In re C.C.: Violating a No-Contact Improvement-Period Condition and False Testimony Support Termination for “No Reasonable Likelihood” of Correction

1) Introduction

Case: In re C.C., No. 25-270 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2026) (memorandum decision).
Parties: Petitioner Mother (F.H.) appealed the Wood County Circuit Court’s order terminating her parental, custodial, and guardianship rights to the child (C.C.). The West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) and the child’s guardian ad litem opposed the appeal.
Background: DHS filed an abuse/neglect petition alleging the parents engaged in domestic violence in the child’s presence; the father had an outstanding warrant for domestic battery and for violating a protective order (petitioner was the victim). The mother stipulated to domestic violence occurring in front of the child, received a post-adjudicatory improvement period, then later obtained a post-dispositional improvement period with an added and explicit condition: “no contact, direct or indirect” with the father, whose parental rights had been terminated.

Key issue on appeal: Whether the circuit court erred by terminating the mother’s rights despite her participation in services, where the court found she violated the “no contact” condition and was dishonest about continued contact with the father—thereby rendering the improvement period unsuccessful and establishing “no reasonable likelihood” of correcting conditions in the near future.

2) Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the termination order. Although the mother participated in services and claimed she remedied the conditions of abuse/neglect, the Court agreed with the circuit court that she failed to successfully complete the improvement period because she maintained contact with the father in direct defiance of a court order and admitted she testified falsely about that relationship. This noncompliance supported findings under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604 that there was no reasonable likelihood the conditions could be substantially corrected in the near future and that termination was necessary for the child’s welfare and permanency.

3) Analysis

A) Precedents Cited

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011) (Syl. Pt. 1)

The Court relied on In re Cecil T. for the standard of review: factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while legal conclusions receive de novo review. This framing mattered because the appeal largely challenged the circuit court’s evaluation of the mother’s credibility and compliance. By applying clear-error review to the circuit court’s findings (e.g., that the contacts were not “coincidental” and that the mother testified falsely), the Supreme Court signaled deference to the trial judge’s first-hand assessment of evidence and credibility.

In re K.L., 247 W. Va. 657, 885 S.E.2d 595 (2022)

The Court quoted In re K.L. for the proposition that a parent’s failure to participate in an improvement period is a “statutorily-recognized basis” upon which the Court “regularly affirms termination.” Importantly, In re C.C. treats “participation” as more than attendance at services: it encompasses compliance with the improvement period’s substantive requirements and court-ordered restrictions—here, the “no contact” condition designed to address the domestic-violence risk nexus.

In re Carlita B., 185 W. Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991) (Syl. Pt. 6)

The Court invoked In re Carlita B. to reaffirm that at the end of an improvement period, the circuit court must review parental performance and decide whether conditions have been satisfied “to justify the return of the child”—and that this determination is “wholly within its discretion” when supported by the record. In In re C.C., the circuit court concluded the mother did not satisfy the improvement period’s conditions because she defied the no-contact order and lied about continued contact.

B) Legal Reasoning

The decision turns on a straightforward but consequential principle: remedying abuse/neglect conditions is measured by compliance with the full case plan and court orders, not by partial progress.

  • The targeted condition to correct: The initiating problem was domestic violence occurring in the child’s presence. The improvement periods were structured to address that risk through services (domestic violence services, therapy, parenting/life skills, psychological evaluation) and, critically at disposition, by severing the mother’s involvement with the father.
  • Noncompliance with a core safety restriction: During the post-dispositional improvement period, the mother was expressly ordered to have “no contact, direct or indirect” with the father. DHS presented video and photographic evidence of the mother and father together at two church-related events. The circuit court found these contacts were not coincidental and occurred “merely days” after the no-contact order.
  • Dishonesty as a compliance and credibility failure: The mother admitted she had been dishonest in earlier testimony about her relationship with the father. The circuit court treated that as further evidence she failed to cooperate with court orders and rehabilitative efforts—undermining confidence that the domestic-violence risk could be controlled or that she could be relied upon to keep the child safe.
  • Statutory fit—“no reasonable likelihood” and termination: The Court tied these facts to W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d)(3). Under those provisions, termination is permitted when there is “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future,” including when a parent fails to “respond[] to or follow[] through with a reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts.” The Supreme Court agreed that violating the no-contact condition—integral to preventing recurrence of domestic violence—constituted failure to follow through.
  • Child-centered permanency rationale: The circuit court emphasized the child’s need for continuity of care, stable caretakers, and timely integration into a permanent home. The Supreme Court treated those findings as appropriately supporting termination once the statutory threshold was met.
  • Procedural point—undeveloped constitutional claim waived: The mother briefly asserted the order “in some sense” infringed her free-exercise rights, but the Court declined to consider it due to lack of supporting argument, authority, or record citations, citing W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7). This underscores that even constitutional arguments can be forfeited on appeal by inadequate briefing.

C) Impact

1) “Completion of services” is not “successful completion” of an improvement period. The case reinforces that courts may treat a single, core protective condition—here, a no-contact order—as essential to remedying the underlying abuse/neglect risk. Attendance at services cannot offset defiance of a safety restriction tailored to the adjudicated harm.

2) No-contact conditions can be dispositive where domestic violence drove the petition. When domestic violence is the precipitating condition and a parent is ordered to sever contact with an abusive partner, violation may be viewed as continuing the very circumstance that endangered the child, supporting “no reasonable likelihood” findings.

3) Credibility and candor matter as risk indicators. The Court’s reliance on the mother’s admitted false testimony signals that dishonesty during improvement periods may be treated not merely as a character issue, but as evidence of noncooperation and increased future risk (e.g., inability to verify safety plans).

4) Appellate deference remains significant. By applying clear-error review to factual findings about contact and credibility, In re C.C. illustrates the practical uphill climb for appellants challenging termination where the record contains concrete evidence (photos/videos) and credibility-based trial findings.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Improvement period: A court-supervised opportunity for a parent to correct problems that led to an abuse/neglect case (through services and specific behavioral conditions). “Successful” completion means meeting the court’s conditions in a way that justifies reunification—not merely attending programs.
  • Post-adjudicatory vs. post-dispositional improvement period: A post-adjudicatory improvement period occurs after the parent is found (or stipulates) to have abused/neglected the child but before final disposition. A post-dispositional improvement period occurs after disposition-related steps, typically when the court is closer to deciding permanency; courts may impose stricter conditions given the heightened permanency timeline.
  • “No reasonable likelihood … can be substantially corrected in the near future”: A statutory standard allowing termination when the court concludes the parent is unlikely to fix the underlying issues soon enough for the child’s needs. Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3), this includes failing to follow through with a reasonable case plan or rehabilitative efforts.
  • Clear error review: On appeal, a factual finding will stand unless the appellate court is firmly convinced a mistake occurred. This deference is especially strong where the trial judge evaluated witnesses and evidence directly.
  • Waiver/forfeiture by inadequate briefing: Courts generally will not decide arguments (even constitutional ones) that are asserted without developed reasoning, supporting authority, and citations to the record.

5) Conclusion

In re C.C. cements a practical rule for West Virginia abuse-and-neglect litigation: an improvement period fails when a parent violates a central protective condition—such as a no-contact order designed to prevent recurrence of domestic violence—and compounds that violation with dishonesty. The decision affirms that courts may terminate parental, custodial, and guardianship rights under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604 when such noncompliance demonstrates no reasonable likelihood of near-term correction and when the child’s welfare and permanency needs require a stable, permanent placement.