In re B.S. (W. Va. 2026): Post-Termination Visitation Requires an Affirmative Best-Interests Finding; Detriment Forecloses Contact Despite a Bond

Introduction

In In re B.S., No. 25-419 (Harrison County CC-17-2024-JA-195), issued May 6, 2026, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed a Circuit Court of Harrison County order terminating Mother A.D.’s parental, custodial, and guardianship rights to her child, B.S. The case arose from a November 2024 abuse and neglect petition filed by the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) alleging unsafe and unsanitary home conditions, inadequate hygiene, food insecurity, lack of running water, and maternal marijuana use.

After adjudication by stipulation (unsafe/unsanitary home), the litigation centered on three closely related dispositional questions:

  1. Whether the mother was entitled to a post-adjudicatory improvement period;
  2. Whether the circuit court should have imposed a less restrictive alternative than termination;
  3. Whether the mother should receive post-termination visitation due to an asserted emotional bond.
The Court’s memorandum decision is notable for its application of the governing standards to a record emphasizing (i) lack of parental insight and accountability, (ii) ongoing instability and substance concerns, and (iii) evidence that contact exacerbated the child’s significant behavioral and mental-health needs.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed in full. It held that the circuit court:

  • Did not abuse its discretion in denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), because the evidence supported a finding that the mother was unlikely to benefit and had regressed despite services;
  • Did not err in terminating parental rights without first using lesser restrictive alternatives, because the record supported the statutory finding of no reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future, and termination was necessary for the child’s welfare under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6);
  • Properly denied post-termination visitation because the evidence supported that continued contact would be detrimental and not in the child’s best interests, consistent with W. Va. R. P. Child Abuse & Neglect Proc. 15(b)(2)(A) and related caselaw.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court’s reasoning is built on a familiar set of West Virginia abuse-and-neglect precedents that allocate deference to the circuit court on factual determinations while preserving appellate oversight of the legal framework.

1) Standards of Review

  • Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011): The Court reiterated the bifurcated review—clear error for findings of fact and de novo review for conclusions of law—in abuse and neglect appeals. This standard set the lens through which the Court evaluated the circuit court’s determinations about the mother’s progress, insight, and the child’s welfare.
  • Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.A., 251 W. Va. 626, 915 S.E.2d 520 (2025): The Court reaffirmed that a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a post-adjudicatory improvement period is reviewed for abuse of discretion, an explicitly deferential standard that heavily depends on the circuit court’s assessment of credibility and the service record.

2) Improvement Period Discretion

  • In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002): Cited for the proposition that a circuit court may deny an improvement period when “no improvement is likely.” In In re B.S., witness testimony (visitation provider, parenting provider, CPS worker) and documentary evidence (drug screening, psychological evaluation) supported the finding that the mother would not benefit because her conduct worsened and she did not demonstrate insight or accountability.

3) Termination Without Lesser Restrictive Alternatives

  • Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)): The Court reiterated the long-standing rule that termination may be ordered “without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives” when there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected. That principle directly answered the mother’s argument that the circuit court should have chosen an alternative disposition.

4) Accountability/Insight as a Precondition to Remediation

  • In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013): The Court invoked the maxim that failure to acknowledge the problem can make it “untreatable.” The record described repeated minimization and excuse-making regarding unsafe conditions and inappropriate visitation conduct—facts the circuit court treated as barriers to successful remediation within a reasonable time.

5) Post-Termination Visitation

  • Syl. Pt. 5, in part, In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995): Cited for the requirement that evidence must indicate post-termination contact “would not be detrimental to the child's well being.” In In re B.S., the Court treated detriment as the decisive counterweight to the asserted parent-child bond.

Legal Reasoning

1) Denial of a Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), a parent must show by clear and convincing evidence that she is likely to fully participate. The circuit court found the mother did not meet that burden, crediting evidence that:

  • She engaged in repeated inappropriate conversations and inadequate caregiving during visits (no food/drink/activities for the child), and an incident of physical roughhousing culminated in the child being pushed into a doorframe without appropriate comfort afterward;
  • She displayed limited insight and judgment per the psychological evaluation and did not meaningfully acknowledge problems highlighted in MDT discussions;
  • She delayed engaging in individual therapy despite being offered resources starting in December 2024;
  • Her housing and financial stability remained uncertain (risk of eviction; unverified apartment conditions due to unsuccessful home contacts);
  • Drug screens included THC positives (Nov. 2024–Jan. 2025) and a February 2025 positive for amphetamine/methamphetamine.

The Supreme Court of Appeals, applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, concluded that the circuit court could reasonably find she “declined while in services” and thus that an improvement period was unlikely to produce safe reunification.

2) Termination as the Proper Disposition

The termination analysis tracked W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and the statutory definition in § 49-4-604(d). The circuit court found “no reasonable likelihood” of correction in the near future because the mother demonstrated an “inadequate capacity” to solve the neglect problems even with help—an assessment reinforced by continued drug-screen concerns, unstable housing/finances, and persistent parenting deficiencies coupled with minimization.

Importantly, the Court also grounded termination in the child-specific welfare determination: B.S. was described as “very highly special needs,” with significant behavioral and mental-health challenges requiring continuity, consistent caretaking, and permanency. Evidence that the child’s behaviors worsened after visits—and improved when visits stopped—supported the finding that delaying permanency would harm the child. Under In re Kristin Y./In re R.J.M., the circuit court was not required to try lesser alternatives once the statutory predicate for termination was met.

3) Denial of Post-Termination Visitation

The Court applied W. Va. R. P. Child Abuse & Neglect Proc. 15(b)(2)(A): post-termination visitation may be granted only if it is in the child’s best interests. Consistent with In re Christina L., the Court treated “detriment” as dispositive: even if a bond exists, visitation is improper where evidence shows harm to the child.

On this record, detriment was supported by (i) inappropriate parental behavior during visits, (ii) lack of parental insight, and (iii) improvement in the child’s functioning after contact ceased. The Court therefore upheld the denial.

The decision also noted that, shortly before disposition, the Court “provisionally amended Rule 15(b) ... to more clearly articulate and adopt appropriate standards” for post-termination visitation. While the memorandum decision did not announce a new multi-factor test, it reinforces the amended rule’s central requirement: an affirmative best-interests finding, with careful attention to the child’s wellbeing and potential detriment.

Impact

  • Reinforced deference on improvement periods: By relying on service-provider testimony and the parent’s demonstrated regression, the decision illustrates how circuit courts can justify denial when participation is not merely incomplete but counterproductive.
  • “No reasonable likelihood” remains the gateway to termination without step-down alternatives: The Court’s application of § 49-4-604(d) underscores that ongoing instability, substance concerns, and—especially—lack of insight can satisfy the statutory standard.
  • Post-termination visitation remains exceptional, not presumed: The opinion emphasizes that an emotional bond is not enough; courts must find visitation is in the child’s best interests and not detrimental, a point likely to be litigated more frequently in light of the provisional Rule 15(b) amendment.
  • Child-specific needs drive timing and permanency: The Court’s focus on B.S.’s special needs and behavioral escalation after visits signals that best-interests and welfare findings will increasingly rest on individualized evidence of how parental contact affects the particular child.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adjudication vs. disposition: Adjudication determines whether abuse/neglect occurred; disposition decides the remedy (services, custody changes, termination).
  • Post-adjudicatory improvement period: A court-supervised window for a parent to complete services and demonstrate change. It is discretionary and requires proof the parent is likely to participate fully.
  • “No reasonable likelihood” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)): A legal finding that, even with help, the parent lacks adequate capacity to fix the problems soon enough for the child’s needs.
  • Less restrictive alternatives: Options short of termination (e.g., guardianship, continued placement with services). Under West Virginia law, they are not required when the statutory grounds for termination are met.
  • Post-termination visitation: Contact after rights are terminated. It is not automatic; it may occur only if the court finds it is in the child’s best interests and not harmful.
  • Standards of review: “Clear error” gives deference to fact findings; “abuse of discretion” gives substantial leeway to trial-court management decisions; “de novo” means no deference on pure legal questions.
  • MDT (Multidisciplinary Team): A coordinated group (agency, providers, counsel, etc.) that plans services and assesses progress in abuse/neglect cases.

Conclusion

In re B.S. affirms three core propositions in West Virginia child welfare jurisprudence: (1) improvement periods are not obligatory and may be denied where evidence shows regression and lack of insight; (2) termination may proceed without lesser restrictive alternatives once the court finds no reasonable likelihood of timely correction and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare; and (3) post-termination visitation is permissible only upon an affirmative best-interests finding—and must be denied where evidence shows detriment, even in the presence of a loving bond. Read alongside the provisional amendment to Rule 15(b), the decision signals a continued, child-centered tightening of standards around post-termination contact.