Acknowledgment of Abuse as a Precondition to Additional Improvement Periods (and a Basis for “No Reasonable Likelihood” Findings)

1) Introduction

In re D.R. arises from an abuse and neglect proceeding in Monongalia County in which the petitioner mother, N.W., appealed the termination of her parental, custodial, and guardianship rights to her infant child, D.R. The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) alleged the mother abused substances while pregnant and failed to meaningfully address prior underlying issues (including domestic violence and emotional abuse) that had recently resulted in the termination of her rights to seven other children via a voluntary relinquishment.

The appeal presented two practical, recurring issues in West Virginia child welfare litigation:

• Whether a parent who has already received an improvement period is entitled to a post-dispositional improvement period, especially where the parent later recants or denies the very conduct forming the adjudication.
• Whether termination is proper under the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” standard when the parent has participated in services but has not made meaningful gains because the parent fails to acknowledge the abusive/neglectful conduct.

2) Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s April 25, 2025, termination order. It held that the circuit court did not err in (1) denying a post-dispositional improvement period and (2) concluding there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future.

Central to the affirmance was the mother’s inconsistent testimony: although she stipulated at adjudication that she abused substances while pregnant, she later testified at disposition that she never did so. The circuit court treated this as a failure to acknowledge the problem, making remediation unlikely and further services futile at the child’s expense.

The Court also rejected (or declined to reach) additional arguments due to lack of preservation or inadequate briefing, including a late challenge framed in “Daubert-style” terms to a CPS worker’s opinion testimony and an unsupported claim regarding post-termination visitation.

3) Analysis

A) Precedents Cited

Improvement periods and the acknowledgment principle

The Court anchored the denial of an additional improvement period in a well-developed line of cases emphasizing that the first step toward correction is recognition. It relied on:

• In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (quoted for the proposition that a parent must acknowledge the problem; otherwise it becomes “untreatable” and an improvement period becomes futile).
• In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 217, 599 S.E.2d 631, 640 (2004) (the source of the quoted rationale incorporated in In re Timber M.).

In this case, the Court treated the mother’s later denial of prenatal substance abuse—despite her prior stipulation and adjudication—as a textbook example of non-acknowledgment. That non-acknowledgment justified both denying additional time and supporting the ultimate dispositional finding that correction was not reasonably likely in the near future.

Preservation and waiver on appeal

The Court invoked appellate preservation principles when addressing the mother’s claim that the circuit court did not conduct a “Daubert-style analysis” regarding a CPS worker’s testimony. Citing:

• W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7) (requiring the appellant to show when/how issues were presented below), and
• Syl. Pt. 4, in part, State v. Browning, 199 W. Va. 417, 485 S.E.2d 1 (1997) (declining to consider unpreserved error),

the Court declined to entertain the argument, noting the record did not show any attempt to qualify the witness as an expert or any contemporaneous objection.

Deference to the factfinder on weighing evidence

Finally, in response to the claim that the circuit court ignored evidence of the mother’s efforts, the Court reiterated that weighing evidence is for the trier of fact, citing State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 669 n.9, 461 S.E.2d 163, 175 n.9 (1995). This reinforced that participation in services does not compel a favorable disposition if the court finds the participation did not translate into insight, changed behavior, or protective capacity.

B) Legal Reasoning

1. Post-dispositional improvement period: statutory burdens and “substantial change in circumstances”

The Court applied the plain requirements of W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(3)(B) (clear and convincing evidence the parent is likely to fully participate) and, because the mother had already received an improvement period, W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(3)(D) (a substantial change in circumstances since the initial improvement period rendering the parent likely to fully participate).

The Court treated “acknowledgment” as the practical predicate to meeting these statutory showings. Even extensive service participation could not carry the mother’s burden where her disposition-stage testimony repudiated the central adjudicatory fact (prenatal substance abuse). In the Court’s view, the recantation was not a minor inconsistency—it was evidence of an ongoing inability or unwillingness to confront the very risk that brought the case into court, undermining the likelihood that additional services would be effective.

2. Termination: “no reasonable likelihood” and necessity for welfare

The Court affirmed termination under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) (no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future and termination necessary for the child’s welfare) and linked that finding to W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3) (no reasonable likelihood where the parent has not responded to or followed through with a reasonable case plan or other rehabilitative efforts).

Importantly, the Court’s reasoning distinguishes participation from response. The circuit court found the mother “gained nothing” from services; the Supreme Court accepted that as a permissible finding supported by the mother’s continued denial and credibility concerns (including her admitted prior falsehood about being pregnant in earlier proceedings and her later denial of stipulated conduct).

On “necessity for welfare,” the Court credited the circuit court’s findings on the infant’s need for continuity of care and committed caregivers—an analysis that often becomes decisive when the court concludes further delay offers little chance of safe reunification.

3. The Court’s treatment of “aggravated circumstances” arguments

The mother argued that her prior voluntary relinquishment of rights to seven other children should not function as “aggravated circumstances” or the basis for termination here. The Court deemed the point immaterial given that termination was affirmed under the independent statutory pathway of § 49-4-604(c)(6). In effect, even if the mother were correct about aggravated circumstances, termination still stood because the circuit court’s “no reasonable likelihood” and best-interest findings were sufficient.

C) Impact

• Reinforcement of acknowledgment as a gatekeeping concept. The decision underscores that acknowledgment is not merely therapeutic advice; it is treated as a legally consequential indicator of whether additional court-ordered services are likely to succeed and whether the statutory burdens for further improvement periods can be met.
• Service participation is not dispositive. The case illustrates that documented attendance or compliance can be outweighed by credibility findings and evidence that the parent has not internalized the safety-related reasons for intervention.
• Stronger incentives for careful litigation positions. A parent’s strategic denial at disposition—particularly denial of stipulated adjudicatory facts—may function as affirmative evidence against a “substantial change in circumstances,” increasing the risk of termination.
• Appellate practice reminder: preserve and brief. The Court’s reliance on W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7) and State v. Browning signals that evidentiary/“Daubert-style” complaints and post-termination visitation disputes must be timely raised below and meaningfully argued on appeal.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

• Adjudication vs. disposition: adjudication answers “Did abuse/neglect occur?”; disposition answers “What should the court do now to protect the child?” (e.g., improvement period, guardianship, termination).
• Improvement period: a court-supervised opportunity for a parent to correct the conditions of abuse/neglect through services. A post-dispositional improvement period is requested after the court has reached the disposition stage and requires heightened showings, especially if an improvement period has already been granted.
• Clear and convincing evidence: a higher burden than “more likely than not”; the parent must produce strong, persuasive proof to obtain a post-dispositional improvement period under § 49-4-610.
• “No reasonable likelihood” of correction: a statutory conclusion under § 49-4-604 that the parent is unlikely to fix the problems within a timeframe compatible with the child’s welfare; the court can reach this when rehabilitative efforts have not produced real change.
• Preservation (raising issues in the trial court): appellate courts generally will not decide issues that were not clearly presented to, and ruled upon by, the circuit court.
• “Daubert-style” analysis: a reliability and qualification screening for expert testimony; if a witness is not offered as an expert or no objection is made, the issue is commonly deemed waived on appeal.

5) Conclusion

In re D.R. affirms that when a parent seeks an additional (post-dispositional) improvement period after already receiving one, the parent must show a substantial change in circumstances and a genuine likelihood of full participation—showings that are undermined when the parent denies or recants the adjudicated abuse/neglect. The decision further illustrates how a failure to acknowledge the core problem can support a finding of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction and, combined with the child’s need for stability, justify termination under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6). Procedurally, it also serves as a caution that unpreserved or underdeveloped appellate arguments will not be reached.