In re V.M.: Termination May Proceed Without Less Restrictive Alternatives When a Parent Stops Following the Family Case Plan

1. Introduction

Case: In re V.M., No. 25-489 (Kanawha County CC-20-2023-JA-331) (W. Va. Mar. 24, 2026) (memorandum decision).
Parties: Petitioner Mother T.M. (appellant); West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) (appellee); child V.M.; guardian ad litem for V.M.

This abuse and neglect appeal arose after V.M. was born in September 2023 and exhibited withdrawal symptoms. DHS alleged the mother used fentanyl, methamphetamine, and benzodiazepines during pregnancy, obtained limited prenatal care, lacked housing (homelessness), and had previously had parental rights involuntarily terminated to another child for the same conditions (substance abuse and homelessness).

The mother stipulated at adjudication to substance abuse creating risk to the child. She received a post-adjudicatory improvement period and initially made meaningful progress, including periods of unsupervised visitation. The case then turned on later regression: refusal to drug screen, stopping services, housing instability, failure to engage in recommended therapy, concerning behavior and statements suggesting mental-health instability and relapse risk, and indications of renewed involvement with the father (who had been adjudicated, had serious drug convictions, and whose rights were terminated).

Key appellate issues: (1) whether the circuit court erred in finding “no reasonable likelihood” that conditions of neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future; and (2) whether the court should have imposed a less restrictive dispositional alternative (e.g., temporary legal guardianship) rather than terminating parental rights.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the June 16, 2025 dispositional order terminating the mother’s parental rights. Applying clear-error review to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions, the Court held that the record supported the finding that the mother “knowingly stopped participating in the remedial services offered,” stopped drug screening, failed to follow through with therapy, lacked stable housing and employment, and demonstrated inadequate capacity to correct the conditions of neglect in the near future under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)(3).

The Court further held that once “no reasonable likelihood” is found, termination may be ordered without employing intervening less restrictive alternatives, citing controlling syllabus-point authority. The Court also declined to address an additional argument about post-termination visitation due to noncompliance with appellate briefing requirements (Rule 10(c)(7)).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)

The Court relied on syllabus point 1 of In re Cecil T. for the governing standard of review: factual findings in abuse and neglect cases are reviewed for clear error, while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. This framework matters because the mother’s appeal largely attacked the circuit court’s factual inference—based on the full record over time—that her later noncompliance and instability outweighed her earlier compliance.

In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011)

The Court quoted syllabus point 5, in part, of In re Kristin Y. for the proposition that termination of parental rights “may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood . . . that conditions of neglect . . . can be substantially corrected.” This precedent directly answered the mother’s “less restrictive alternative” argument: once the statutory and factual predicate for “no reasonable likelihood” is met, a circuit court is not required to experiment with intermediate dispositions (such as guardianship) if termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)

In re Kristin Y. itself quotes syllabus point 2 of In re R.J.M., and the Court repeated that quoted authority here. The cited lineage underscores that West Virginia’s termination jurisprudence has long recognized a child-centered endpoint: if correction is not reasonably likely in the near future, courts are not obliged to prolong uncertainty by layering less restrictive dispositions before termination.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) “No reasonable likelihood” grounded in non-response to the case plan

The Court anchored its affirmance in West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)(3), which permits a “no reasonable likelihood” finding when the abusing parent “ha[s] not responded to or followed through with a reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts.”

The mother emphasized a favorable snapshot (a June 2024 DHS summary describing compliance, housing, and employment). The Court treated that as incomplete because disposition depends on the parent’s sustained ability to correct conditions—not momentary compliance. By March 2025, the record reflected:

  • cessation of parenting/adult life skills classes and domestic violence counseling (mid-January);
  • no visits since late January;
  • stopping drug screening (early February) and earlier refusals to screen;
  • failure to meaningfully engage in individual therapy (only intake; belief she “didn’t need therapy”);
  • housing instability (leaving a previously suitable residence; moving into a crowded home the circuit court found unsuitable);
  • unstable employment;
  • concerning conduct and statements suggesting instability and relapse risk; and
  • social media indications of continued connection to the father, whose rights were terminated and whose history heightened risk.

The Court’s reasoning reflects a practical evidentiary principle common in abuse and neglect disposition: progress must be durable, verifiable, and consistent with the MDT plan. A parent’s unilateral decision that services are “no longer needed”—particularly where services were court-ordered conditions of an improvement period—supports the statutory conclusion that the parent has not “followed through” with rehabilitative efforts.

(b) Termination versus less restrictive alternatives

Having affirmed the “no reasonable likelihood” finding, the Court applied syllabus-point authority to reject the argument for “temporary legal guardianship.” In effect, the Court treated the less-restrictive-alternative request as legally contingent: if the statutory prerequisites for termination are met and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare, the circuit court may terminate without first trying other dispositions.

The Court also noted an important appellate posture point: the circuit court found termination was in V.M.’s best interests, and the mother did not challenge that finding on appeal. That omission narrowed the appeal to whether the “no reasonable likelihood” determination was supported—making affirmance more likely once noncompliance was established.

(c) Statutory fit: West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)

The Court cited § 49-4-604(c)(6), authorizing termination “[u]pon a finding that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect . . . can be substantially corrected in the near future and, when necessary for the welfare of the child.” The decision shows how the statutory structure operates in tandem:

  • § 49-4-604(d) defines and explains “no reasonable likelihood,” including non-response to the case plan (§ 49-4-604(d)(3));
  • § 49-4-604(c)(6) supplies the dispositional consequence—termination—when the (d) finding is made and the child’s welfare requires it.

(d) Appellate waiver/forfeiture: Rule 10(c)(7)

Although not central to the disposition, the Court’s treatment of post-termination visitation is instructive. The Court declined to review the argument because the brief lacked “citations that pinpoint when and how the issues in the assignments of error were presented to the lower tribunal,” as required by Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court further noted the absence of record citations showing that post-termination visitation was requested below.

This reinforces a procedural rule with substantive consequences: even in child welfare appeals, issues inadequately preserved and inadequately supported with record citations may be disregarded.

3.3. Impact

  • Sustained compliance is dispositive, not early compliance. Parents and counsel should treat improvement-period requirements as continuous obligations through disposition; earlier progress can be overtaken by later noncompliance, instability, or refusal to engage in core services (e.g., screening, therapy).
  • MDT-recommended services matter. The Court emphasized that individual therapy was an express improvement-period term through MDT compliance; ignoring one key service can support a “no reasonable likelihood” finding even if other services were completed earlier.
  • Relapse-risk indicators and protective decision-making are central. Continued association with a high-risk partner (here, the father with serious drug convictions and terminated rights), coupled with erratic behavior and refusal of mental-health treatment, can be treated as evidence of inadequate capacity to correct conditions.
  • Less restrictive alternatives are not mandatory after a proper “no reasonable likelihood” finding. The decision reaffirms that guardianship is not a required “step” before termination when statutory criteria are met and the child’s welfare requires termination.
  • Appellate practice discipline is essential. The Rule 10(c)(7) discussion signals that counsel must build a clear record below (requests, rulings) and cite it precisely on appeal, or the argument may not be reached.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Post-adjudicatory improvement period: A court-ordered opportunity for an adjudicated parent to participate in services (treatment, classes, therapy, screening) designed to correct conditions of abuse/neglect. Compliance must be ongoing and demonstrable.
  • MDT (multidisciplinary team): The collaborative body (often including DHS, service providers, counsel, and others) that plans services and recommendations. Courts frequently incorporate MDT recommendations into enforceable improvement-period terms.
  • “No reasonable likelihood” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)): A statutory finding that, based on evidence, the parent has shown an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse/neglect on their own or with help. One pathway is failing to respond to or follow through with a reasonable case plan (§ 49-4-604(d)(3)).
  • Less restrictive alternative: A disposition short of termination (e.g., guardianship). West Virginia law allows termination without these intermediate steps once “no reasonable likelihood” is found and termination is necessary for the child.
  • Clear error vs. de novo review: “Clear error” means an appellate court will not reweigh evidence; it reverses factual findings only if firmly convinced a mistake was made. “De novo” means legal questions are reviewed anew.
  • Rule 10(c)(7): An appellate briefing rule requiring pinpoint citations showing where issues were raised and ruled upon below; noncompliance can lead to the Court disregarding the issue.

5. Conclusion

In re V.M. is a reaffirmation with practical bite: a parent’s early gains in an improvement period do not prevent termination when the parent later stops engaging in essential remedial services, refuses screening, declines recommended therapy, and destabilizes housing and decision-making. By applying West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)(3) and relying on In re Kristin Y. (quoting In re R.J.M.), the Court confirmed that once “no reasonable likelihood” is properly found, termination may proceed without intervening less restrictive alternatives, provided termination is necessary for the child’s welfare under § 49-4-604(c)(6). The decision also underscores appellate rigor: arguments not properly tied to the record under Rule 10(c)(7) may not be reviewed.