In re S.R.: Parental Unavailability and Speculative Rehabilitation Do Not Defeat Termination

Introduction

In re S.R. concerns the termination of Mother S.L.’s parental rights following recurring methamphetamine abuse, unsuccessful treatment efforts, lack of contact with child-welfare authorities, and noncompliance with a court-approved improvement period. The mother argued that the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) did not make reasonable reunification efforts and that her participation in a third rehabilitation program showed a reasonable likelihood that she could correct the conditions of abuse or neglect.

The Supreme Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. It held that reasonable efforts are evaluated from the totality of the services and opportunities provided; they do not require the DHS to overcome a parent’s persistent unavailability or refusal to cooperate. The Court also concluded that enrollment in another rehabilitation program did not outweigh the mother’s repeated treatment failures, continued substance use, and prolonged noncompliance. The child’s need for stability and permanency permitted termination without waiting for a speculative future improvement.

Background and Procedural History

• A prior abuse-and-neglect case based on parental substance abuse began in 2019. It was dismissed after the parents completed improvement periods and regained custody of S.R. in 2022.
• In March 2024, the DHS filed the present petition alleging renewed substance abuse, specifically methamphetamine use.
• The DHS referred the mother to the Wyoming County Day Report Center for drug screening and treatment services. Although placement at Anchor Point was offered, she chose Serenity Pointe.
• In November 2024, the mother stipulated to substance abuse and was adjudicated an abusing parent. She received a post-adjudicatory improvement period, later extended.
• The improvement period required contact with the DHS, substance-abuse evaluation and treatment, drug testing, participation in recommended services, and abstinence.
• Serenity Pointe discharged the mother after she became aggressive and attempted to initiate a physical altercation.
• The circuit court allowed her to enter My Hope for Tomorrow rather than immediately revoking the improvement period. She later left that program against medical advice after hospitalization and was briefly incarcerated.
• She stopped communicating with counsel and the DHS, did not visit the child, missed hearings, and at times could not be located.
• At disposition, she was reportedly participating in a third rehabilitation program, but the circuit court found no reasonable likelihood that she could correct the conditions in the near future.

The circuit court terminated both parents’ rights. The permanency plan for S.R. was adoption in the child’s current placement.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the July 29, 2025, dispositional order. Applying West Virginia Code §§ 49-4-601(d) and 49-4-604, the Court reached three principal conclusions:

1. The DHS made reasonable efforts to preserve the family. It provided transportation, drug screening, treatment services, an available placement at Anchor Point, multidisciplinary-team activity, and efforts to arrange supervised visitation.
2. The mother’s unavailability explained why some services were not completed. Although the DHS did not secure the ordered psychological evaluation or provide every service she later identified, she could not reliably be contacted outside treatment programs and did not participate consistently in the case.
3. Termination was justified despite her third treatment attempt. Her repeated discharges, continued methamphetamine use, abandonment of treatment, missed hearings, lack of contact, and failure to visit S.R. supported the finding that she lacked the present capacity to correct the conditions in the near future.

Because there was no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction and termination was necessary for S.R.’s welfare, the statutory requirements for termination under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) were satisfied.

Analysis

Standard of Review

Relying on syllabus point 1 of In re K.S., the Court applied a three-part standard:

• Substantive rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion;
• Factual findings are reviewed for clear error; and
• Legal questions are reviewed de novo.

This framework gave substantial deference to the circuit court’s findings about the mother’s conduct, credibility, compliance, and prospects for improvement, while preserving independent appellate review of the governing statutes.

Reasonable Reunification Efforts

West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(d) requires the DHS to provide supportive services intended to remedy circumstances detrimental to a child. Under § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C)(iii), a court considering termination must examine whether the DHS made reasonable remedial and reunification efforts, with the child’s health and safety as the paramount concern.

The mother focused on services that were not completed: additional multidisciplinary-team meetings, a psychological evaluation, and parenting classes. The Court instead considered the record as a whole. The DHS provided transportation and substance-abuse services through the Day Report Center; a provider obtained an Anchor Point placement; CPS attempted to maintain contact; MDT meetings were conducted; and the DHS tried to arrange supervised visits while the mother was progressing at Serenity Pointe.

The decision treats “reasonable efforts” as a practical, fact-sensitive obligation rather than a requirement that every possible service be delivered. The DHS was not responsible for the mother’s rejection of an available placement, failure to complete self-selected programs, or inability to be located. Her lack of cooperation materially limited the agency’s ability to conduct an evaluation or provide additional services.

No Reasonable Likelihood of Substantial Correction

West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d) defines the absence of a reasonable likelihood of correction to include circumstances in which an abusing adult has demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the underlying problems independently or with assistance.

The Court did not treat enrollment in a third rehabilitation program as conclusive evidence of likely recovery. Instead, it examined the mother’s course of conduct:

• Discharge from the first program for aggressive behavior;
• Continued substance use, including methamphetamine shortly before admission to another program;
• Departure from the second program against medical advice;
• Failure to maintain contact with the DHS and counsel;
• Failure to appear at multiple hearings or participate in MDT meetings;
• No contact with S.R.; and
• Periods during which her whereabouts were unknown.

Against this history, the third program represented only a possibility of future improvement. The statutory inquiry, however, concerns whether substantial correction is reasonably likely in the near future. The Court found that the evidence supported a negative answer.

The Child’s Welfare and Permanency

A finding that correction is unlikely does not alone complete the analysis; termination must also be necessary for the child’s welfare. The circuit court considered S.R.’s need for stability, continuity of care, and permanent placement. The Supreme Court agreed that termination would permit adoption and avoid additional delay while the mother pursued uncertain recovery.

The ruling reflects the principle that abuse-and-neglect proceedings are not solely rehabilitation proceedings for parents. The child’s timeframe matters independently, and a court need not indefinitely postpone permanency based on another unproven treatment attempt.

Precedents Cited

In re K.S.

This case supplied the governing appellate standard of review. Its importance lies in separating factual, discretionary, and legal questions. The circuit court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous, and its decision to terminate parental rights fell within its statutory discretion.

In re Cecil T.

The Court relied on syllabus point 4 of In re Cecil T. for the rule that courts need not exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement where the child’s welfare would be seriously threatened. This principle directly answered the mother’s reliance on her third rehabilitation placement. A new treatment attempt did not require the court to disregard her prior failures or defer permanency indefinitely.

In re R.J.M.

In re Cecil T. quoted the relevant rule from In re R.J.M.. The latter is the foundational authority for the proposition that child-welfare courts need not continue experimenting with uncertain parental rehabilitation when doing so threatens the child’s welfare. In the present case, the mother’s repeated inability to complete treatment made further improvement speculative rather than reasonably probable.

In re Isaiah A.

The Court cited In re Isaiah A. for the proposition that children are entitled to permanency to the greatest degree possible. This precedent supported termination rather than a less final disposition because adoption offered S.R. a safe, stable, and permanent home.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Adjudication

The stage at which the court determines whether a child was abused or neglected and whether a parent is legally responsible.

Post-adjudicatory improvement period

A court-supervised opportunity, granted after adjudication, for a parent to correct the conditions that led to abuse or neglect.

Reasonable efforts

Practical and appropriate steps by the DHS to reunify the family while keeping the child’s health and safety paramount. The term does not mean every imaginable service must be provided regardless of parental cooperation.

Multidisciplinary team

A group of professionals and participants who coordinate services, treatment, visitation, and permanency planning in an abuse-and-neglect case.

No reasonable likelihood of substantial correction

A finding that the parent lacks the capacity to resolve the harmful conditions, either alone or with assistance, within a timeframe compatible with the child’s needs.

Clear error

A deferential standard under which an appellate court generally accepts factual findings unless the record leaves a firm conviction that a mistake occurred.

De novo review

Independent appellate review of legal questions without deference to the lower court’s legal conclusion.

Disposition

The final stage at which the court selects the legal outcome, which may include reunification, guardianship, or termination of parental rights.

Potential Impact

Although issued as a memorandum decision, In re S.R. reinforces several important principles for future West Virginia abuse-and-neglect cases:

• Reasonable efforts are not measured by a rigid checklist. Courts may consider the services actually offered and whether the parent’s own conduct prevented additional services.
• Parental cooperation is central. A parent who cannot be located, refuses available treatment, or abandons programs cannot ordinarily attribute the resulting service gaps entirely to the DHS.
• Current enrollment does not erase prior noncompliance. Participation in a new program must be assessed against the parent’s entire history and the likelihood of timely, sustained change.
• Permanency may outweigh speculative recovery. Courts need not delay adoption where further improvement remains uncertain and the child requires stability.

The decision does not establish that multiple treatment attempts automatically justify termination. Nor does it excuse the DHS from providing meaningful reunification assistance. Its narrower lesson is that, when substantial services were offered and the parent repeatedly failed to engage, uncompleted services and a late treatment effort do not necessarily preclude termination.

Conclusion

In re S.R. affirms that reasonable reunification efforts require meaningful assistance, not guaranteed success or pursuit of every service despite parental unavailability. The mother’s repeated treatment failures, continued substance use, missed hearings, lack of contact, and failure to visit S.R. supported the conclusion that she could not substantially correct the conditions in the near future.

Most importantly, the Court placed S.R.’s need for a stable and permanent home ahead of another speculative period of rehabilitation. The decision therefore reinforces the governing balance in West Virginia child-welfare law: parents must receive a fair opportunity to improve, but children are not required to wait indefinitely for uncertain change.