In re C.B.: “Welfare” Means Permanency—Termination Required When Continued Contact Jeopardizes a Child’s Well-Being Despite Pleasant Visits

1. Introduction

Case: In re C.B., No. 25-75 (W. Va. Mar. 3, 2026) (memorandum decision).
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Parties: Petitioner Father (J.B.) appealed the termination of his parental rights to the child (C.B.). The West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) was the petitioner below; the child was represented by a guardian ad litem; the child’s mother was the nonabusing parent and permanency placement.

The case arose after DHS received allegations that the father discharged a firearm during a dispute “within earshot” of the child and that he had substance-abuse issues. DHS implemented a safety plan and offered preservation services (including drug screening and parenting education), but the father refused to participate. The abuse-and-neglect petition that followed alleged poor impulse control, emotional harm to the child, and refusal to comply with protective measures intended to ensure the child’s safety.

Key issues on appeal: Whether the circuit court erred in finding that termination of parental rights was “necessary for the child’s welfare,” where (i) supervised visits had included observations that the child was excited to see the father and enjoyed play, and (ii) the father proposed family-member supervision as an alternative to full termination.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s December 19, 2024 order terminating the father’s parental rights. The Court held that the record supported the circuit court’s findings that:

  • There was no reasonable likelihood the father could substantially correct the conditions of abuse/neglect in the near future; and
  • Termination was necessary for the child’s welfare, particularly given the child’s fear of the father, the father’s refusal to acknowledge deficiencies, and expert testimony that continued exposure would be detrimental.

The Court rejected the father’s argument that the child’s enjoyment during some supervised visits and the availability of relatives to supervise contact made termination unnecessary. The Court emphasized that “welfare” includes the child’s personal well-being and entitlement to permanency, and that the circuit court may not choose an option that jeopardizes that permanency.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)

The Court cited In re Cecil T. for the standard of review in abuse-and-neglect appeals: findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. This framing mattered because the father’s challenge largely targeted the circuit court’s welfare determination—a mixed question grounded heavily in factual findings about the child’s fear, the father’s lack of insight, and the likely harm from continued contact.

In re A.P., 245 W. Va. 248, 858 S.E.2d 873 (2021)

In re A.P. supplied the decision’s central interpretive lens for West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6): a child’s “welfare” concerns personal well-being and “necessarily implicates” the child’s need for and entitlement to permanency. The Court quoted In re A.P. to underscore that the “and when necessary for the welfare” language “does not allow a court to make a dispositional election which jeopardizes a child’s right to that permanency.”

By invoking In re A.P., the Court treated the father’s proposed alternative—termination of custodial rights but preservation of parental rights with supervised contact—not as a neutral compromise, but as a potential threat to permanency where the evidence showed ongoing detriment to the child and no near-term prospect of safe reunification.

State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995)

The Court relied on State v. Guthrie for the appellate restraint principle: an appellate court may not decide witness credibility or weigh evidence, as that is the exclusive function of the trier of fact. This was pivotal because the father emphasized favorable snippets of visitation observations (the child’s excitement and enjoyment), but the circuit court credited other evidence more heavily—especially the forensic evaluator’s opinion and the child’s expressed fear.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps:

  1. Statutory gateway satisfied: West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) permits termination when (a) there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future, and (b) termination is necessary for the welfare of the child. The circuit court made both findings; notably, the father did not challenge on appeal the “no reasonable likelihood” finding.
  2. “Welfare” includes permanency and emotional safety: Drawing from In re A.P., the Court held that welfare is not confined to whether a child can have pleasant moments during contact; it includes the child’s overall well-being and right to permanency. Thus, an option that preserves ongoing legal ties and contact is not required—indeed may be disallowed—when it jeopardizes permanency or psychological stability.
  3. Deference to the circuit court’s weighing of evidence: The record contained some favorable visitation notes, but also expert testimony that continued exposure would be detrimental, evidence of the father’s lack of service participation, lack of accountability, and the child’s fear and trauma symptoms (anxiety/nightmares as reported by the mother). Under State v. Guthrie, the Supreme Court would not reweigh that evidence.

3.3. Impact

Although issued as a memorandum decision, In re C.B. meaningfully reinforces and operationalizes several points likely to shape future abuse-and-neglect litigation in West Virginia:

  • Supervised-contact proposals are not a default “middle ground.” Even where visits appear enjoyable, courts may still find termination “necessary for the child’s welfare” if expert evidence and the child’s expressed fear show ongoing psychological harm or risk, and if reunification is not realistically attainable.
  • Permanency is a core component of “welfare.” Parties arguing against termination must grapple with permanency—not merely propose supervision logistics. The decision signals that “welfare” arguments narrowly focused on the existence of some positive interactions will often fail when permanency and emotional safety point the other way.
  • Appellate strategy matters. The father’s failure to challenge the “no reasonable likelihood” finding effectively left a major statutory predicate intact, making reversal far more difficult even if the welfare inquiry were debatable at the margins.
  • Forensic/psychological evaluations can be dispositive. The circuit court explicitly held full termination “in abeyance” pending the child’s psychological evaluation. The resulting expert testimony provided the evidentiary bridge from “custodial termination” to “full parental termination.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adjudication vs. disposition: Adjudicatory hearings decide whether abuse/neglect occurred. Dispositional hearings decide what happens next (services, custody arrangements, or termination).
  • “No reasonable likelihood ... can be substantially corrected”: A statutory finding that the parent is not likely to fix the problems (e.g., substance abuse, violent behavior, refusal to engage in services) within a timeframe that meets the child’s needs.
  • “Necessary for the welfare of the child”: Not limited to physical safety. It includes emotional/psychological well-being and, critically, the child’s right to permanency—stable, lasting arrangements without ongoing legal uncertainty.
  • Custodial rights vs. parental rights: Terminating custodial rights removes custody/decision-making authority; terminating parental rights ends the legal parent-child relationship (including many rights to contact), subject to any narrow post-termination contact permitted by law and orders.
  • MDT (multidisciplinary team): A coordinated group (often including DHS, providers, counsel, and other stakeholders) that plans services and safety steps; refusal to cooperate can support findings of non-correction.
  • Clear error vs. de novo review: Appellate courts rarely overturn factual findings unless clearly mistaken (clear error). Legal conclusions are reviewed anew (de novo). In practice, this gives trial courts significant latitude in welfare determinations tied to credibility and evidence weight.

5. Conclusion

In re C.B. affirms that, under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), termination is proper when the parent cannot correct conditions in the near future and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare—where “welfare” includes permanency and psychological well-being, not merely the presence of pleasant or affectionate supervised visits. Relying on In re A.P., the Court rejected dispositional alternatives that could jeopardize permanency, and, under State v. Guthrie, refused to reweigh evidence where the circuit court credited expert testimony and the child’s expressed fear over selective favorable observations. The decision underscores that sustained refusal to engage in services and lack of accountability can convert supervised-contact proposals into insufficient substitutes for termination when the child’s emotional safety and permanency are at stake.