In re A.E.: No Post-Permanency DHS Funding for Visitation Absent Explicit Statutory Authority

1. Introduction

In re A.E. is a child abuse and neglect appeal from the Circuit Court of Hancock County in which the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) challenged a narrow—but practically significant—feature of a permanency order. The circuit court granted permanent custody of A.E., a profoundly disabled and medically fragile sixteen-year-old, to his non-abusive mother, E.P., who lives in Florida. The court also determined that A.E.’s paternal grandparents, J.E. and A.E.-3, were A.E.’s “psychological parents” and awarded them visitation.

The appealed provision required DHS to pay the cost of transporting A.E. from Florida to West Virginia each summer for visitation “until [A.E.] reaches the age of 23.” DHS did not contest the custody placement, the psychological-parent finding, or visitation itself; it contested only the court’s authority to impose ongoing transportation costs on DHS after permanency had been achieved (and even past age eighteen).

The Supreme Court of Appeals treated the question as one of statutory authority and limits on judicial power in abuse and neglect cases—especially after a case has reached permanency and the child welfare proceeding is effectively over.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Applying de novo review under Syllabus Point 1 of Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., the Court reversed in part the permanency order and remanded with directions. The Court held (Syllabus Point 2) that absent explicit statutory authority, circuit courts may not order DHS to pay visitation-related expenses after permanency has been achieved in an abuse and neglect proceeding.

The Court concluded that:

  • No statute authorized DHS to pay post-permanency transportation for visitation with psychological parents.
  • The circuit court improperly bound DHS to expenditures beyond the pendency of the abuse and neglect proceeding and beyond A.E.’s eighteenth birthday, when abuse and neglect jurisdiction terminates.
  • Even the “best interests of the child” principle cannot expand a court’s authority beyond constitutional, statutory, and rule-based limits.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The decision is built on two intertwined lines of authority: (1) the State’s child-protection role under parens patriae, and (2) the statutory limits that define how that role is executed and supervised.

A. Parens patriae and the child-welfare framework

  • State ex rel. Miller v. Locke and In re Jeffrey R.L. (quoting In re Betty J.W.) are used to reaffirm that the State may intervene to protect children and that the State has a “substantial interest” in their welfare. The Court relied on these cases to set the backdrop for why DHS and the courts have roles in abuse and neglect matters.
  • State ex rel. Slatton v. Boles supplies the historical account: the doctrine of parens patriae moved from monarchical origins into modern statutory child welfare schemes, emphasizing that “the welfare of the child is still the basic consideration.” The Court used Slatton to emphasize that the Legislature operationalizes child protection through statutes—meaning courts must work within those enactments.
  • The Court also cited out-of-state and historical authorities referenced in Slatton—Jensen v. Sevy, Helton v. Crawley, and People v. Pierson—as part of the doctrinal lineage that locates protective power in the sovereign, as structured by law.

B. Shared responsibilities—DHS plans and delivers; courts supervise

  • State ex rel. S.C. v. Chafin is central for the proposition that Chapter 49 sets “affirmative duties” for both DHS and circuit courts. The Court used Chafin to frame the relationship as interdependent but statutorily defined—not open-ended judicial management of an agency.
  • In re D.H. is cited for the point that parens patriae interests “rest with both the judicial and the executive branches,” supporting the idea of judicial oversight—while still recognizing separation-of-powers boundaries.
  • On DHS’s statutory role, the Court cited State ex rel. Diva P. v. Kaufman (“the legislature has made [the DHS] the State’s representative”) and relied on federal-court descriptions of West Virginia’s system, especially Jonathan R. by Dixon v. Just. (“To sum up, the [DHS] maintains responsibility for planning and delivering the care, the circuit courts for supervising it.”).
  • The Court also cited State ex rel. W. Virginia Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. Wilmoth to reinforce that DHS authority is statutory and concerns care and custody of juveniles—again underscoring the statutory nature of DHS obligations.
  • For the circuit court’s exclusive jurisdiction over abuse and neglect petitions and proceedings, the Court cited In re B.C. (quoting Syllabus Point 3 of State ex rel. Paul B. v. Hill).

C. Limits on circuit court discretion in abuse and neglect cases

  • The Court relied heavily on In re J. G., which warned that Chapter 49, the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect, and caselaw are “mandatory” and cannot be “casually disregarded or enlarged” without “clear-cut statutory authority.” That admonition is the decision’s conceptual bridge to the core holding: ordering DHS to pay post-permanency visitation expenses is an enlargement not grounded in statute.
  • State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Wilson reinforces that a circuit court is “not at liberty to ignore” statutes and rules even if it disagrees with them—supporting reversal where the order lacked legal footing.
  • State ex rel. D.B. v. Bedell and State ex rel. Paul B. v. Hill are cited as examples where circuit courts exceeded authority by disregarding statutory prerequisites or creating extra-statutory bases for action. They function as cautionary comparators: child welfare courts have broad power, but not legislative power.
  • The Court referenced Jonathan R. v. Morrisey (S.D.W. Va. 2025) for the constitutional warning against courts “developing public policy and administering state agencies,” even with “altruistic impulses,” reinforcing separation-of-powers sensitivity in remedial orders aimed at DHS.

D. “Equity” and “best interests” do not supply missing statutory authority

  • The psychological parents argued for “equitable authority” and cited Honaker v. Burnside. The Court rejected that use of Honaker, explaining that Honaker focused on continued association as potentially serving the child’s best interests—not on a free-floating equitable power to impose financial duties on DHS without statutory authorization.
  • The Court also relied on State ex rel. W. Virginia Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. Delligatti (memorandum decision) to underscore that an order cannot be justified as “fair, reasonable, and equitable” when it lacks legal authority.

E. Jurisdictional and temporal limits: permanency and age eighteen

  • The Court anchored the termination principle in State ex rel. S.C. v. Chafin (quoting In re Willis) for the proposition that the State’s interest extends to “a minor child under the age of eighteen years.”
  • It cited In re R.M. and State v. T.C. for the foundational requirement that the State’s intervention is predicated on abuse/neglect as defined by statute—and that those definitions delimit continuation of the matter.
  • Most directly, State ex rel. W. Virginia Dep't of Health & Hum. Res. ex rel. Chastity D. v. Hill is cited for the rule that circuit court jurisdiction in abuse and neglect “terminates when the child turns eighteen” and that the case should be dismissed as to the child at eighteen.
  • On the procedural end-point of permanency, the Court relied on the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings (Rules 6, 42(b), 45(a), 52) and referenced In re C.E. (quoting Syllabus Point 5 of James M. v. Maynard) to show that the court’s child-welfare apparatus (e.g., guardian ad litem/CASA involvement) is designed to end once permanent placement is achieved.
  • Finally, In re L.M. supplies the well-known “polar star” formulation of best interests, which the Court accepts—but confines within lawful boundaries.

F. The Court’s treatment of collateral statutory arguments

  • The Court rejected DHS’s suggestion that West Virginia “will lose jurisdiction” under the UCCJEA, explaining that exclusive, continuing jurisdiction remains until a proper relinquishment finding is made under the UCCJEA (W. Va. Code §§ 48-20-202, 48-20-203).
  • The Court also rejected the attempt to recharacterize the visitation as grandparent visitation under the Grandparent Visitation Act, relying on In re Adoption of K.J. for the proposition that grandparents’ visitation does not become “grandparent visitation” when awarded on a different legal basis (here, psychological parenthood). The Court emphasized that the statutory Grandparent Visitation Act findings (including the enumerated factors in W. Va. Code § 48-10-502 and the findings under W. Va. Code § 48-10-501) were not made.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

  1. Identify the nature of the order as an agency-funding mandate. The appealed provision was not simply a visitation schedule; it required DHS to fund transportation annually for years, including after permanency and into adulthood. That transformed the order into a continuing fiscal obligation imposed on an executive agency.
  2. Ask whether any statute authorizes the expenditure. The Court examined the Child Welfare Act’s payment authority, focusing on W. Va. Code § 49-4-108 (“Payment of services”). It concluded that transportation for post-permanency visitation with psychological parents is not within the authorized categories (e.g., Medicaid-rate “professional services” or “socially necessary services”), and in any event § 49-4-108 is explicitly limited to payments ordered “during any proceeding.” The Court also noted W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(4)(A) (improvement period expenses) was inapplicable. With no “explicit statutory authority,” the order could not stand.
  3. Confirm the order also fails because it extends beyond the case’s lawful duration. The Court held the circuit court exceeded its authority by binding DHS beyond permanency and beyond age eighteen. A.E. reached permanency when placed in the permanent custody of a non-abusive parent under W. Va. R. P. Child Abuse & Neglect Proc. 3(n)(2); at that point, the abuse and neglect matter is designed to conclude and be dismissed, and DHS’s case-related financial responsibilities cease. Separately, jurisdiction in abuse and neglect ends when the child turns eighteen, making a transport-payment mandate to age twenty-three “wholly arbitrary, unsupported, and unenforceable as a matter of law.”

Importantly, the Court recognized the centrality of best interests, but treated it as a substantive standard for decisions within lawful authority, not as an independent source of authority to impose extra-statutory financial obligations on DHS.

3.3. Impact

In re A.E. establishes a clear, administrable boundary for abuse and neglect courts: once permanency has been achieved, courts cannot require DHS to keep paying for visitation-related costs unless a statute expressly authorizes it. Likely effects include:

  • More disciplined remedial orders. Circuit courts must tie DHS payment obligations to specific statutory provisions and ensure the timing fits (“during any proceeding”), or risk reversal.
  • Clearer off-ramps at permanency. The opinion reinforces that permanency is not merely a placement outcome; it is a jurisdictional and institutional end-point that shuts down ongoing court-managed DHS involvement in the child’s life (absent separate legal authority).
  • Budgetary and separation-of-powers implications. By rejecting “equitable” funding mandates, the Court curtails judicially created agency expenditures that resemble appropriations or program design—matters typically left to legislative authorization and executive administration.
  • Practical pressure shifts to parties and alternative legal vehicles. If ongoing visitation is ordered after permanency, the costs must ordinarily be allocated to parents/guardians or handled through non-Child Welfare Act mechanisms (e.g., ordinary domestic relations enforcement, private arrangements, or—where legally available—adult guardianship/conservatorship proceedings once the child reaches adulthood).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Parens patriae
The State’s role as protector for those who cannot protect themselves (especially children). In child welfare, the Legislature channels this role through statutes that define when and how courts and agencies may act.
Permanency / permanent placement
The legally intended end-state of an abuse and neglect case—such as permanent custody with a non-abusive parent (W. Va. R. P. Child Abuse & Neglect Proc. 3(n)(2)). Once achieved, the case is typically dismissed and ongoing “permanency reviews” stop.
Psychological parent
A non-parent who, based on the child’s lived experience and attachment, is recognized by the court as having a parent-like relationship that may support visitation or other relational rights. In this case, the psychological-parent finding was not on appeal; only who pays for visitation travel was.
De novo review
Appellate review without deference to the circuit court’s legal conclusions. The Court used it because the question was statutory authority (a pure question of law).
UCCJEA exclusive, continuing jurisdiction
Under the UCCJEA, once a state makes a custody determination, it generally keeps jurisdiction until it affirmatively relinquishes it under statutory criteria. Moving to another state does not automatically eliminate West Virginia’s jurisdiction.
Why “best interests of the child” didn’t decide the appeal
“Best interests” governs the merits of child-related decisions within lawful power. It does not authorize a court to impose an obligation on DHS that the Legislature has not authorized—especially after the proceeding has ended.

5. Conclusion

In re A.E. delivers a targeted but consequential rule: without explicit statutory authority, West Virginia circuit courts cannot require DHS to pay visitation-related expenses after permanency has been achieved in an abuse and neglect proceeding. The Court reaffirmed the State’s parens patriae role and the primacy of best interests, but emphasized that both operate within statutory and constitutional limits—particularly where judicial orders would extend agency involvement and spending beyond permanency and beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday.

The decision is a reminder that child welfare courts have broad responsibilities and oversight powers, yet those powers must remain tethered to the Child Welfare Act, the abuse and neglect rules, and the separation of powers—especially when an order effectively creates a long-term funding program by judicial decree.