In re I.B.-1, I.B.-2, and R.B.: Termination Affirmed Where the Court’s Written Order (Not Oral Remarks) Controls and Noncompliance Makes Domestic-Violence Conditions “Uncorrected”

Introduction

In In re I.B.-1, I.B.-2, and R.B., No. 25-183 (W. Va. Mar. 3, 2026) (memorandum decision), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the Nicholas County Circuit Court’s termination of a father’s parental and custodial rights. The underlying abuse-and-neglect case arose from allegations of serious domestic violence between the parents (including an incident where the father allegedly broke the mother’s nose and an incident where the mother allegedly struck the father with a vehicle), coupled with concerns about unsafe family contacts.

The key appellate dispute did not meaningfully contest the statutory grounds for termination so much as it targeted a purported factual error: the father argued the circuit court wrongly found that domestic violence continued after the petition was filed. The Supreme Court’s resolution turned on two core points: (1) appellate review centers on what the circuit court actually ordered in writing, not every oral remark at a hearing; and (2) even absent new violent incidents, a parent’s failure to engage in domestic-violence-focused services, drug/alcohol screening, and visitation can support a finding that the conditions of abuse and neglect remain uncorrected and are not likely to be corrected soon.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed termination. It acknowledged the Department’s concession that there was no evidence of additional domestic violence incidents during the proceedings, but held that the father’s argument failed because the complained-of “continuing domestic violence” finding appeared only as an oral statement and did not appear in the written termination order. Applying the principle that a court “speaks only through its orders,” the Court concluded the termination decision rested instead on detailed written findings of the father’s willful refusal to participate in services and failure to visit the children.

On the merits, the Court further held that the circuit court did not err in concluding the domestic-violence condition persisted, because the father did not complete domestic-violence programming (including BIPP), continued to test positive for marijuana and alcohol, failed to screen, avoided contact with the Department, and minimized/denied problematic conduct after stipulating. Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3), such nonresponse to a reasonable family case plan supports a finding of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction in the near future; and under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), termination is permitted when that finding is paired with the child-welfare necessity determination (which the father did not challenge on appeal).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011): The Court restated the governing standards of review in abuse-and-neglect appeals—factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and legal conclusions de novo. This framework matters here because the father’s challenge was aimed at factual findings (domestic violence) and the legal sufficiency of termination grounds.
  • In re J.P., No. 18-0171, 2018 WL 6040185 (W. Va. Nov. 19, 2018) (memorandum decision) (quoting Legg v. Felinton, 219 W. Va. 478, 637 S.E.2d 576 (2006)): The Court relied on the maxim that a court “speaks only through its orders.” This was dispositive of the father’s principal argument: even if a judge misspeaks orally, appellate review focuses on the written order’s actual findings and rationale.
  • In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013) (quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004)): The Court used these cases for the proposition that a “failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem” makes it “untreatable.” This reinforced the circuit court’s conclusion that the father’s minimization/denial after stipulating to domestic violence undermined any realistic prospect of remediation.
  • In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996): Cited for the principle that a parent’s interest in visiting children while out of custody is a “significant factor” in assessing the parent’s potential to improve and parent safely. The father’s lack of visits (none with the youngest child; none with the older children since April 2024) supported the adverse prognosis and “no reasonable likelihood” finding.
  • Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)): These authorities support the dispositional rule that termination may be used without less restrictive alternatives once there is “no reasonable likelihood” the conditions can be substantially corrected. The Court used this line of cases to validate termination given sustained noncompliance.
  • Syl. Pt. 11, In re Daniel D., 211 W. Va. 79, 562 S.E.2d 147 (2002): Referenced in a footnote to explain that an emotional bond is relevant chiefly to post-termination visitation. Because the father did not appeal denial of post-termination visitation, any dispute about “bond” did not undermine termination.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Oral remarks vs. written findings (“the order controls”). The father’s appellate claim hinged on a supposed factual error—continued domestic violence after filing. The Court accepted there was no evidence of new domestic-violence incidents, but held this did not matter because the challenged “finding” was not in the written termination order. By applying In re J.P. / Legg v. Felinton, the Court treated the written order as the authoritative statement of the circuit court’s decision and reasoning.
  2. “Persistence” of domestic-violence conditions can be shown by non-remediation, not only new incidents. The Court drew a clear distinction between (a) proving new episodes of violence and (b) proving the original condition remains uncorrected. It approved the circuit court’s inference that the domestic-violence condition persisted because the father failed to complete core domestic-violence interventions (including BIPP), failed to participate meaningfully in services, and did not demonstrate insight or accountability. The Court emphasized that partial progress (completing one section of a program) did not equal successful completion, and that denial/minimization after stipulation is a strong indicator of non-correctability (In re Timber M.; In re Charity H.).
  3. Noncompliance with the case plan establishes “no reasonable likelihood” under the statute. Invoking W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3), the Court highlighted that “no reasonable likelihood” exists where the abusing parent “has not responded to or followed through with a reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts.” The factual record the Court pointed to included repeated positive screens for marijuana and alcohol, missed screens, lack of contact with DHS, revoked improvement periods, and sustained refusal to engage in services.
  4. Visitation behavior is evidence of capacity and willingness to improve. The Court relied on In re Katie S. to treat non-visitation as probative of a parent’s potential to achieve minimally adequate parenting. The father’s long lapse in visiting the older children and complete failure to visit the youngest child corroborated the circuit court’s finding that he was not engaging in remediation and that waiting longer would not likely change the outcome.
  5. Termination is permissible without lesser alternatives once statutory conditions are met. With “no reasonable likelihood” established and the children’s welfare supporting termination (a finding not challenged on appeal), W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) authorized termination. The Court cited In re Kristin Y. (quoting In re R.J.M.) to reaffirm that courts need not attempt less restrictive alternatives when the statutory standard is satisfied.

Impact

  • Appellate focus on the written dispositional order. This decision reinforces a practical appellate lesson: alleged errors in oral comments may not carry the day if they are not adopted in the written order. Counsel must therefore ensure that disputed findings are addressed in the written order (via objections, proposed orders, or motions to correct) and must frame appellate challenges to the order’s actual findings and legal bases.
  • “Condition persists” can be proven by failure to remediate, not by new harm. The Court’s reasoning confirms that the State need not wait for new violent episodes to prove ongoing risk; persistent refusal to complete domestic-violence programming and to demonstrate accountability can itself support findings that the condition remains uncorrected.
  • Case-plan noncompliance remains a central termination pathway. By emphasizing W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3), the decision underscores that repeated missed/positive screens, avoidance of services, and disengagement from DHS are not peripheral—they can be the core evidence supporting “no reasonable likelihood” and thus termination.
  • Visitation is treated as diagnostic of parental capacity and motivation. The reliance on In re Katie S. signals that prolonged non-visitation will continue to be treated as strong evidence against a parent, particularly where it aligns with broader noncompliance and denial.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Abuse and neglect petition
A filing by DHS alleging a parent’s conduct (or failure to protect) endangers a child and asking the court to intervene.
Adjudication vs. disposition
Adjudication decides whether the parent committed abuse/neglect (often by evidence or stipulation). Disposition decides what to do next—services, custody arrangements, or termination.
Improvement period
A court-ordered opportunity (with conditions) for a parent to correct problems—such as substance use or domestic violence—through services.
Revocation of improvement period
If a parent does not comply (e.g., misses screens, refuses services), the court can cancel the improvement period and proceed toward termination.
BIPP (Batterer Intervention and Prevention Program)
A structured program intended to address patterns of domestic violence, accountability, and behavioral change.
“Court speaks only through its orders”
Appellate courts treat the written order as the official, binding statement of what the trial court decided and why.
“No reasonable likelihood” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3))
If a parent does not respond to or follow through with a reasonable case plan or rehabilitative efforts, the court may find the problems will not be corrected soon enough for the child.
Termination without less restrictive alternatives
If statutory findings are met, the court may terminate rather than try intermediate options like extended improvement periods or guardianship.

Conclusion

In re I.B.-1, I.B.-2, and R.B. affirms termination where the written order rests on extensive evidence of a parent’s noncompliance, lack of visitation, and failure to complete domestic-violence-focused interventions—regardless of whether new incidents of violence occurred during the case. The decision also provides a critical procedural reminder: appellate review turns on the findings and reasoning contained in the written order, not on stray or contested oral statements. In West Virginia abuse-and-neglect practice, sustained refusal to engage in the case plan—especially where the parent denies the underlying problem—remains a legally sufficient and frequently decisive basis for termination under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604.