the trial court’s finding that mother could not resume parental duties within a reasonable time; and whether alleged service inadequacies could undermine termination (in the shadow of the rule that ADA violations are not a defense to termination).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed termination of mother’s parental rights. The family division found (by clear and convincing evidence) that mother’s progress toward reunification stagnated over time, including persistent inability to perform basic caregiving tasks even while medicated and supported by long-term coaching. Mother later stopped medication, was hospitalized, and then left supportive housing that provided medication monitoring. She ceased contact with DCF and the child, did not sign releases, did not attend parenting classes, and did not attend the child’s medical appointments after 2022.

On appeal, mother argued not an ADA defense, but that DCF’s case planning failed to address foreseeable nonadherence to medication (e.g., by advocating for alternatives such as long-acting injectables). The Court rejected this framing, holding that the record supported the trial court’s conclusion: even with substantial services and periods of medication compliance, mother did not develop safe parenting capacity, and her stagnation was attributable in meaningful part to choices within her control.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • In re B.W., 162 Vt. 287, 291 (1994)
    Sets the two-step framework after initial disposition: the court must first find a change in circumstances warranting modification of the disposition order before reaching best interests/termination. In In re W.M., this framed the threshold inquiry, satisfied by stagnation over time.
  • In re H.A., 153 Vt. 504, 515 (1990)
    Defines the most common “change in circumstances” in this posture: parental capacity has “stagnated or deteriorated over the passage of time.” The Court relied on this conception to treat mother’s lack of improvement—despite services—as the key changed circumstance.
  • In re J.B., 167 Vt. 637, 639 (1998)
    Identifies the “most important” best-interests factor under the statute: the likelihood the parent can resume parental duties within a reasonable time. This case anchored the Court’s focus on prospective parenting capacity rather than solely past compliance or noncompliance.
  • In re N.L., 2019 VT 10, ¶ 9, 209 Vt. 450
    States the appellate standard: findings stand unless clearly erroneous; conclusions are affirmed if supported by findings. This deference was pivotal because mother’s argument largely sought to reweigh what DCF “should have” done against the trial court’s supported findings.
  • In re B.S., 166 Vt. 345, 354 (1997)
    Holds that a parent may not raise alleged ADA violations as a defense to termination. Mother conceded this rule, and the Court’s analysis stayed within the traditional termination framework rather than treating ADA accommodation as dispositive.
  • In re J.M., 170 Vt. 587, 589 (2000) (mem.)
    Explains that the court need not make a “reasonable efforts” finding as a prerequisite to termination, but DCF assistance is a relevant factor in assessing whether DCF met its burden to prove inability to resume duties within a reasonable time. The Court used In re J.M. to situate mother’s “insufficient services” argument as evidentiary, not a separate legal bar.
  • In re S.R., 157 Vt. 417, 421-22 (1991)
    Rejects the claim that stagnation is beyond parental control where services are offered and the parent does not progress. This supported the Court’s conclusion that mother’s lack of progress was not attributable to DCF’s alleged failure to “ensure” medication adherence.
  • Cf. In re K.G., 2023 VT 51, ¶ 42, 218 Vt. 419
    Bars collateral attacks on earlier, unappealed orders (there, emergency care order/CHINS merits) when a party failed to appeal at the proper time. Here, the Court invoked the same principle to foreclose mother’s attempt—at the termination stage—to challenge the case plan requirements embedded in the unappealed initial disposition order.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Step 1: Change in circumstances (stagnation).
    The Court upheld the trial court’s finding of stagnation as a sufficient change in circumstances under In re B.W. and In re H.A.. Critically, the record showed that during periods when mother was engaged in treatment and medication, and while receiving extensive Family Time Coaching, her parenting did not meaningfully improve—she still required prompting for basic hygiene and safety-related caregiving tasks. This allowed the court to treat stagnation as persistent and structural, not merely episodic relapse.
  2. Step 2: Best interests—reasonable time to resume parental duties.
    Applying 33 V.S.A. § 5114(a) and In re J.B., the Court affirmed findings that mother was unlikely to resume parental duties within a reasonable time. Mother’s prolonged absence (no contact with DCF since August 2025; last seeing child then) and unknown housing/treatment status supported the “reasonable time” determination.
  3. DCF services as a factor, not a dispositive element.
    Mother attempted to convert her medication-adherence critique into a failure-of-proof argument. The Court, citing In re J.M., treated DCF’s efforts as relevant but not an independent required finding. It emphasized that DCF provided extensive services for a substantial time, and that even when mother was medication-compliant and supported, she did not achieve safe, independent caregiving.
  4. Causation and control.
    The Court affirmed the trial court’s attribution of stagnation partly to factors within mother’s control (leaving supportive housing with medication monitoring; failing to sign releases; disengaging from contact). In re S.R. supported the principle that offered services coupled with lack of progress can demonstrate stagnation attributable to the parent rather than external barriers.
  5. ADA and remedies.
    The trial court rejected mother’s ADA accommodation argument (as an independent basis to deny termination), and mother conceded on appeal that ADA violations are not a defense under In re B.S.. The Supreme Court’s approach underscores that challenges to service adequacy must be litigated within the statutory best-interests and “reasonable time” framework, not as an overriding ADA bar to termination.
  6. Procedural finality: no collateral attack on the case plan.
    To the extent mother objected to plan requirements (e.g., specific services/classes), the Court relied on Cf. In re K.G. to bar a belated challenge because mother did not appeal the initial disposition order adopting the case plan.

C. Impact

Although this is a three-justice panel Entry Order and “not to be considered as precedent,” its reasoning signals several practical consequences in Vermont child-protection litigation:

  • Medication nonadherence does not automatically translate into “insufficient services.” Where DCF offers sustained treatment support and parenting coaching, and the parent still cannot safely parent even during periods of stability, courts may find that additional medication-management proposals (e.g., long-acting injectables) would not change the “reasonable time” analysis.
  • Service adequacy arguments must grapple with demonstrated parenting capacity. The decision emphasizes functional caregiving ability (meeting basic needs safely and consistently) rather than mere treatment participation.
  • Supportive housing and monitored medication can be decisive evidence. A parent’s decision to leave a structured, supportive placement may weigh heavily in assessing both stagnation and reasonable-time prospects.
  • Earlier orders matter. Parties who disagree with case plan requirements should raise and appeal issues at the disposition stage; waiting until termination risks a collateral-attack bar.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • CHINS (Child in Need of Care or Supervision): A finding that the child is not receiving proper care or is at risk of harm, allowing court oversight and DCF involvement.
  • Disposition order / case plan: The court’s roadmap after CHINS, setting the permanency goal (often reunification) and the tasks/services intended to remedy conditions.
  • Termination of parental rights (TPR): A permanent legal severance of the parent-child relationship, allowed only after specific findings and proof by a heightened standard.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A higher burden than “more likely than not,” requiring a firm belief or conviction in the truth of the allegations.
  • Change in circumstances (post-disposition): A required threshold showing—often proven by stagnation or deterioration—before the court revisits the disposition goal and considers termination.
  • Best interests / “reasonable time”: The central predictive question: can the parent resume parental duties soon enough to meet the child’s developmental need for permanency and stability?
  • ADA in child-protection cases: While agencies must avoid disability discrimination, Vermont law (as cited) does not treat ADA violations as a defense that blocks termination; service adequacy remains relevant within the best-interests analysis.
  • Collateral attack: An attempt to challenge an earlier order later in the case; generally barred if the earlier order was appealable and not appealed.

5. Conclusion

In re W.M. affirms termination where the record shows extensive services, persistent stagnation in functional parenting skills, and a lack of realistic prospect that the parent can resume parental duties within a reasonable time. The decision reinforces Vermont’s post-disposition structure—change in circumstances followed by best-interests analysis—and underscores that disagreements with case plan requirements must be timely litigated, not resurrected at termination. Even in cases involving serious mental illness and known medication-adherence risks, the decisive inquiry remains whether the parent can provide safe, stable care within the child’s timeframe.