Termination Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) May Be Affirmed Without “Magic Words” Where Findings Show No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction and Permanency Necessitates Termination

1. Introduction

Case: In re M.H., A.H., and A.M., No. 25-388 (W. Va. May 6, 2026) (memorandum decision).
Lower Court: Circuit Court of Cabell County (May 13, 2025 termination order).
Parties: Petitioner Mother C.S. (appellant); West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS); children M.H., A.H., and A.M.; Guardian ad litem.

The DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition in April 2023, alleging the mother’s substance abuse created serious safety risks (drug paraphernalia accessible in the home, mother found unconscious with a hypodermic needle, and dangerous driving while impaired/falling asleep). The mother was adjudicated an abusing and neglecting parent after admitting her drug use affected parenting and acknowledging recent heroin use. She received a post-adjudicatory improvement period with a case plan focused on treatment, screening, parenting services, and avoiding drug users.

The key appellate issues were (1) whether the circuit court made the statutory findings required to terminate parental rights under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), and (2) whether the circuit court failed to consider less restrictive alternatives before terminating parental rights.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed. It held that, even if a dispositional order does not precisely track the statutory phrasing of § 49-4-604(c)(6), termination will be upheld when the record and findings demonstrate the court reached the required conclusions: (a) there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions of abuse/neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future, and (b) termination is necessary for the children’s welfare—including their entitlement to permanency.

The Court further held that once “no reasonable likelihood” is supported, termination may be imposed without intervening less restrictive alternatives, especially where alternatives would jeopardize permanency.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)
    Role in this decision: Supplied the standard of review: factual findings are reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. This framework underpinned the Court’s refusal to reweigh evidence where the record supported the circuit court’s findings regarding noncompliance, relapse cycles, and the children’s need for stability.
  • In re Jamie Nicole H., 205 W. Va. 176, 184, 517 S.E.2d 41, 49 (1999)
    Role in this decision: Central to the mother’s “insufficient findings” argument. The Court relied on this case for the proposition that a termination order need not “track” the exact language of the statute if the reviewing court is convinced the circuit court reached the conclusions required by § 49-4-604(c)(6) before terminating parental rights. Here, the Court treated the circuit court’s phrasing (“no reasonable likelihood … such that it is in the children’s best interests to be returned”) as substantively consistent with the statutory requirements when read with the full set of findings.
  • In re A.P., 245 W. Va. 248, 257 n.17, 858 S.E.2d 873, 882 n.17 (2021)
    Role in this decision: Provided the interpretive lens for the statutory phrase “necessary for the welfare of the child” in § 49-4-604(c)(6). The Court used In re A.P. to emphasize that a child’s welfare “necessarily implicates” the child’s entitlement to permanency and that courts may not choose a disposition that jeopardizes permanency under the guise of welfare.
  • Syl. Pt. 2, in part, In re H.T., 250 W. Va. 11, 902 S.E.2d 143 (2024)
    Role in this decision: Acknowledged the general rule favoring the least restrictive alternative in dispositions under § 49-4-604. The Court cited this to frame the mother’s argument correctly before explaining why it did not control given the circuit court’s “no reasonable likelihood” finding.
  • Syl. Pt. 3, In re H.T., 250 W. Va. 11, 902 S.E.2d 143 (2024) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980))
    Role in this decision: Provided the dispositive rule on alternatives: termination may be employed without less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood that conditions can be substantially corrected under § 49-4-604(c). This principle allowed the Court to uphold termination notwithstanding the mother’s call for an alternative disposition.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two linked steps: (1) whether the circuit court’s findings satisfied § 49-4-604(c)(6), and (2) whether, given those findings, less restrictive alternatives were required.

A. Statutory findings: substance over form

The mother argued the circuit court applied “the incorrect standard” because it did not expressly recite the statutory language (“no reasonable likelihood” and “necessary for the welfare of the child”). The Court rejected this as a “magic words” argument. Invoking In re Jamie Nicole H., it held that precise statutory phrasing is not required if the order and record show the circuit court reached the required conclusions.

The Court then matched the circuit court’s findings to statutory pathways showing “no reasonable likelihood”:

  • Failure to follow through with a reasonable family case plan under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3): the mother missed parenting sessions and drug screens, tested positive for marijuana, and refused inpatient treatment.
  • Habitual substance abuse/addiction impairing parenting and nonresponse to treatment under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(1): despite years of therapy/rehabilitation cycles, the mother continued “pervasive substance abuse and cycles of active addiction,” and the children had a lengthy history of removals across multiple prior DHS cases.

Importantly, the Court treated “welfare” as inseparable from permanency. The record included professional recommendations of no contact, a bonding evaluation indicating reintroduction would harm the youngest child after a year of stability, and evidence the older children consistently wanted no contact. These facts supported the circuit court’s conclusion that return or prolonged uncertainty was contrary to the children’s welfare.

B. Least restrictive alternatives: not required once “no reasonable likelihood” is established

On the alternatives argument, the Court acknowledged the general preference for the least restrictive alternative (In re H.T., Syl. Pt. 2, in part). But it emphasized the controlling exception: under In re H.T., Syl. Pt. 3 (quoting In re R.J.M.), termination may be imposed without intermediate dispositions when “no reasonable likelihood” exists.

The Court added a permanency-based limit: citing In re A.P., it reasoned that a disposition that prolongs instability can be impermissible because § 49-4-604(c)(6)’s “necessary for the welfare” language does not permit jeopardizing a child’s right to permanency. Given an 18-month stable placement and professional opinions against contact, the Court concluded a less restrictive alternative would be inconsistent with permanency and welfare.

3.3 Impact

Although styled as a memorandum decision, the opinion reinforces several operational rules likely to influence abuse-and-neglect litigation:

  • Reduced traction for “verbatim statutory language” challenges: Parties may find it harder to reverse termination orders based on drafting/formalistic critiques if the order’s factual findings and conclusions substantively align with § 49-4-604(c)(6), consistent with In re Jamie Nicole H..
  • Permanency is treated as an element of “welfare,” not merely a best-practices consideration: By leaning on In re A.P., the Court signals that welfare analysis must account for the child’s entitlement to stable, timely permanency; alternative dispositions that extend uncertainty can be rejected on that basis.
  • Case-plan noncompliance plus entrenched addiction history remains a strong “no reasonable likelihood” record: The decision illustrates how missed screens, incomplete services, refusal of recommended inpatient treatment, and repeated relapse/removal history can satisfy § 49-4-604(d)(1) and (d)(3).
  • Child-specific evidence matters at disposition: The bonding evaluation for the youngest child and the older children’s stated wishes supported the conclusion that reunification/contact was not beneficial and that termination best served welfare.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “No reasonable likelihood that conditions … can be substantially corrected”: A legal determination that, based on the parent’s conduct and responsiveness to services, the problems that made the home unsafe are unlikely to be fixed soon enough to meet the child’s needs. West Virginia law gives examples in § 49-4-604(d), including ongoing addiction that has not responded to treatment and failure to follow a case plan.
  • “Necessary for the welfare of the child”: Not limited to immediate safety; it includes the child’s developmental need for stability and permanence. The Court treats prolonged uncertainty as harmful to welfare.
  • “Least restrictive alternative”: The idea that courts should prefer less drastic options than termination (e.g., guardianship, continued improvement period) when those options adequately protect the child. But that preference yields when the court finds “no reasonable likelihood” of correction.
  • “Improvement period” and “family case plan”: Structured opportunities and requirements designed to remedy abuse/neglect conditions. Noncompliance (missed screens, missed classes, refusal of recommended treatment) is often used to show that the parent did not meaningfully benefit from services.
  • “Bonding evaluation”: An expert assessment of the child’s attachment relationships and the likely psychological impact of placement changes or renewed contact. Here, it supported the conclusion that reintroducing the mother would harm the youngest child after stability in kinship care.

5. Conclusion

In re M.H., A.H., and A.M. affirms termination where the circuit court’s findings—though not necessarily mirroring statutory phrasing—substantively establish § 49-4-604(c)(6)’s requirements. The decision underscores that (1) “no reasonable likelihood” can be grounded in demonstrated case-plan noncompliance and long-standing, relapsing substance abuse that has not responded to treatment, (2) once “no reasonable likelihood” is found, the court is not required to adopt less restrictive alternatives, and (3) a child’s “welfare” includes the right to timely permanency, which courts may not jeopardize through extended or unstable dispositions.