In re A.G.: Ongoing Domestic-Violence Threat and Prior Involuntary Terminations Support Adjudication, Denial of Improvement Period, and Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives

1. Introduction

In In re A.G. (No. 25-313), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the Wood County Circuit Court’s order terminating petitioner mother C.V.’s parental rights to A.G. The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) filed an October 2024 abuse-and-neglect petition alleging (1) ongoing substance abuse (including methamphetamine/amphetamine positives), (2) untreated mental illness after the mother stopped prescribed medication, and (3) exposure of the child to domestic violence involving the mother’s boyfriend, C.G.

The appeal raised three central issues: whether the evidence supported adjudication for domestic-violence exposure under W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i); whether the circuit court abused discretion by denying a post-adjudication improvement period; and whether termination was improper because it was not the least restrictive alternative.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed on all assignments of error. It held that clear and convincing evidence supported adjudication for exposing A.G. to domestic violence because the record showed an ongoing pattern and an incident close in time to the petition, and because adjudication does not depend on accepting the parent’s testimony over other evidence. It further held that denial of an improvement period was within the circuit court’s discretion, especially given the mother’s noncompliance, last-minute efforts, and the case’s “aggravated circumstances” posture due to prior involuntary terminations. Finally, it held that termination was permissible without less restrictive alternatives once the circuit court found “no reasonable likelihood” that conditions could be substantially corrected in the near future and termination was necessary for the child’s welfare.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, -- S.E.2d --, 2026 WL 1362143 (W. Va. May 15, 2026): The Court reiterated the appellate standards in abuse-and-neglect cases—substantive rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and legal questions de novo. This framing mattered because the mother’s arguments largely asked the Court to reweigh evidence and second-guess credibility determinations.
  • Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re Joseph A., 199 W. Va. 438, 485 S.E.2d 176 (1997) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, In re S.C., 168 W. Va. 366, 284 S.E.2d 867 (1981)): The Court relied on this line for the proposition that W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i) requires the DHS to prove conditions existing at the time of filing by clear and convincing evidence, but the statute does not mandate a particular mode of proof. That principle directly defeated the mother’s attempt to restrict the evidence to her own narrative about what the child had seen and when.
  • State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 669 n.9, 461 S.E.2d 163, 175 n.9 (1995): Cited for the rule that appellate courts do not assess witness credibility or weigh evidence—functions reserved to the trier of fact. This reinforced the deference owed to the circuit court’s view of conflicting testimony and documentary evidence (including domestic-violence records and investigative testimony).
  • In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002): Used to support that a circuit court has discretion to deny an improvement period when no improvement is likely. The Court applied it to the mother’s repeated noncompliance and the circuit court’s finding that she had not meaningfully changed despite prior services.
  • Syl. Pt. 5, in part, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980)): Central to the dispositional ruling: termination may be ordered without intervening less restrictive alternatives where there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions can be substantially corrected. This precedent supplied the legal answer to the mother’s “least restrictive alternative” argument.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Domestic violence as a “condition existing at the time of filing”

The mother argued the domestic-violence adjudication failed because she claimed A.G. witnessed only one incident that occurred months before the petition. The Court rejected that framing on two core grounds:

  • The record supported ongoing risk close in time to filing. Evidence showed an incident within days of filing in which C.G. attempted to kick down the door, plus the mother’s admissions that A.G. had recently been present during altercations and that she moved the child to another home because she did not want the child “in that situation.”
  • Proof under § 49-4-601(i) is not limited to any single type of evidence. Invoking In re Joseph A. and In re S.C., the Court emphasized DHS could meet its burden through varied evidence. And relying on State v. Guthrie, it refused to reweigh credibility to credit the mother’s minimization over contrary evidence.

The Court also linked the domestic-violence facts to the statutory definition of an abused child under W. Va. Code § 49-1-201, which includes being “threatened” by domestic violence—underscoring that the legal focus is not solely whether the child directly witnessed violence, but whether the child was endangered by it.

B. Denial of an improvement period in an aggravated-circumstances case

The circuit court denied an improvement period due to noncompliance with drug screening, prior improvement periods and services “to no avail,” and unmanaged mental health issues, along with concerns the relationship with C.G. continued (including social-media contradictions).

On appeal, the Court highlighted that the mother’s prior involuntary terminations triggered W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(C), meaning the DHS was not required to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family. While the statute does not forbid improvement periods, its effect is practical and legal: a parent in this posture faces a steeper hill to show that additional time and services are justified and likely to work given the history.

Applying In re Tonjia M., the Court deferred to the circuit court’s assessment that improvement was unlikely—particularly where the mother delayed treatment until the “last minute,” offered excuses for missed screens, and had already received extensive services in prior cases without durable change.

C. Termination without less restrictive alternatives

The mother argued termination was not the least restrictive disposition. The Court answered with the established rule from In re Kristin Y. (quoting In re R.J.M.): where the circuit court finds no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction, termination may be ordered without trying less restrictive alternatives.

The Court tied that rule to the statutory termination framework: W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d) (defining “no reasonable likelihood”) and W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) (authorizing termination when no reasonable likelihood exists and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare). Here, the circuit court relied on repeated methamphetamine-related issues, relapse patterns, missed screens, limited engagement, and continued domestic-violence risk. The Court also noted the mother did not challenge on appeal the separate finding that termination was necessary for A.G.’s welfare.

3.3. Impact

Although issued as a memorandum decision, In re A.G. consolidates several practical lessons likely to guide litigants and trial courts in West Virginia abuse-and-neglect proceedings:

  • “Conditions at filing” can be shown through a pattern of risk and near-in-time events, not solely by a parent’s characterization. Even if a child witnessed only one “remote” incident, ongoing domestic-violence dynamics and continued contact with an abusive partner can support adjudication where the record shows a continuing threat.
  • Dismissed protective-order matters do not erase the underlying risk. The Court treated the mother’s failure to appear and resulting dismissals as part of the broader evidentiary picture rather than as proof that violence was not occurring.
  • Aggravated circumstances shape the improvement-period calculus. When prior involuntary terminations exist, DHS’s reasonable-efforts obligations change under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(C), and late-start compliance efforts may be reasonably viewed as insufficient to justify delaying permanency.
  • Termination analysis remains tightly tethered to the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” finding. Once the record supports that finding under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d), the “least restrictive alternative” argument loses force under In re Kristin Y./In re R.J.M..

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adjudication (in abuse-and-neglect cases): The court’s determination, after hearing evidence, that a parent has abused or neglected the child (or that the child is abused/neglected). It is not the final disposition but is the gateway to services and/or termination proceedings.
  • “Conditions existing at the time of filing” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i)): DHS must prove the problems justifying state intervention were present when the petition was filed. The proof can come from testimony, documents, admissions, and other evidence; it is not limited to one witness’s account.
  • Improvement period: A court-ordered window of time for a parent to complete services (treatment, screening, therapy, classes) designed to correct the problems. Granting it is discretionary; the key question is whether the parent is likely to improve with the time and structure offered.
  • Aggravated circumstances (as used here): A statutory posture triggered by facts such as prior involuntary terminations. Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(7)(C), it relieves DHS of the duty to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family.
  • “No reasonable likelihood” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)): A legal conclusion drawn from facts showing the parent lacks adequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse/neglect in the near future, even with help.
  • Least restrictive alternative: The general preference to choose the minimally intrusive disposition that protects the child. But under In re Kristin Y. (quoting In re R.J.M.), that preference yields when “no reasonable likelihood” exists—termination may then be ordered without trying intermediate steps.

5. Conclusion

In re A.G. reaffirms that domestic-violence exposure in abuse-and-neglect law includes ongoing threat and risk, not merely a parent’s narrowed description of what a child witnessed. It also underscores that improvement periods are not automatic—particularly where a parent’s history includes prior involuntary terminations, repeated substance-abuse relapses, noncompliance with screening, and last-minute engagement. Finally, it reiterates the controlling rule that termination may proceed without less restrictive alternatives once the circuit court properly finds “no reasonable likelihood” of correction and that termination is necessary for the child’s welfare, aligning permanency outcomes with the statutory framework of W. Va. Code § 49-4-604.