In re N.M.W.: Court of Appeals Must Follow Supreme Court Juvenile-Code Precedent; “Magic Words” Not Required for N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d) Findings

1. Introduction

In re N.M.W. and A.N.D. (N.C. Mar. 20, 2026) is a discretionary-review decision in a juvenile matter arising from Carteret County District Court. The petitioner-appellant was the Carteret County Department of Social Services (DSS), joined in seeking review by the Guardian ad Litem (GAL). The respondent-appellee was the children’s mother.

The Supreme Court reviewed a divided Court of Appeals decision, 299 N.C. App. 20 (2025), which had vacated a permanency-related district court order (and affirmed/vacated parts of another), then remanded. No party sought Supreme Court review as to the father, so the Supreme Court limited its review accordingly.

The central issues were (i) whether the trial court’s permanency planning findings satisfied N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d) under the Supreme Court’s juvenile-code precedents—particularly In re L.L.—and (ii) a broader institutional concern: the Court of Appeals’ obligation to apply binding Supreme Court precedent, especially in recurring “insufficient findings” disputes.

2. Summary of the Opinion

In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals “as it pertains to respondent-mother.” The Court expressly reminded the Court of Appeals that it is bound to properly apply Supreme Court precedent.

On the merits, the Court held that the permanency planning order’s findings were sufficient to satisfy N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d) under In re L.L., 386 N.C. 706, 909 S.E.2d 151 (2024). Because the findings were sufficient, the Court stated that discussion about whether remand rather than vacatur is the proper remedy for insufficient findings was “unnecessary.”

Justice Berger filed a concurrence (concurring in the per curiam disposition) that sharply criticized the Court of Appeals for issuing a published opinion in tension with Supreme Court precedent and used the case as a vehicle to question whether North Carolina should continue to apply horizontal stare decisis to Court of Appeals panel decisions under In re Civil Penalty.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • In re L.L., 386 N.C. 706, 909 S.E.2d 151 (2024)
    Role in In re N.M.W.: This was the Supreme Court’s controlling juvenile-code precedent for assessing whether a permanency planning order satisfies statutory written-finding requirements. The per curiam opinion applies In re L.L. to conclude the trial court’s findings were sufficient under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d). Justice Berger emphasizes In re L.L. for the proposition that “magic words are not required” and that findings need not “track the statutory language verbatim.”
  • In re L.R.L.B., 377 N.C. 311 (2021)
    Role in In re N.M.W.: Cited (in the concurrence) as another “straightforward” Supreme Court decision rejecting “magic word” approaches to juvenile orders. It reinforces that juvenile court findings do not have to quote the statute’s exact language to be legally adequate.
  • In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165 (2013)
    Role in In re N.M.W.: Referenced through In re L.R.L.B. for the proposition that findings across related juvenile orders (e.g., termination and permanency planning) may be considered together. This line of authority undercuts hyper-technical challenges demanding rote statutory phrasing in a single standalone order.
  • In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373 (1989)
    Role in In re N.M.W.: This is the foundational North Carolina authority for the principle that Court of Appeals panels are bound by prior Court of Appeals panel decisions on the same issue (horizontal stare decisis). Justice Berger argues the doctrine—while intended to create stability— can generate confusion and temporarily displace Supreme Court doctrine when an erroneous panel opinion is published and treated as binding until corrected.
  • Holmes v. Moore, 384 N.C. 426 (2023) (citing Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (1787))
    Role in In re N.M.W.: Cited for the constitutional principle that it is the duty of the Supreme Court of North Carolina to declare what the law is under the state constitution. Justice Berger uses it to frame the Court of Appeals’ failure to apply Supreme Court precedent as a structural problem: “inattentiveness or recalcitrance” can functionally alter the law without constitutional authority.
  • State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764 (1949); Mial v. Ellington, 134 N.C. 131 (1903); Williamson v. Rabon, 177 N.C. 303 (1919)
    Role in In re N.M.W.: These cases are cited (in the concurrence) for a classical view of stare decisis: binding force typically attaches after a principle becomes “settled by a series of decisions,” and a “single decision” is rarely a sound basis for rigid adherence. Justice Berger invokes these authorities to argue that In re Civil Penalty improperly grants near-automatic statewide precedential force to a single first-in-time Court of Appeals panel opinion.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s per curiam reasoning proceeds in two steps:

  1. Institutional correction (vertical stare decisis). The Court admonishes that the Court of Appeals must “apply properly the precedent of this Court.” This is not presented as a new doctrinal test, but as an enforcement of hierarchy: Supreme Court holdings control even if an intermediate appellate panel takes a different view.
  2. Application of controlling juvenile precedent to findings under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d). The Court concludes the permanency planning findings were sufficient under In re L.L.. The “magic words” theme is central: juvenile orders are evaluated for substance—whether the findings address the statutory requirements—rather than for verbatim recitation of statutory language.

The per curiam opinion also clarifies a remedial point: because the findings were sufficient, extended debate about whether remand rather than vacatur is the proper remedy for insufficient findings did not matter to the disposition. In other words, the Supreme Court’s reversal rests on sufficiency under existing precedent, not on refining remedies for insufficiency.

3.3. Impact

Juvenile practice (permanency planning orders). The immediate impact is practical and corrective: litigants and courts should not treat “insufficient findings” challenges as invitations to demand rigid, formulaic statutory phrasing. In re N.M.W. reinforces that In re L.L. governs and that substance controls over “magic words” when evaluating findings under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d).

Appellate discipline and publication effects. The Supreme Court’s public reminder signals that it views misapplication of its juvenile precedents as a serious, recurring problem—particularly when a published Court of Appeals opinion could be cited statewide and potentially distort trial-court practice.

Potential future reform: horizontal stare decisis in the Court of Appeals. Justice Berger’s concurrence is not itself a holding changing the status of In re Civil Penalty, but it tees up a significant institutional question: whether Court of Appeals panel decisions should remain binding on later panels, or instead be persuasive unless issued en banc (referencing N.C. R. App. P. 31.1). The concurrence’s reasoning suggests the Court may be open, in a future case, to revisiting or recalibrating the precedential effect of non-en-banc Court of Appeals opinions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Permanency planning order: In juvenile cases, a court order that sets or reviews a child’s long-term plan (e.g., reunification, guardianship, adoption) and includes specific required findings to justify that plan.
  • N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d): A statute requiring particular findings in permanency planning. The Supreme Court’s juvenile cases emphasize that the order must address the substance of the statutory factors, but it need not copy the statute word-for-word.
  • “Magic words” problem: A shorthand for arguments that a court order is defective because it does not recite exact statutory language. In re L.L. and related cases reject that approach.
  • Vertical stare decisis: Lower courts must follow higher-court precedent. Here, the Court of Appeals must follow Supreme Court holdings such as In re L.L..
  • Horizontal stare decisis: A court following its own prior decisions. Under In re Civil Penalty, Court of Appeals panels are generally bound by earlier panel decisions on the same issue unless overruled by a higher court.
  • En banc: Review by the full Court of Appeals rather than a three-judge panel. Rule 31.1 provides a mechanism to resolve panel splits.
  • Vacatur vs. remand: “Vacatur” nullifies an order; “remand” sends the case back for further proceedings (often to make additional findings). The Supreme Court deemed the remedy debate unnecessary because it found the findings sufficient.

5. Conclusion

In re N.M.W. reinforces two core propositions. First, in permanency planning under N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(d), trial courts are not required to use “magic words”; findings are assessed for substantive compliance under binding Supreme Court precedent such as In re L.L.. Second, the decision serves as an institutional corrective: the Court of Appeals must apply Supreme Court holdings faithfully, and failures—especially in published opinions—risk destabilizing statewide juvenile practice. Justice Berger’s concurrence further signals that the Court may, in an appropriate future case, reassess the continuing wisdom of In re Civil Penalty in light of modern en banc procedures under N.C. R. App. P. 31.1.