Battered-Parent Status Is Foreclosed by Findings of Participation/Acquiescence in Abuse; Severe Chronic Nonaccidental Injuries Support Aggravated-Circumstances and Termination

1. Introduction

Case: In re J.P.-1 and J.P.-2, No. 25-171 (W. Va. Apr. 21, 2026) (memorandum decision).
Parties: Petitioner Mother C.M. (appellant) vs. West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) (appellee); children represented by a guardian ad litem.
Context: DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition after both children were hospitalized with severe, nonaccidental injuries while in mother’s care; mother reported domestic violence by her boyfriend, D.C., but also later pled guilty to felony child neglect creating substantial risk of bodily injury.
Issues on appeal: (1) whether the circuit court reversibly erred by not determining at adjudication whether mother was a statutory “battered parent”; (2) whether the court erred in finding “aggravated circumstances” (relieving DHS of reunification efforts); and (3) whether termination was improper because a less restrictive disposition should have been used.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the termination order. It held that:

  • The circuit court complied with the requirement to allow evidence on battered-parent status and, after disposition, made findings (“participated and acquiesced”) that legally precluded battered-parent designation under W. Va. Code § 49-1-201.
  • Given the severe, chronic, nonaccidental injuries, mother’s stipulation to failure to protect, and her criminal conviction, the circuit court did not err in finding “aggravated circumstances,” thereby relieving DHS of the duty to make reasonable reunification efforts under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604.
  • Termination was proper because the record supported “no reasonable likelihood” of correction in the near future, and termination was necessary for the children’s welfare under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6).

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standard of review: In re Cecil T.

The Court applied the familiar abuse-and-neglect appellate framework from Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011): factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while legal conclusions receive de novo review. This division mattered because mother’s arguments mixed legal claims (what “battered parent” requires; what qualifies as “aggravated circumstances”) with challenges to the circuit court’s credibility and inference-drawing (e.g., whether mother “acquiesced” or was evasive).

2) Battered-parent procedure and findings requirement: In re J.F.-1

Syl. Pt. 3, in part, In re J.F.-1, 252 W. Va. 439, 923 S.E.2d 369 (2025), requires that when battered-parent status is asserted, the circuit court must (i) permit evidence and (ii) make findings of fact and conclusions of law on whether the parent meets the statutory definition.

The Court treated the requirement as satisfied in substance because evidence was taken at adjudication and the issue was held open for further development; critically, the dispositive later findings (“participated and acquiesced”) resolved the battered-parent question against mother under the statute. In other words, the Court effectively held that any arguable timing/sequence defect was not outcome-determinative where the final findings necessarily negated the statutory elements of battered-parent status.

3) Failure-to-protect liability and “allowing another to inflict” abuse: In re Jeffrey R.L. and In re Betty J.W.

To uphold aggravated circumstances, the Court relied on the statutory definition of “abused child” and reinforced it with Syl. Pt. 2, In re Jeffrey R.L., 190 W. Va. 24, 435 S.E.2d 162 (1993), which cites Syl. Pt. 3, In re Betty J.W., 179 W. Va. 605, 371 S.E.2d 326 (1988): a child may be “abused” where a parent “knowingly allows another person to commit the abuse.” This directly answered mother’s narrative that D.C. was the “sole perpetrator”; the Court emphasized that “subjected the child” includes knowingly allowing abuse by another.

4) Termination without lesser alternatives: In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M.

The Court reaffirmed Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)): termination may be ordered without less restrictive alternatives where “no reasonable likelihood” exists that conditions can be substantially corrected. This precedent supported affirmance given the severity of the injuries, mother’s lack of engagement, her evasiveness, and the practical impossibility of parenting due to criminal supervision conditions.

5) Adequate briefing and waiver: State v. Kaufman and United States v. Dunkel

When mother made only a passing reference to error in denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period, the Court declined to address it for noncompliance with appellate briefing rules, invoking State v. Kaufman, 227 W. Va. 537, 555 n.39, 711 S.E.2d 607, 625 n.39 (2011) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991)). This reflects the Court’s insistence that abuse-and-neglect appeals—despite their stakes—must still present developed legal argument and authority.

6) Acknowledgment as prerequisite to correction: In re Timber M. and In re Charity H.

The Court reinforced the dispositional finding of no reasonable likelihood of correction with the principle from In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 217, 599 S.E.2d 631, 640 (2004)): the problem must be acknowledged before it can be remedied. Mother’s testimony that her only “accountability” was the “poor decision” to be with D.C. supported the circuit court’s view that she had not meaningfully accepted responsibility for protective failures (or worse, participation).

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Battered-parent status: statutory elements control the outcome

The Court anchored battered-parent status in the text of W. Va. Code § 49-1-201: a “battered parent” is one “adjudicated by the court to have not condoned the abuse or neglect and has not been able to stop the abuse or neglect of the child . . . due to being a victim of domestic violence.”

The key move in the Court’s reasoning is that battered-parent status is incompatible with findings that the parent “participated and acquiesced” in the abuse. “Acquiesced” and “participated” are treated as the functional opposites of “has not condoned.” Thus, even though mother presented domestic-violence testimony, the circuit court’s ultimate factual findings foreclosed the designation as a matter of statutory definition.

Notably, the opinion also signals that battered-parent status is not established merely by proving domestic violence; the statute requires the additional, child-protection-centered finding that the parent did not condone abuse/neglect and was unable to stop it because of domestic violence. The Court’s approach places the protective conduct (or failure) at the core of the battered-parent inquiry.

2) Aggravated circumstances: chronic, severe nonaccidental injuries and knowing allowance

The Court treated the record as supporting “aggravated circumstances” (including “chronic abuse”) under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(A), which relieves DHS of the reunification “reasonable efforts” obligation otherwise addressed in W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C)(iv).

The finding was supported by multiple converging facts: injuries of various ages (suggesting ongoing harm), the severity and nonaccidental nature of the injuries, the mother’s adjudicatory stipulation to failure to protect, and her criminal conviction. Crucially, the Court emphasized that “subjected the child” includes knowingly allowing another to inflict injury (W. Va. Code § 49-1-201; In re Jeffrey R.L.; In re Betty J.W.), which neutralized mother’s attempt to deflect culpability onto D.C.

3) Termination: “no reasonable likelihood” plus best interests/welfare

The Court relied on (i) evidentiary findings showing a low probability of near-term correction (severity of harm, mother’s lack of engagement, evasiveness, and failure to acknowledge responsibility) and (ii) the legal permission to terminate without less restrictive alternatives where no reasonable likelihood of correction exists (In re Kristin Y.). It also highlighted a practical barrier: mother’s extended supervised release conditions barred her from residing with or visiting minors, including these children, absent further criminal-court order—making reunification during the children’s childhood implausible.

Finally, the Court noted that mother did not meaningfully challenge the circuit court’s best-interests finding on appeal, underscoring that appellate success requires confronting the welfare determination, not just procedural or label-based arguments.

C. Impact

  • Battered-parent claims will turn on child-focused findings, not domestic-violence proof alone: Even where a parent credibly alleges domestic violence, the battered-parent designation requires an affirmative adjudication that the parent did not condone the child’s abuse/neglect. Findings of participation, acquiescence, or condonation will defeat the claim.
  • Timing disputes may be immaterial if ultimate findings foreclose the statutory status: The opinion suggests that where the circuit court permits evidence and the later dispositional findings definitively negate battered-parent elements, reversal for an earlier failure to explicitly label the parent is unlikely.
  • Aggravated circumstances can be supported by failure-to-protect evidence plus chronicity/severity: Severe nonaccidental injuries, especially of varying ages, combined with proof the parent knowingly allowed harm (and/or a related conviction), can justify relieving DHS of reasonable efforts and moving directly to termination.
  • Criminal supervision conditions may significantly shape the “near future” analysis: Where criminal orders restrict contact with minors for lengthy periods, courts may treat reunification as unrealistic within a child-centered timeframe, strengthening “no reasonable likelihood” and welfare determinations.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Battered parent” (W. Va. Code § 49-1-201)
A legal status for a parent who is a domestic-violence victim and is found by the court to have not condoned the child’s abuse/neglect, but was unable to stop it because of the domestic violence. It is not automatic upon showing the parent was abused by a partner.
“Aggravated circumstances” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(A))
A category of serious situations (here, including “chronic abuse”) in which the court may relieve DHS of the duty to make “reasonable efforts” to reunify the family, because the risk and harm are so extreme that reunification efforts are not required.
“Reasonable efforts”
Steps DHS usually must take to try to keep families together or reunify them (services, visitation planning, referrals). If aggravated circumstances are found, the law may excuse DHS from providing those efforts.
“No reasonable likelihood” of correction (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6))
A dispositional finding that the parent likely cannot fix the abuse/neglect conditions soon enough to meet the child’s needs. It authorizes termination, particularly when required for the child’s welfare.
“Failure to protect” / “knowingly allows another to inflict” abuse
A parent can be legally responsible for abuse even if someone else struck or injured the child, if the parent knowingly permitted the abuser access or failed to act to prevent harm.

5. Conclusion

In re J.P.-1 and J.P.-2 reinforces that battered-parent status is a narrow, statutory designation requiring an adjudicatory determination that the parent did not condone the child’s abuse and could not stop it due to domestic violence; it is incompatible with findings that the parent participated in or acquiesced to the abuse. The decision also underscores that severe, chronic, nonaccidental injuries—combined with a failure-to-protect stipulation and related criminal conviction—can support aggravated-circumstances findings, relieve DHS of reunification efforts, and justify termination without less restrictive alternatives when the parent cannot correct conditions in the near future and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.