Repeated Defiance of Child-Protection Orders May Render an Improvement Period Futile and Support Termination of Parental Rights

Introduction

In re T.S. concerns whether a father who repeatedly violated a court order prohibiting the child’s mother from contacting the child was entitled to another opportunity to correct his conduct through a post-adjudicatory improvement period. It also addresses whether termination of his parental rights was unnecessarily severe.

Petitioner Father Z.S. knowingly allowed T.S. to have contact with her mother even though the mother’s parental rights had been terminated and a no-contact order was in effect. Similar violations had already resulted in prior abuse-and-neglect proceedings and repeated removals of T.S. from the father’s custody. During the current proceeding, the father also had unauthorized contact with the child and defended the mother’s boyfriend against T.S.’s allegation of physical abuse.

The central questions were whether the father proved that he was likely to participate successfully in an improvement period and whether the child’s welfare required termination despite the availability of theoretically less restrictive alternatives.

Factual and Procedural Background

• In 2020, the mother’s parental rights to T.S. were terminated, and the father received custody on the condition that he prevent contact between the mother and child.
• The father later violated that condition, resulting in multiple interventions and temporary removals of T.S.
• In October 2024, the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) alleged that the father was again permitting contact and that T.S. had reported physical abuse by the mother’s boyfriend.
• An amended petition also alleged that the father neglected T.S.’s mental-health needs.
• The father stipulated that he failed to protect T.S. and permitted prohibited contact. He was adjudicated a neglectful parent.
• After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied a post-adjudicatory improvement period as futile.
• At disposition, evidence showed that repeated caregiver disruptions had severely impaired T.S.’s emotional functioning and ability to form secure attachments. At age six, she required residential treatment.
• On October 6, 2025, the circuit court terminated the father’s parental rights.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the circuit court acted within its discretion in denying an improvement period because the father’s history demonstrated that additional services were unlikely to produce lasting compliance. Although he had completed improvement periods in earlier cases, he resumed the same prohibited conduct and again exposed T.S. to instability.

The Court also upheld termination because the father had demonstrated an inadequate capacity to correct the conditions of neglect, even after extensive court and child-protective interventions. His conduct had caused repeated placement disruptions and psychological harm, while his continued disregard of directives showed a substantial risk of future neglect.

Finally, the Court rejected the argument that termination was contrary to the child’s best interests. Expert evidence established that T.S. urgently needed stability and consistency. The law did not require the circuit court to experiment with additional services when continued uncertainty would seriously threaten her welfare.

Analysis

1. Standards of Appellate Review

Relying on Syllabus Point 1 of In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026), the Court applied three distinct standards:

• Abuse of discretion for the circuit court’s substantive and dispositional decisions;
• Clear error for factual findings; and
• De novo review for legal questions.

The specific decision whether to grant an improvement period was reviewed for abuse of discretion under Syllabus Point 1 of In re K.A., 251 W. Va. 626, 915 S.E.2d 520 (2025). Consequently, the appellate court did not decide the matter anew. It asked whether the circuit court’s decision was supported by the evidence and fell within the range of permissible judicial choices.

2. Denial of the Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(2)(B) permits a post-adjudicatory improvement period when the parent proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is likely to participate fully. This showing is not satisfied merely by promising future obedience or expressing willingness to receive services.

Under In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002), a court may deny an improvement period when no meaningful improvement is likely. The father’s history was particularly important:

• He knew of the no-contact order and violated it intentionally.
• He had already received improvement periods and other services in earlier proceedings.
• Previous interventions produced only temporary compliance rather than lasting behavioral change.
• He failed to use the proper legal procedure to seek modification of the no-contact order, despite knowing that such a procedure existed.
• He had unauthorized, unsupervised contact with T.S. during the pending case.
• His defense of the mother’s boyfriend tended to discredit T.S.’s abuse report rather than protect her.

The Court therefore rejected the father’s argument that he had complied with the “spirit” of the order by informally assessing the mother’s sobriety. A parent cannot substitute personal judgment for an operative child-protection order. If circumstances have changed, the lawful response is to seek judicial modification—not to disregard the order.

The decision also makes clear that successful completion of an earlier improvement period does not create an entitlement to another one. Courts may consider whether the earlier improvement was durable. Here, recurrence of the same misconduct showed that prior services had not corrected the underlying problem.

3. No Reasonable Likelihood of Substantial Correction

West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)(3) and (5) identifies circumstances supporting a finding that abuse or neglect cannot be substantially corrected in the near future. Those circumstances include a parent’s failure to respond to rehabilitative efforts and conduct causing injury where the risk of further harm is too great to justify continued expenditure of remedial resources.

The evidence satisfied that standard. The father repeatedly engaged in the same conduct despite prior proceedings, improvement plans, CPS involvement, and the child’s removals. His problem was therefore not lack of notice or lack of access to services. It was his continuing choice to disregard protective boundaries.

The psychological consequences strengthened the statutory finding. Expert testimony connected the repeated caregiver disruptions to severe impairment of T.S.’s interpersonal functioning, behavior, and ability to form secure attachments. The circuit court could reasonably find that offering more time and services would expose the child to further harm without a realistic prospect of correction.

4. Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

The father argued that the circuit court should have selected a less restrictive disposition. The Court relied on Syllabus Point 5 of In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), quoting Syllabus Point 2 of In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980). Those authorities permit termination without first employing less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected.

The relevant inquiry is not whether some less severe option can be imagined. It is whether such an option would adequately protect the child within a reasonable period. Because previous interventions had failed and further instability threatened T.S.’s treatment and development, the circuit court was not required to postpone permanency.

5. The Child’s Best Interests

Under Syllabus Point 1 of In re R.J.M., courts need not exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement when the child’s welfare will be seriously threatened. West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) likewise authorizes termination when the conditions cannot be substantially corrected in the near future and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

The Court also invoked Syllabus Point 4 of In re N.H., 241 W. Va. 648, 827 S.E.2d 436 (2019), quoting Syllabus Point 4 of In re B.H., 233 W. Va. 57, 754 S.E.2d 734 (2014): the controlling standard in disposition is the child’s best interests.

Here, those interests required stability. The child had experienced three removals resulting from the father’s violations, followed by another placement disruption linked to unauthorized contact. Her need for residential treatment at age six illustrated the seriousness of the resulting emotional harm. The father’s interest in further rehabilitation therefore yielded to the child’s immediate need for permanency and a stable therapeutic environment.

6. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re K.S.

Supplied the general standards of appellate review for abuse-and-neglect cases.

In re K.A.

Confirmed that granting or denying an improvement period is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

In re Tonjia M.

Established that a court may deny an improvement period when improvement is unlikely, supporting the futility determination.

In re Kristin Y.

Confirmed that termination may occur without less restrictive alternatives when substantial correction is not reasonably likely.

In re R.J.M.

Provided both the rule permitting immediate termination and the principle that courts need not exhaust speculative possibilities of improvement when the child remains at serious risk.

In re N.H.

Reaffirmed that the child’s best interests control dispositional decisions.

In re B.H.

Was quoted through In re N.H. as the source of the controlling best-interests standard.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Adjudication

The stage at which the court determines whether a child was abused or neglected and whether a parent is responsible.

Post-adjudicatory improvement period

A court-supervised opportunity, after a neglect finding, for a parent to address the problems that endangered the child. It is discretionary, not automatic.

Clear and convincing evidence

A demanding level of proof requiring a firm belief that the asserted fact is highly probable.

No reasonable likelihood of substantial correction

A finding that the parent is unlikely to remedy the dangerous conditions soon enough to protect the child’s welfare.

Least restrictive disposition

A preference for using a less severe option when it can safely protect the child. It does not require ineffective alternatives or delay that places the child at risk.

Abuse of discretion

An appellate standard under which a lower court’s decision is upheld unless it exceeds the bounds of reasonable judicial judgment.

Secure attachment

A child’s stable emotional bond with a dependable caregiver. Repeated removals and disruptions can impair the child’s ability to form such bonds.

Potential Impact

Although issued as a memorandum decision, In re T.S. provides a significant application of established West Virginia child-welfare law. It signals that:

• Repeated intentional violations of protective orders may independently demonstrate that further rehabilitation would be futile.
• A parent’s personal belief that prohibited contact benefits the child does not excuse violation of a court order.
• Prior completion of improvement periods carries little weight when the same harmful conduct later recurs.
• Psychological injury from instability and disrupted attachments may justify termination even without proof of direct physical abuse by the parent.
• Courts may prioritize prompt permanency over additional services when continued uncertainty would impair a child’s treatment or development.

Future courts are likely to examine not only whether a parent participated in past services, but whether those services produced lasting behavioral change. The decision also reinforces the importance of lawful modification procedures: parents must ask the court to change an order rather than unilaterally deciding that the order no longer serves the child.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed termination because the father’s repeated, knowing defiance of the no-contact order persisted despite extensive prior interventions and caused serious psychological harm to T.S. His promises of future compliance did not overcome the history of recurring violations.

The principal lesson of In re T.S. is that an improvement period is a remedial opportunity, not an entitlement. When prior services have failed to produce durable change and additional delay would threaten a child’s stability, a court may deny further rehabilitation and terminate parental rights in the child’s best interests.