In re J.T.: ADA “Reasonable Accommodations” Findings Under § 49-4-604(c)(5)(C) Are Not Required for Termination Under § 49-4-604(c)(6) Absent a Developed ADA Showing

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Date: July 28, 2026
Disposition: Termination order affirmed (memorandum decision)

1. Introduction

In re J.T. arises from an abuse and neglect proceeding in Ohio County involving newborn J.T. and Petitioner Mother P.T. The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) alleged that Mother’s untreated mental health conditions, reported medication refusal, volatile domestic-violence dynamics, substance-abuse concerns, and borderline intellectual functioning rendered her unable to safely parent.

The case presented three appellate issues: (1) whether DHS failed to provide sufficiently tailored reunification services and “reasonable accommodations” for Mother’s intellectual/mental health limitations; (2) whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s motion to continue the dispositional hearing when she was hospitalized; and (3) whether termination was improper because less restrictive alternatives (or further improvement opportunities) should have been used.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights. The Court held:

  • Mother’s reliance on W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(5)(C) (requiring a dispositional order to state whether DHS made ADA reasonable accommodations) was “unavailing” because termination was entered under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), which does not contain that language.
  • Even assuming the ADA-accommodations language applied, Mother did not cite the ADA or record support showing she had a disability covered by the ADA. Meanwhile, the record showed DHS attempted extensive, tailored services (including step-by-step parenting instruction), and Mother was inconsistently engaged. A psychologist testified that no amount of services could remedy Mother’s parenting deficits and that her prognosis was “very poor.”
  • Denial of a continuance was not an abuse of discretion and did not deny a meaningful opportunity to be heard because the court continued the dispositional hearing, Mother later appeared and testified, and counsel participated and cross-examined witnesses throughout.
  • Termination was supported by findings that there was “no reasonable likelihood” Mother could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect and that termination was necessary for the child’s welfare and permanency.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

In re K.S., Syl. Pt. 1, -- W. Va. --, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026)

The Court began by anchoring the appellate standards of review—abuse of discretion for substantive rulings, clear error for factual findings, and de novo review for legal issues. This framing mattered because Mother’s arguments attacked both discretion-based rulings (continuance; disposition choice) and legal/statutory interpretations (the reach of § 49-4-604(c)(5)(C); entitlement to less restrictive alternatives).

In re Billy Joe M., Syl. Pt. 4, in part, 206 W. Va. 1, 521 S.E.2d 173 (1999)

This is the opinion’s central child-welfare principle: when neglect flows from a parent’s “intellectual incapacity,” termination should occur only after the system makes a “thorough effort” to determine whether the parent can adequately care for the child with “intensive long-term assistance”—and that determination should occur “as soon as possible” to maximize permanency prospects.

The Court used In re Billy Joe M. in two ways: (1) to measure whether DHS attempted tailored, intensive efforts; and (2) to justify moving to termination when the record (especially expert testimony) showed that further services would not change capacity within a timeframe compatible with permanency.

In re Mark M., Syl. Pt. 3, in part, 201 W. Va. 265, 496 S.E.2d 215 (1997) (quoting State v. Bush, 163 W. Va. 168, 255 S.E.2d 539 (1979))

These authorities supplied the governing rule for continuances: they are committed to the trial court’s discretion, reviewed case-by-case, with attention to the reasons presented when the motion is denied. Applying that framework, the Court credited the circuit court’s management concerns (case pending ten months; expectation of a two-day disposition hearing) and, critically, the procedural safeguard that Mother could appear later at the continued hearing—which she did.

In re Kristin Y., Syl. Pt. 5, 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980))

These cases support the proposition that termination may be ordered “without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives” when there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions can be substantially corrected. The Court invoked this line to reject Mother’s argument that the circuit court was required to select a less restrictive disposition once it found futility and ongoing incapacity.

State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, Syl. Pt. 4, in part, 247 W. Va. 235, 878 S.E.2d 730 (2021)

In a footnote, the Court enforced a procedural prerequisite: a circuit court may not grant an improvement period unless the respondent files a written motion requesting it. This citation served as a doctrinal backstop against any claim that Mother was entitled to a post-dispositional improvement period absent a supported, record-cited written motion.

Noble v. W. Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 223 W. Va. 818, 679 S.E.2d 650 (2009) (quoting Shaffer v. Acme Limestone Co., Inc., 206 W.Va. 333, 524 S.E.2d 688 (1999))

These cases were used to find waiver/forfeiture where a party attempts to raise (or reframe) nonjurisdictional issues for the first time on appeal. The Court applied this principle to Mother’s complaint about the length of the improvement period, noting the record showed agreement to an initial three-month period.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) The Court’s treatment of the ADA-accommodations argument

Mother relied on W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(5)(C), which (when a court imposes disposition “under this section”) directs that the order state whether DHS made “reasonable accommodations” consistent with the ADA to allow meaningful access to reunification/family-preservation services.

The Court rejected the argument primarily on a statutory ground: Mother’s rights were terminated under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), and the Court emphasized that subsection (c)(6) “does not contain such language.” In other words, the decision signals that a parent cannot treat (c)(5)(C)’s express “ADA accommodations” findings requirement as an automatic, universal predicate to termination when the termination path used is (c)(6).

The Court then added an evidentiary/record-development ground “even assuming” applicability: Mother did not cite the ADA itself or develop record support that she had an ADA-covered disability. The opinion thus ties ADA-based complaints in abuse and neglect appeals to a threshold showing—both legal (identify the ADA basis) and factual (record evidence of coverage and denial of meaningful access).

(B) “Thorough effort” and futility under In re Billy Joe M.

The Court did not treat intellectual limitations as a categorical basis for termination. Instead, consistent with In re Billy Joe M., it evaluated whether DHS made a “thorough effort” to determine if Mother could parent with intensive assistance. The record findings the Court highlighted included:

  • Extensive improvement-period terms directly targeted to intellectual and mental health needs (adaptive living skills, tailored therapy, medication compliance, domestic violence programming, parenting services).
  • DHS/provider coordination to tailor services (including use of a “Step-by-Step parenting curriculum” to accommodate comprehension issues).
  • Mother’s refusal/inconsistent participation (missed services, failure to attend domestic violence services, inconsistent visitation, refusal/noncompliance with mental health treatment).
  • Expert testimony that Mother’s prognosis for improved parenting was “very poor,” and that no amount of services could remedy the parenting deficits.

This combination allowed the Court to conclude that the “thorough effort” obligation had been met and, importantly, that continued efforts would not change capacity within a child-centered timeframe. That conclusion also supported proceeding to disposition and rejecting a “more services” theory.

(C) Continuance denial and the “meaningful opportunity to be heard”

Mother argued that the continuance denial deprived her of the chance to be heard under W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(h). The Court’s reasoning was functional rather than formal: the circuit court took some evidence at the March setting, continued the matter, and Mother later appeared at the April continued hearing where she testified. Counsel participated at both hearings, presented evidence, and cross-examined witnesses.

The Court’s approach indicates that “meaningful opportunity” can be satisfied across a multi-day or continued dispositional process so long as the parent ultimately has a real chance to testify and litigate through counsel before final disposition.

(D) Termination versus less restrictive alternatives

Applying W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and the definition in W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d), the Court found that Mother demonstrated an “inadequate capacity” to solve the parenting problems “on their own or with help.” It then relied on In re Kristin Y. / In re R.J.M. to hold that once “no reasonable likelihood” is found, termination may be used without intermediate dispositions. Permanency for an infant—paired with expert futility testimony—was central to the “necessary for the child’s welfare” finding.

3.3. Impact

  • Clarifies limits of § 49-4-604(c)(5)(C) arguments: The decision gives DHS and circuit courts a clear response to a common appellate claim—an alleged failure to make and/or memorialize ADA accommodations—by distinguishing the statutory route used for termination (§ 49-4-604(c)(6)) from the provision containing explicit “order shall state” ADA language (§ 49-4-604(c)(5)(C)).
  • Reinforces record-development requirements for ADA-based claims: Parents raising ADA accommodation issues must develop the record: identify the ADA framework and point to evidence showing ADA-covered disability and denied meaningful access, not merely diagnoses or general assertions.
  • Strengthens the “services tailored + futility” pathway: Where DHS can document tailored services (e.g., simplified curricula, specialized therapy referrals) and an expert opines that deficits are not remediable, courts may more readily find “no reasonable likelihood” and proceed to termination.
  • Procedural guidance on continuances in disposition: The opinion supports flexible disposition scheduling: a partial evidentiary day followed by a continued hearing can preserve the statutory right to be heard, reducing the risk that an unavoidable absence automatically requires postponement of all proceedings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “No reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected”: A legal conclusion that, even with offered help, the parent lacks sufficient capacity to fix the problems in a timeframe that meets the child’s need for safety and permanency. The statute (§ 49-4-604(d)) frames this as inadequate capacity “on their own or with help.”
  • “Reasonable accommodations” (ADA context): Adjustments that allow a person with a qualifying disability meaningful access to services (here, reunification services). In this decision, merely alleging mental illness or intellectual limitations was not enough; the Court focused on the absence of ADA/record proof and the presence of tailored services.
  • “Improvement period”: A structured, court-ordered time for a parent to complete services aimed at reunification. The decision underscores that certain improvement periods require a written motion and that agreed-upon terms can be waived for appeal.
  • “Less restrictive alternatives”: Options short of termination (e.g., continued improvement periods, temporary placements). Under In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M., courts are not required to use them once “no reasonable likelihood” is found.

5. Conclusion

In re J.T. affirms termination where DHS documented extensive, tailored reunification efforts, Mother’s participation was inconsistent, and expert testimony supported futility. The decision is most significant for its treatment of disability-based reunification arguments: it limits reliance on § 49-4-604(c)(5)(C) when termination is entered under § 49-4-604(c)(6) and emphasizes that ADA-based claims must be developed with legal and factual specificity. Procedurally, it also confirms that a continuance denial will be upheld where the parent ultimately receives a meaningful opportunity to testify and litigate at a continued dispositional hearing.