In re B.F.: Circuit Court Discretion to Reject Partial Adjudicatory Stipulations Under Rule 26(a) and Proceed to Contested Adjudication

1. Introduction

In re B.F. (No. 25-244) is a West Virginia child abuse and neglect appeal in which Petitioner Mother A.H. challenged the Circuit Court of Kanawha County’s termination of her parental rights. The underlying petition (filed November 2023 by the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”)) alleged that the child, B.F., was exposed to registered sex offenders in the home and lived in unsafe conditions. After a period of services and a trial reunification, the child was removed again following evidence of physical abuse and continued exposure to registered sex offenders.

The appeal presented two core issues: (1) whether the circuit court erred by rejecting the mother’s proposed stipulation at adjudication and instead conducting a contested adjudicatory determination, and (2) whether the circuit court erred at disposition by terminating parental rights rather than employing a less restrictive alternative.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the termination order. The Court held that the circuit court acted within its discretion under Rule 26(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings when it rejected a stipulation that did not include admissions to conduct “reasonably at issue” in the petition—particularly allegations of physical abuse (grabbing causing bruising/marks). The Court further upheld termination because the evidence supported findings that (a) there was no reasonable likelihood the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future, and (b) termination was necessary for the child’s welfare under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011).
    The Court relied on this syllabus point for the appellate standard of review: factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. This framing is significant because the mother’s claims largely attacked the circuit court’s exercise of discretion (stipulation) and evaluative findings (benefit from services, likelihood of correction).
  • In re A.E., No. 24-675, 2025 WL 3287508 (W. Va. Nov. 25, 2025) (memorandum decision).
    This decision supplied the key doctrinal bridge for the stipulation issue: Rule 26(a) describes what a stipulation must contain to satisfy due process if accepted, but it does not create a right to stipulate. Rather, the circuit court retains discretion to accept or refuse a stipulation. In re B.F. applies that principle directly, reinforcing that the trial court may reject a stipulation that does not adequately address the allegations and deficiencies driving court intervention.
  • In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)).
    These authorities support the dispositional rule that termination may be ordered without pursuing intervening less restrictive alternatives where there is “no reasonable likelihood” the conditions of abuse/neglect can be substantially corrected. The Court used these cases to reject the mother’s argument that the circuit court should have employed a less restrictive disposition.
  • State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, 247 W. Va. 235, 878 S.E.2d 730 (2021).
    Although not central to the merits, the Court invoked this syllabus point to dispose of the mother’s improvement-period argument: a circuit court may not grant an improvement period unless the respondent files a written motion. This underscores procedural rigor in abuse-and-neglect practice and illustrates how appellate courts will not entertain improvement-period claims absent compliance with the motion requirement.
  • In re Jonathan Michael D., 194 W. Va. 20, 459 S.E.2d 131 (1995) (quoting W. Va. Dep't of Human Serv. v. Peggy F., 184 W. Va. 60, 399 S.E.2d 460 (1990)).
    These cases supply the “compliance versus improvement” principle: a parent can comply with aspects of a case plan yet fail to improve overall parenting attitude and protective capacity. In re B.F. used this concept to validate the circuit court’s determination that participation in services did not equate to meaningful benefit—especially in light of a failed trial reunification and continued contact with sex offenders.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Discretion to Reject an Adjudicatory Stipulation

The mother offered to stipulate that she exposed B.F. to sex offenders and that J.H. hit the child, while denying other alleged abusive conduct (including that she grabbed B.F. hard enough to cause bruising/marks). The circuit court rejected the stipulation after finding she did not accept responsibility for her actions and took judicial notice of prior hearing testimony to resolve adjudication.

On appeal, the Supreme Court did not treat Rule 26(a) as a mechanism allowing a respondent to dictate adjudication through partial admissions. Instead, consistent with In re A.E., the Court emphasized that the circuit court retains discretion and may reject a stipulation that fails to address “conduct or deficiencies reasonably at issue,” as alleged in the petition. In other words, if a proposed stipulation narrows admissions in a way that leaves material allegations unresolved—especially allegations bearing directly on safety and protective capacity—the court may require a contested adjudicatory determination.

B. Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

At disposition, the circuit court found (1) no reasonable likelihood the conditions of abuse/neglect could be corrected in the near future, and (2) termination was in B.F.’s best interests. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence supporting those findings: despite extensive services and a preadjudicatory improvement period, the case culminated in a “wholly unsuccessful” trial reunification and further exposure to registered sex offenders. The Court also noted evidence of physical abuse and the mother’s continuing relational/communicative ties to C.P., alongside minimization of the risks posed by C.P. and J.H.

Applying In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M., the Court held that termination may be ordered without intermediate alternatives once the “no reasonable likelihood” finding is made. The Court further relied on W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), which expressly authorizes termination upon those findings when necessary for the child’s welfare.

C. “Participation” Is Not “Benefit”

The Court’s dispositional analysis turned on a common abuse-and-neglect distinction: formal compliance (attendance, participation, completion) does not necessarily show that the parent has internalized skills or developed protective capacity. Quoting In re Jonathan Michael D. (and Peggy F.), the Court validated the circuit court’s conclusion that continued risky associations and the failed reunification demonstrated a lack of genuine improvement.

3.3. Impact

  • Stipulations at adjudication are not respondent-controlled. The decision reinforces that Rule 26(a) is not a “right to stipulate.” Trial courts may reject partial or strategically narrow stipulations when they do not fairly encompass the allegations and deficiencies that prompted state intervention.
  • Trial courts may prioritize child-safety factfinding over negotiated admissions. By approving rejection of a stipulation where the parent would not acknowledge a central allegation (physical abuse), the Court signals that adjudication must create a reliable factual basis for disposition and services—especially where credibility and minimization are concerns.
  • Termination analysis continues to focus on protective capacity and real-world outcomes. A failed trial reunification while services are ongoing is powerful evidence that the parent has not benefitted sufficiently, supporting “no reasonable likelihood” findings under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d).
  • Procedural discipline for improvement periods. By invoking State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson, the Court reiterates that improvement periods require a written motion; practitioners should treat this as a non-negotiable preservation requirement.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adjudication vs. disposition: Adjudication answers “Did abuse/neglect occur, and is this parent responsible?” Disposition answers “What should the court do now to protect the child (services, placement, or termination)?”
  • Stipulation (Rule 26(a)): A parent’s agreement to certain facts so the court can adjudicate without a full contested hearing. Rule 26(a) sets minimum content for an acceptable stipulation, but the judge can still refuse it.
  • Judicial notice (in this context): The court’s use of prior sworn testimony from earlier hearings in the same case, rather than re-taking identical evidence, to resolve disputed issues.
  • Improvement period: A structured period where the parent receives services to correct problems. In West Virginia, the parent must file a written motion to request it.
  • “No reasonable likelihood” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)): A legal conclusion that the parent has shown an inadequate capacity to solve the abuse/neglect problems, even with help, within a timeframe that meets the child’s needs.
  • Compliance vs. benefit: Attending classes and checking boxes is “compliance.” Demonstrated, sustained safe parenting choices and protection from known risks is “benefit.”

5. Conclusion

In re B.F. affirms two practice-significant principles in West Virginia abuse-and-neglect law. First, even if a parent’s proposed stipulation addresses some wrongdoing, the circuit court retains discretion to reject it under Rule 26(a) where it fails to encompass material allegations and does not reflect meaningful acceptance of responsibility. Second, termination of parental rights may be ordered without lesser alternatives when the evidence supports findings of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction and necessity for the child’s welfare under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), even where the parent has technically participated in services. The decision thus reinforces that child safety and demonstrated protective capacity—not mere participation—drive adjudicatory acceptance and dispositional outcomes.