In re A.C.: No Authority to Reinstate a Terminated Improvement Period; Noncompliance Supports Termination and Final Disposition

1. Introduction

Case: In re A.C., Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (Memorandum Decision), issued June 24, 2026.
Parties: Petitioner Mother A.S.-C. (appellant) vs. Department of Human Services (“DHS”); child A.C. represented by a guardian ad litem.
Proceeding: Abuse and neglect case from the Circuit Court of Cabell County; appeal from a July 17, 2025 dispositional order terminating the mother’s parental rights.

The case arose from allegations that the mother failed to provide A.C.’s basic needs (notably stable housing), continued substance use (marijuana and later other substances), and unmanaged mental-health conditions affecting parenting. Although the mother received a post-adjudicatory improvement period, the circuit court terminated that improvement period for noncompliance and later terminated parental rights at disposition. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Key issues on appeal: (1) whether the circuit court erred in terminating the mother’s post-adjudicatory improvement period; and (2) whether the circuit court erred in terminating parental rights. A subsidiary issue—an asserted refusal to “extend” the improvement period—was rejected as unpreserved and unsupported by the record.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s order. It held that the circuit court acted within its discretion under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(7) to terminate an improvement period upon finding the parent “has failed to fully participate,” and that the evidence supported noncompliance (missed screens, positive tests, discontinued parenting services due to aggressive behavior).

The Court further held that termination of parental rights was proper under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) because the circuit court reasonably found: (a) no reasonable likelihood the conditions of neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future, and (b) termination was necessary for A.C.’s welfare, particularly given the child’s young age and specialized needs.

Additionally, the Court emphasized preservation and procedural limits: the mother did not show she moved for an extension below, and—critically—there is “no authority” for a motion to reinstate an improvement period after it has been terminated.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standards of appellate review: In re K.S.

The Court reiterated the governing review framework from Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.S.: substantive rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and legal questions de novo. This framing mattered because the mother’s primary complaints targeted the circuit court’s discretionary case-management choices (termination of improvement period; dispositional outcome), which receive substantial deference when supported by evidence.

2) Discretion to terminate an improvement period: In re Lacey P. and In re K.P.

Relying on Syl. Pt. 2, in part, In re Lacey P., the Court stressed a symmetry principle: if a circuit court has discretion to grant an improvement period, it likewise has discretion to terminate it when not satisfied that necessary progress is being made.

The Court bolstered that point with In re K.P. (memorandum decision), where termination of an improvement period was upheld after positive tests and failures in other services. Together, these authorities supported the conclusion that continued substance use, missed screening, and failed engagement in services are paradigmatic grounds for finding a failure to “fully participate” under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(7).

3) Termination without less restrictive alternatives: In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M.

On disposition, the Court applied W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and reinforced the governing termination principle through Syl. Pt. 5, in part, In re Kristin Y., which quotes Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M.: termination “may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives” when there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions can be substantially corrected.

This precedent matters because a common appellate theme in abuse/neglect litigation is whether the court should have tried “something less” than termination. Here, the Court treated the statutory findings—no reasonable likelihood of correction and necessity for the child’s welfare—as sufficient to allow termination, aligning with Kristin Y./R.J.M..

4) Preservation and record support on appeal: Noble v. W. Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles and Shaffer v. Acme Limestone Co., Inc.

The opinion invoked W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7) and cited Noble v. W. Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles (quoting Shaffer v. Acme Limestone Co., Inc.) for the rule that nonjurisdictional issues raised for the first time on appeal are generally not considered. This supported rejecting the mother’s “extension” argument because she did not point to where such a motion was made below.

The Court also noted the absence of a transcript from the May 2025 review hearing, illustrating a recurring appellate hazard in abuse/neglect cases: the appellant bears responsibility for an appendix that permits review of claimed error.

5) No motion to “reinstate” an improvement period: In re J.M.

The opinion’s most pointed doctrinal clarification appears in footnote 5: the mother’s counsel asked the circuit court to “reinstate” an improvement period after it had been terminated, but the Supreme Court stated plainly that “[n]o authority permits a parent to move to reinstate an improvement period,” citing In re J.M. (memorandum decision) (“there is no authority for a motion to reinstate an improvement period”).

While phrased as an application of existing law, the Court’s emphasis functions as an operational rule for practitioners: once an improvement period is terminated for noncompliance, the procedural path is not “reinstatement” by motion; the parent must instead pursue legally authorized mechanisms (and must preserve them with a clear record), such as requesting an extension when permitted and properly supported—before termination—or otherwise litigating disposition on the statutory standards.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Termination of the post-adjudicatory improvement period

Applying W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(7), the Court focused on participation and progress, not mere enrollment. The record (as credited by the circuit court) showed repeated positive screens (marijuana, cocaine, alcohol), extensive missed screens, and discontinuation of parenting services after a physical altercation during a session. The Court treated these facts as sufficient to support a finding that the mother failed to “fully participate,” making termination of the improvement period a discretionary decision well within the court’s authority.

2) Termination of parental rights at disposition

The Court then applied W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and the statutory definition in W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d). It upheld findings that the mother demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of neglect “on [her] own or with help,” emphasizing:

  • persistent substance use throughout the case and noncompliance with screening;
  • minimal participation in therapy and failure to provide corroborating treatment records;
  • failure to take prescribed antipsychotic medication and ongoing concerns about mental health stability;
  • housing instability (including eviction shortly before disposition);
  • behavioral dysregulation affecting visitation such that visits ceased and the child was upset.

Finally, the child-centered “welfare” prong was supported by evidence that A.C. had significant developmental needs and was in specialized foster care, and that stability and safety could not be assured if returned to the mother.

C. Impact

  • Practice impact—no “reinstatement” motion: The Court’s reliance on In re J.M. and its unequivocal statement that there is no authority to reinstate a terminated improvement period signals to counsel that the request itself is procedurally defective; future litigation must be framed through authorized statutory avenues and made at a procedurally meaningful time.
  • Case-management impact—improvement periods remain conditional: The decision reinforces that improvement periods are not entitlements and can be cut short when evidence shows nonparticipation, especially when ongoing substance use and unsafe behaviors compromise services and visitation.
  • Appellate impact—record and preservation are decisive: By invoking Rule 10(c)(7) and preservation precedents, the Court underscores that appellate relief is unlikely without pinpoint citations, proof the issue was raised below, and an adequate appendix (including transcripts where necessary).
  • Substantive impact—stability and specialized needs: For children with significant needs, the “welfare of the child” analysis may weigh more heavily toward timely permanency when a parent’s progress is minimal and the prospects of near-future correction are poor.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Post-adjudicatory improvement period: A court-supervised window after a parent has been adjudicated (by stipulation or finding) as having abused/neglected the child, during which the parent must complete a case plan (e.g., housing, treatment, drug screens, parenting education) to attempt reunification.
  • Termination for failure to “fully participate” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(7)): The court can end the improvement period early if the parent is not meaningfully engaging—missed drug screens, continued substance use, nonattendance, or conduct that prevents services from continuing can all qualify.
  • “No reasonable likelihood” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)): A legal conclusion drawn from facts showing the parent lacks adequate capacity to fix the problems causing neglect/abuse, even with offered help. It does not require certainty the parent will never improve—only that substantial correction is not reasonably likely in the near future.
  • “Less restrictive alternatives”: Options short of termination (e.g., temporary custody arrangements). Under In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M., a court may proceed directly to termination if the statutory findings for termination are met.
  • Preservation for appeal: Appellate courts generally will not decide issues that were not clearly raised and ruled on below. The appellant must show where the issue was presented and provide an adequate record to review it.

5. Conclusion

In re A.C. affirms two core principles of West Virginia abuse-and-neglect practice: (1) improvement periods are conditional and may be terminated when a parent fails to fully participate, particularly where ongoing substance use, housing instability, and unmanaged mental-health concerns undermine safety and service engagement; and (2) when the circuit court finds no reasonable likelihood of near-future correction and that termination is necessary for the child’s welfare, termination may proceed without intermediate alternatives.

The decision also carries an important procedural lesson with practical bite: consistent with In re J.M., there is no recognized motion to “reinstate” a terminated improvement period, and appellate challenges will fail without proper preservation and an adequate record. In emphasizing stability for a child with specialized needs, the opinion reinforces the system’s prioritization of timely permanency when parental progress is minimal and safety risks remain unresolved.