In re D.P.: “Support” Is Not “Treatment,” and Parental Stagnation (Not Agency Friction) Justifies Post-Disposition Termination

1. Introduction

Case: In re D.P., Juvenile (Vt. Sup. Ct. Aug. 21, 2026) (entry order; three-justice panel).
Parties: M.P. (Mother) and D.B. (Father) appealed the Orleans Unit, Family Division’s termination of their residual parental rights to D.P.
Background: D.P. entered DCF custody in June 2023 after police found father in mother’s bedroom in violation of conditions of release, with drug paraphernalia accessible to the two-year-old child, and mother admitted methamphetamine use. The case proceeded through CHINS merits (Oct. 2023), disposition with a reunification goal, and ultimately a termination petition (Dec. 2024).

Key issues on appeal centered on (1) whether the family court clearly erred in finding a “change in circumstances” based on parental stagnation, and (2) whether claimed DCF obstruction—particularly around mother’s proposed Lund placement and visitation expansion—undermined the stagnation finding. Father additionally argued early-case treatment as a “non-parent” caused stagnation and attempted to piggyback on mother’s Lund-related theory.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the family division did not clearly err in finding both parents had stagnated in their ability to resume parenting, constituting a change in circumstances justifying modification of the original disposition order. The Court rejected mother’s contention that sober living, AA/NA participation, and recovery supports were equivalent to the recommended substance-use treatment (IOP) she had not yet engaged. It also concluded that any friction or delay around the Lund program and visitation increases did not establish that DCF caused mother’s lack of progress, particularly given her earlier refusal and later delays.

As to father, the Court found no prejudice from a brief early delay in visitation due to disputed parentage and later criminal conditions, emphasizing that father’s nonprogress—out-of-state relocation, refusal of transport assistance, lack of treatment engagement, hostility to DCF, missed meetings, and outstanding warrants—was primarily within his control. Finally, the Court declined to address father’s Lund-based argument because it was not preserved below.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • In re B.W., 162 Vt. 287, 291 (1994)
    Used for the two-step framework in post-disposition termination: the court must first find a change in circumstances sufficient to modify disposition before turning to best interests. In re D.P. applies this sequencing explicitly and treats the “change” inquiry as a threshold gate.
  • In re H.A., 153 Vt. 504, 515 (1990)
    Provides the canonical definition that change in circumstances is “most often found” where parental ability has “stagnated or deteriorated over the passage of time.” The Court relies on this formulation to validate the family division’s focus on lack of forward movement (continued supervised visits, incomplete treatment, unstable housing, father’s disengagement).
  • In re J.B., 167 Vt. 637, 639 (1998)
    Cited for the proposition that the “most important” best-interests factor is the likelihood of resuming parental duties within a reasonable time. Although neither parent challenged best-interests findings on appeal, the Court frames the case in the gravitational field of this “reasonable time” principle, particularly given D.P.’s long placement (nearly two years) and developmental gains in foster care.
  • In re N.L., 2019 VT 10, ¶ 9, 209 Vt. 450
    Supplies the appellate standard of review: findings stand unless clearly erroneous; conclusions stand if supported by findings. This deference is central to the Court’s rejection of mother’s factual reframing (e.g., whether DCF “blocked” Lund; whether supports were “treatment”).
  • In re A.F., 160 Vt. 175, 178 (1993)
    Invoked to underscore that credibility determinations belong to the family court. The Court uses it to uphold the trial judge’s decision to discount the Lund representative’s case-specific recollection (and thus to avoid turning uncertain testimony into a finding of DCF obstruction).
  • In re C.H., 170 Vt. 603, 604 (2000) (mem.)
    Cited for preservation: arguments not raised below are not reached on appeal in termination cases. This is the basis for declining to address father’s theory that a Lund placement would have facilitated mother’s primary custody while maintaining father-child contact.
  • In re D.S., 2014 VT 38, ¶ 20, 196 Vt. 325
    Used to attribute consequences of criminal behavior to the parent, not the system. The Court applies this logic when noting father’s conditions-of-release interruption to visitation and later outstanding warrants; these are framed as self-created barriers to reunification.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Threshold “change in circumstances” through stagnation
    The Court accepted the family division’s stagnation finding as a legitimate “change in circumstances” under In re H.A.. For mother, stagnation was evidenced by the persistence of supervised-only contact (no overnights), incomplete recommended substance-use IOP, and lack of stable child-appropriate housing planning. For father, stagnation was supported by the absence of in-person contact for more than two years, rejection of transport assistance, failure to engage in substance-use and domestic-violence services, and ongoing criminal exposure.
  2. “Support” versus “treatment”
    The Court drew an important functional distinction: sober living, daily AA/NA, a sponsor, and a recovery coach may be “tremendous support,” but they are not necessarily the clinically recommended “treatment” in a case plan (here, substance-use IOP). The trial court’s finding was sustained because evidence at hearing did not show mother was “actively engaged” in the substance-use IOP recommended by her provider.
  3. Causation: agency conduct must be tethered to the parent’s lack of progress
    Mother’s Lund theory failed not because agency conduct can never matter, but because the record supported an alternative, parent-centered explanation: she initially refused Lund, then delayed paperwork, and sought the placement roughly two years into the case after repeated relapse and inconsistent treatment. Even if DCF’s timing concerns contributed to Lund’s reluctance, the Court held the mother’s overall lack of progress remained “within [her] control” and did not defeat the stagnation finding.
  4. Visitation management while termination is pending
    The Court treated DCF’s approach as discretionary and reasoned: DCF increased visit length during the pending petition, kept the schedule aligned with mother’s IOP timing, and considered the child’s travel burden. The Court emphasized that mother did not seek judicial modification of visitation—undercutting the claim that DCF “arbitrarily refused” increased contact.
  5. Father’s “non-parent” theory and lack of prejudice
    The Court acknowledged early uncertainty about parentage but found father was still appointed counsel and treated as a party, and visitation began once mother stipulated to parentage. The key analytical move is prejudice: even if delay existed, father did not show it caused his later nonprogress given subsequent choices and conduct (moving away, service noncompliance, warrants, and missed engagement).
  6. Preservation as a hard stop
    Relying on In re C.H., the Court refused to reach father’s Lund-based argument because it was not presented to the trial court in the form he advanced on appeal (mother supporting father’s contact through her placement). This reinforces the requirement that termination appeals be built on issues actually litigated below.

3.3 Impact

This decision is an entry order by a three-justice panel and expressly “not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.” Its practical influence is therefore primarily persuasive and signal-setting rather than formally binding. Even so, it is likely to shape how Vermont practitioners and trial courts present and evaluate evidence in several recurring termination disputes:

  • Evidence framing in recovery cases: Parties should expect courts to demand proof of engagement in the specific clinically recommended modality (e.g., IOP), not merely generalized recovery supports, when the case plan calls for “treatment.”
  • Agency-interference theories: Allegations that DCF impeded reunification will require a clear causal link to the parent’s lack of progress and a record demonstrating the parent acted promptly and consistently—particularly where permanency timelines have run long.
  • Visitation disputes: If a parent contends visitation should increase, the opinion implicitly encourages building a record through motions and hearings rather than relying solely on retrospective claims on appeal.
  • Out-of-state parents and criminal exposure: The reasoning reinforces that relocation decisions, refusal of offered supports, and unresolved warrants can weigh heavily in stagnation and reasonable-time analyses, and are typically attributed to parental choice.
  • Appellate issue preservation: The case highlights preservation as dispositive; creative reframing on appeal will be foreclosed when not fairly presented to the family division.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

CHINS (Child in Need of Care or Supervision)
A juvenile proceeding where the State proves a child lacks proper care or is at risk, permitting court-ordered services and, if necessary, custody changes.
Disposition order
The court’s post-merits order setting the plan (often reunification), services, and conditions for parents to regain custody.
Residual parental rights
The rights remaining after custody is transferred (e.g., the right to visitation, to consent in some contexts). Termination ends these rights permanently.
Termination of parental rights (TPR)
A court judgment permanently severing the legal parent-child relationship, typically to free a child for adoption or other permanency.
Change in circumstances (post-disposition)
A required threshold finding before terminating rights after an initial disposition. Often shown by stagnation—the parent is not moving toward readiness to parent.
Clear and convincing evidence
A heightened proof standard—more than “more likely than not,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Clearly erroneous (appellate review)
An appellate court generally will not reweigh evidence; it reverses factual findings only if they lack support in the record.
IOP (Intensive Outpatient Program)
Structured treatment several days a week that is more intensive than standard outpatient care, often recommended for substance-use disorders and co-occurring conditions.
Preservation
A rule requiring parties to raise issues in the trial court before arguing them on appeal, so the trial court has a chance to address them and build a record.

5. Conclusion

In re D.P. affirms termination where the trial court found parental stagnation and no realistic ability to resume parenting within a reasonable time, notwithstanding parents’ claims that DCF hindered reunification. The decision underscores three practical lessons: (1) recovery “supports” do not automatically equate to compliance with recommended “treatment”; (2) agency-interference claims must be causally connected to the parent’s lack of progress and measured against the parent’s own timeliness and choices; and (3) appellate review is highly deferential to trial-court factfinding, credibility determinations, and issue preservation rules—particularly in permanency-driven CHINS litigation.