In re C.S.-1: Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives When No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction—and No Improvement Period Without a Written Motion

1. Introduction

Case: In re C.S.-1, No. 25-207 (Braxton County CC-04-2024-JA-37) (W. Va. Jan. 29, 2026) (memorandum decision).
Parties: Petitioner Father (C.S.-2) appealed the termination of his parental rights to newborn child C.S.-1. The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) prosecuted the abuse and neglect case; the child was represented by a guardian ad litem.

The proceeding arose shortly after C.S.-1’s birth, when DHS filed amended petitions alleging the father’s extensive violent criminal history (including domestic battery against the mother), substance abuse, and a prior involuntary termination of his parental rights to other children for similar reasons. After the father stipulated at adjudication to the core allegations (violent history, substance abuse, prior termination, failure to correct), the circuit court proceeded to disposition.

Key issues on appeal were whether the circuit court erred by (a) terminating parental rights rather than adopting a less restrictive alternative, (b) finding no reasonable likelihood the father could substantially correct the conditions of abuse/neglect in the near future, and (c) effectively denying an improvement period where the father expressed willingness to participate.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed. The Court held that the record supported findings that (1) there was no reasonable likelihood the father could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future—especially given repeated domestic violence/substance-abuse concerns across multiple cases, a positive methamphetamine and fentanyl screen on the day of disposition, and equivocal/denying testimony—and (2) termination was necessary for the child’s welfare, particularly because the child was an infant.

The Court also rejected the father’s improvement-period argument because he did not file a written motion seeking an improvement period, a prerequisite under controlling authority.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)
    The Court invoked In re Cecil T. for the governing appellate standard of review in abuse and neglect appeals: factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while legal conclusions receive de novo review. This framing mattered because the father’s arguments primarily attacked the circuit court’s dispositional findings (no reasonable likelihood; best interests), which are heavily fact-dependent and thus difficult to overturn absent clear error.
  • Syl. Pt. 5, in part, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980))
    These authorities supply the core dispositional rule applied here: termination may be ordered “without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives” when there is “no reasonable likelihood” the conditions of neglect/abuse can be substantially corrected. The Court used this principle to dispose of the father’s “less restrictive alternative” argument—once the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” finding is supported, the court is not required to attempt incremental or speculative alternatives.
  • In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 217, 599 S.E.2d 631, 640 (2004))
    The Court relied on the well-known “acknowledgment” principle: failure to acknowledge the underlying problem can render it untreatable. The father’s shifting testimony—denying “knowing” use, attributing positives to secondhand exposure, then partially “admitting” use—supported the circuit court’s credibility determinations and the inference that meaningful treatment progress was unlikely in the near future.
  • Syl. Pt. 4, in part, State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, 247 W. Va. 235, 878 S.E.2d 730 (2021)
    The Court used State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson to reject the improvement-period argument procedurally: a circuit court may not grant an improvement period unless the respondent files a written motion requesting it. Because the father did not show he filed such a motion (and did not properly preserve/pinpoint it in the record), he was not entitled to relief.
  • In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980) (additional point referenced)
    Beyond the “less restrictive alternatives” doctrine, the Court cited In re R.J.M. for the child-welfare principle that courts need not “exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement” where a child’s welfare is seriously threatened—“particularly applicable to children under the age of three years” who require consistent close interaction with committed adults. Given C.S.-1’s infancy, this consideration amplified the urgency of permanency and the permissibility of termination when the statutory criteria are met.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in a standard, statute-anchored dispositional sequence:

  1. Statutory predicate for termination: The Court emphasized West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), allowing termination when (1) there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions can be substantially corrected in the near future, and (2) termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.
  2. “No reasonable likelihood” supported by repeated, unremedied conditions: The father’s case history was central: this was a second abuse/neglect case with the same core problems (domestic violence and substance abuse), and the father previously failed to benefit from services. The positive methamphetamine/fentanyl screen on the day of disposition served as contemporaneous evidence that substance abuse remained active rather than historical.
  3. Credibility and “untreatability” from lack of acknowledgement: The circuit court rejected the father’s explanation for the positive screen, and the Supreme Court deferred to that credibility assessment under clear-error review. Using In re Timber M./In re Charity H., the Court treated minimization/denial as probative of poor treatment prospects—supporting the “no reasonable likelihood” finding consistent with West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d) (including habitual abuse/addiction to controlled substances as an example of inability to correct).
  4. No requirement to try less restrictive alternatives once the statutory findings are met: Responding directly to the father’s argument, the Court applied In re Kristin Y./In re R.J.M. to hold termination may be employed without intervening less restrictive alternatives when the “no reasonable likelihood” finding is made.
  5. Improvement period barred by procedural omission: Even if the father orally expressed willingness at disposition, State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson foreclosed relief absent a written motion. The Court additionally noted briefing/record-citation deficiencies under W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7).
  6. Infant permanency considerations reinforce necessity: With C.S.-1 under six months old, the Court invoked In re R.J.M. to underscore that speculative reunification efforts are disfavored where an infant’s need for stable, committed caregiving is immediate.

3.3. Impact

Although issued as a memorandum decision, In re C.S.-1 is important as an applied reaffirmation of several recurring West Virginia abuse-and-neglect principles:

  • Procedural discipline on improvement periods: Respondents must file a written improvement-period motion; oral requests or generalized willingness at disposition will not preserve the issue or authorize relief.
  • Repeated-case evidence strengthens “no reasonable likelihood”: Where a parent previously received services yet later presents with the same core risk factors (domestic violence and substance abuse), courts may more readily find incapacity to correct “on their own or with help” within the statutory timeframe.
  • Drug-screen timing and credibility matter: A positive screen on the day of disposition—paired with minimization or inconsistent explanations—can be treated as powerful evidence that the problem remains active and is not presently treatable.
  • Infant cases and permanency: The decision reinforces that, for children under three (and especially newborns), courts need not prolong uncertainty to explore speculative parental improvement when statutory findings justify termination.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “No reasonable likelihood … can be substantially corrected”: This does not require proof that improvement is impossible. It asks whether, based on the evidence, meaningful correction is unlikely within a timeframe that serves the child’s need for safety and permanency.
  • “Less restrictive alternatives”: These are options short of termination (e.g., temporary custody arrangements, guardianship, or services with continued parental rights). Under West Virginia law, courts need not use these options when statutory findings show they would not adequately protect the child.
  • Improvement period: A structured period in which a parent is given time and services to correct conditions. In West Virginia, it is not automatic and—critically here—requires a written motion.
  • Clear error review: On appeal, the Supreme Court will not reweigh evidence or reassess credibility simply because it might have decided differently; it looks for a definite mistake in the circuit court’s factual findings.

5. Conclusion

In re C.S.-1 affirms termination where a parent’s domestic-violence and substance-abuse issues persist across successive abuse-and-neglect proceedings, are corroborated by current positive drug screens, and are compounded by denial or minimization that makes treatment prospects uncertain. The decision also highlights a strict procedural rule with practical consequences: a respondent cannot obtain appellate relief regarding an improvement period absent a written improvement-period motion. In infant cases, the Court again stresses that permanency and safety can outweigh speculative possibilities of parental rehabilitation when the statutory termination findings are satisfied.