New West Virginia Abuse-and-Neglect Rule: A Parent Cannot Be Dismissed While Any Parental Rights Remain, and Disposition Modification Must Follow the Full Procedures of the New Disposition

Case: In re P.F. and M.F.-1
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Date: May 22, 2026
Disposition: Vacated and remanded with directions

1. Introduction

This consolidated appeal arose from Mason County abuse-and-neglect proceedings involving two children, P.F. and M.F.-1, and their parents, S.F. (mother) and M.F.-2 (father). After adjudication based on parental stipulations concerning domestic violence exposure and unsafe housing, the case initially resolved at disposition through the parents’ voluntary relinquishment of custodial rights (not parental rights) and placement of the children in a subsidized legal guardianship.

When the intended guardianship later unraveled, the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) moved to modify disposition and sought termination of parental rights to free the children for adoption. The circuit court granted DHS’s modification request and terminated parental rights. On appeal, although the parties focused on notice and best interests, the Supreme Court identified two foundational procedural failures:

• The circuit court improperly dismissed the parents as parties despite their retention of parental rights.
• The circuit court terminated parental rights on a modification motion without conducting the legally required termination-focused dispositional process and findings.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court vacated the termination order and remanded. It held that the circuit court substantially disregarded and frustrated the statutory and rules-based abuse-and-neglect process in two respects: (1) dismissing parents who still had parental rights, and (2) terminating parental rights without satisfying the procedural and substantive requirements for a contested termination under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604 and Rules 35 and 36 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Vacatur for serious process failures

• In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001): The Court invoked Syllabus Point 5 to justify vacating and remanding when the established statutory/rules process has been “substantially disregarded or frustrated.” It also referenced Edward B.’s insistence on meaningful, case-specific findings rather than conclusory “buzzwords.”
• In re H.B., 252 W. Va. 350, 922 S.E.2d 350 (2025); In re E.T., No. 17-1085, 2018 WL 1773180 (W. Va. Apr. 13, 2018); In re S.J., No. 19-0702, 2020 WL 31728623 (W. Va. June 15, 2020): These decisions supported the Court’s willingness to address glaring procedural defects sua sponte even when not properly raised by the parties.

2) Fundamental parental rights and due process

• In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973): Provided the foundational state constitutional principle that a natural parent’s interest is a fundamental liberty interest; termination requires notice and a meaningful hearing. Willis framed the Court’s critique of dismissing parents and later proceeding in a manner that risked termination without fair participation.
• Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); In re J.S., 233 W. Va. 394, 758 S.E.2d 747 (2014): These authorities grounded the Court’s discussion of notice and the “meaningful time and meaningful manner” requirement.
• Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); State v. T.C., 172 W. Va. 47, 303 S.E.2d 685 (1983): Santosky supplied the federal constitutional minimum—clear and convincing evidence with fundamentally fair procedures. T.C. tied the West Virginia “clear, cogent and convincing” standard and Santosky together, reinforcing that termination requires a robust evidentiary and procedural record.
• In re L.M., 245 W. Va. 751, 865 S.E.2d 493 (2021); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996): These cases reinforced the distinction between custody loss and irrevocable termination of parental status, and the due-process sensitivity of termination proceedings.

3) Party status, participation, and post-disposition proceedings

• In re H.M., 251 W. Va. 333, 912 S.E.2d 885 (2025): Directly supported the Court’s conclusion that dismissal at disposition is improper when parental rights remain intact—because parents continue to have a participatory role in subsequent reviews until permanency is achieved.

4) Dispositional hearing requirements and burden of proof

• State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res. ex rel. Chastity D. v. Hill, 207 W. Va. 358, 532 S.E.2d 358 (2000); In re K.S., 246 W. Va. 517, 874 S.E.2d 319 (2022): These cases were used to emphasize that when termination is sought and resisted, the circuit court must conduct a disposition hearing where termination is “specifically and thoroughly addressed.”
• In re K.V., 251 W. Va. 418, 914 S.E.2d 517 (2025): Reinforced that the burden remains on the State; process errors that effectively shift the burden undermine the validity of termination.

5) Modification of disposition must still satisfy termination standards

• In re R.B., 252 W. Va. 534, 923 S.E.2d 464 (2025): Served as a contrast: modification-based termination can be affirmed when the circuit court makes both (a) modification findings under § 49-4-606(a) and (b) termination findings under § 49-4-604(c)(6).

6) Constructive notice arguments (and why they failed here)

• In re J.F., No. 14-0091, 2014 WL 4347145 (W. Va. Aug. 29, 2014); Winona National Bank v. Fridley, 122 W. Va. 479, 10 S.E.2d 907 (1940) (with the Court noting the quotation’s correct source as Schupbach v. Newbrough, 173 W. Va. 156, 313 S.E.2d 432 (1984)): DHS cited these to argue counsel-notice sufficed and parties must stay apprised. The Court distinguished them because the parents had been improperly dismissed, disrupting counsel relationships and eliminating any fair presumption they knew counsel had been reappointed.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Why dismissal was unlawful: party status tracks parental rights

The Court anchored its new rule in West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(h), which requires that any party with “custodial or other parental rights or responsibilities” be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Because the parents relinquished only custodial rights and retained parental rights, they remained necessary parties and could not be dismissed.

The Court also tied the statutory command to due process: terminating—or even moving toward termination—without ensuring reliable notice and participation violates core principles articulated in In re Willis, Mullane, and Santosky. The opinion stressed a practical consequence of improper dismissal: it creates a high risk that later hearings (permanency reviews, modification requests, termination efforts) proceed without actual notice, counsel coordination, or meaningful participation.

2) Why modification-based termination required a full termination disposition

West Virginia Code § 49-4-606(a) allows modification of a dispositional order upon clear and convincing evidence of a material change of circumstances and best interests. But the Court held that this is only a threshold. If the “new manner of disposition” is termination, then the circuit court must also satisfy the procedures and findings that termination demands under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and the procedural rules (including Rules 35(b) and 36(a)).

The circuit court’s error was structural: it treated “material change + best interests” as sufficient to terminate parental rights. It neither conducted a termination-focused contested dispositional hearing nor made (or memorialized) the required findings:

• “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future,” and
• termination is “necessary for the welfare of the child[ren].”

The Court emphasized that these requirements are not technicalities; they implement the constitutionally required burden of proof described in Santosky v. Kramer and West Virginia jurisprudence. A dispositional order cannot be salvaged by generalized conclusions or borrowed “proper wording” without the court’s own supported findings (echoing the warning in In re Edward B. and In re K.S.).

C. Impact

1) Procedural safeguard: parents remain parties until parental rights end

The new syllabus point creates a bright-line procedural rule: if parental rights remain, the parent remains a party. Practically, this should reduce “silent” procedural drift—where parents fall out of the case after custody changes—and should improve the reliability of notice, counsel continuity, and participation during permanency review hearings and modification motions.

2) Clarification of modification practice under § 49-4-606

The Court’s second holding will affect how DHS and circuit courts litigate modification requests. A court may still modify disposition based on a material change and best interests, but if the remedy sought is a different dispositional endpoint (especially termination), the court must “level up” procedurally—conducting the hearing and making the findings required for that endpoint.

3) Likely litigation consequences

• Increased vacatur risk for modification-based terminations that do not include § 49-4-604(c)(6) findings and a proper contested dispositional record.
• Greater emphasis on service and actual notice when parties were previously (even mistakenly) removed or counsel appointments were ended.
• More careful sequencing in permanency planning: guardianship disruption alone will not justify termination without the required statutory termination proof.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Custodial rights vs. parental rights: Custody concerns where the child lives and who makes day-to-day decisions. Parental rights include the enduring legal relationship—status, potential reunification, and other legal ties. A parent can relinquish custody without terminating parental status.
• Subsidized legal guardianship: A permanency option placing the child with a guardian (often a relative/kin) with financial support, without necessarily terminating parental rights.
• Modification of disposition (§ 49-4-606): A mechanism to change the court’s earlier permanency/dispositional order upon a material change and best interests. This case holds it does not erase the requirements for whatever new disposition is sought.
• Contested termination: Termination “sought and resisted” triggers heightened procedures: an evidentiary hearing focused on termination and specific findings under § 49-4-604(c)(6), reflected in a written order.
• Constructive notice: Notice “through” a lawyer is often treated as notice to the client, but the Court held it was inadequate here because the parents were improperly dismissed, disrupting counsel and undermining any fair assumption they knew counsel had been reinstated.

5. Conclusion

In re P.F. and M.F.-1 is a process-centered decision that strengthens procedural integrity in West Virginia abuse-and-neglect cases at two critical junctures. First, it prohibits dismissing parents as parties while any parental rights remain, aligning party status with the statutory guarantee of a meaningful opportunity to be heard and constitutional due process. Second, it clarifies that modification under West Virginia Code § 49-4-606 cannot be used as a shortcut: if the new disposition is termination, the circuit court must conduct the full termination dispositional process and make the specific findings demanded by West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and the Court’s rules.

The practical significance is clear: permanency disruptions (like a failed guardianship) may justify revisiting a case, but they do not themselves justify severing the parent-child legal relationship without the rigor that termination law requires.