Improvement Periods May Be Denied When Untreated Psychosis Makes Participation Unlikely; DHS Not Required to Pursue Involuntary Commitment

1. Introduction

In In re D.C. (No. 25-714), Petitioner Mother M.B. appealed the Circuit Court of Kanawha County’s September 26, 2025 order terminating her parental rights to D.C. The central appellate issue was whether the circuit court erred by denying her request(s) for a post-adjudicatory and/or post-dispositional improvement period before terminating parental rights.

The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) alleged abuse and neglect rooted in Mother’s severe mental impairment (psychotic symptoms and delusions), substance abuse, educational neglect, lack of supervision/food, and reports of physical abuse and “odd punishments.” Services were initially ordered, but were curtailed after service providers reported safety concerns due to Mother’s hostile and threatening behavior. A psychological evaluation later concluded Mother likely suffered from schizophrenia, lacked insight, was unlikely to voluntarily engage in treatment, and posed a danger to the child if untreated.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed. It held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying improvement periods because Mother failed to demonstrate—by clear and convincing evidence—that she was likely to fully participate, and because an improvement period would have been contrary to the child’s welfare. The Court further held that termination was proper under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) because there was no reasonable likelihood that conditions of abuse/neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future and termination was necessary for D.C.’s welfare.

Critically, the Court rejected Mother’s argument that DHS should have placed her into inpatient psychiatric treatment “either voluntarily or involuntarily,” noting she cited no authority requiring DHS to pursue involuntary commitment.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Syl. Pt. 1, In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026)
    The Court invoked In re K.S. for the governing appellate standards of review in abuse and neglect cases: substantive rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and legal questions de novo. This framing mattered because Mother’s challenge largely attacked the circuit court’s discretionary calls about participation likelihood and best interests.
  • In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002)
    Quoted for the proposition that circuit courts may deny an improvement period “when no improvement is likely.” The Court used this principle to validate denial where Mother’s untreated psychosis, combative behavior, noncompliance with basic case requirements (release/drug screens), and refusal to meaningfully engage made success unlikely.
  • Syl. Pt. 3, in part, State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res. v. Dyer, 242 W. Va. 505, 836 S.E.2d 472 (2019)
    Cited for the best-interests limitation: even if statutory boxes could be checked, an improvement period should be granted only when it will not jeopardize the child’s best interest. The Court relied on the circuit court’s findings that D.C. was traumatized and did not desire contact, making further delay and forced engagement contrary to welfare.
  • In re S.S., -- W. Va. --, --, 928 S.E.2d 577, 582 (2026)
    The Court emphasized In re S.S.’s “two-fold inquiry” for improvement periods: (1) statutory compliance and (2) a best-interests analysis. This reinforced that Mother’s inability to satisfy the participation standard was not the only problem; child welfare independently supported denial.
  • In re J.C., No. 23-436, 2024 WL 4275761 at *3 (W. Va. Sept. 24, 2024) (memorandum decision)
    Used as a close factual analogue: termination affirmed where a parent’s “steadfast denial” of serious mental illness and need for treatment supported a “no reasonable likelihood” finding. In re D.C. applied the same logic to Mother’s denial of psychosis/schizophrenia and refusal to engage in treatment.
  • In re D.M.-D., No 19-0716, 2020 WL 2735528 at *5 (W. Va. May 26, 2020) (memorandum decision)
    Cited for the proposition that where delusional symptoms from paranoid schizophrenia “continued unabated” and the parent remained unwilling to accept responsibility for addressing severe mental illness, termination is affirmed. This supported the circuit court’s conclusion that Mother’s conditions persisted throughout proceedings.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Improvement Periods: Statutory Threshold + Best Interests

The Court applied W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), (3)(B), which conditions an improvement period on the parent demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is likely to fully participate. The circuit court found the opposite: Mother’s ongoing “erratic” and “dangerous” behavior, refusal to acknowledge mental illness, failure to sign a medical release as ordered, and failure to participate in drug screening made compliance improbable.

The Court then reinforced that improvement periods are not purely parent-focused opportunities; they are constrained by the child’s best interest. Consistent with State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res. v. Dyer and In re S.S., the Court accepted the circuit court’s welfare-based findings: D.C. was significantly traumatized and did not want further contact, and DHS could not safely provide services or visitation given Mother’s conduct (including repeatedly disrupting the child’s placement).

2. DHS Not Required to Seek Involuntary Commitment to “Enable” Participation

Mother argued her mental illness prevented her from meeting the improvement-period participation standard, and she attempted to shift responsibility to DHS for not placing her into psychiatric treatment “either voluntarily or involuntarily.” The Court rejected this as unsupported by authority, specifically noting there was no cited requirement that DHS file a mental hygiene petition or otherwise pursue involuntary commitment.

The opinion also relied on the record showing the practical alternative—voluntary treatment—was explained and available, and that Mother ultimately declined to enter inpatient care despite DHS attempts to assist. The Court additionally noted (in a footnote) that the record did not support Mother’s claim that her diagnosis made self-placement impossible; instead, she had been instructed how to seek treatment and did not do so.

3. Termination: “No Reasonable Likelihood” + “Necessary for Welfare”

Applying W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), the Court upheld termination upon findings that:

  • there was no reasonable likelihood the conditions of abuse/neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future; and
  • termination was necessary for the welfare of the child.

The “no reasonable likelihood” determination was supported under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(3): Mother had not responded to rehabilitative efforts and the threatening conditions continued. The Court treated Mother’s persistent, untreated psychosis, denial of illness, and continuing destabilizing behavior as the continuing condition that rendered near-term correction unrealistic.

C. Impact

  • Clarifies the limits of DHS’s obligations when mental illness is the core barrier. The Court’s rejection of the “DHS should have involuntarily committed me” theory underscores that improvement periods remain conditioned on the parent’s demonstrable likelihood of participation; DHS is not transformed into a compulsory mental-health custodian absent legal authority.
  • Reinforces the two-gate structure for improvement periods. Even where a parent requests additional time, courts must apply both (a) the statutory clear-and-convincing participation requirement and (b) a best-interests assessment—especially where the child is traumatized and further contact or delay risks harm.
  • Signals strong deference to circuit-court safety and feasibility findings about services. Where service providers reasonably fear for their safety and a parent’s conduct disrupts placements, the opinion supports limiting services and treating nonparticipation as evidence against improvement periods and in favor of termination.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Improvement period”: A court-ordered window of time in which a parent receives services (classes, treatment referrals, visitation, etc.) to correct conditions of abuse/neglect. It is not automatic; the parent must show she is likely to participate and that the plan aligns with the child’s best interests.
  • “Clear and convincing evidence”: A higher level of proof than “more likely than not,” requiring strong, persuasive evidence. Here, Mother had to strongly demonstrate she would fully participate; the court found she could not.
  • “No reasonable likelihood … can be substantially corrected in the near future”: A statutory standard permitting termination when the parent’s problems are not realistically fixable soon enough to meet the child’s needs—often shown by persistent noncompliance, lack of insight, and failure to follow through with treatment.
  • “Mental hygiene petition” / involuntary commitment (as referenced in the opinion): A legal process that may lead to involuntary psychiatric hospitalization under certain conditions. The Court’s key point was narrow: Mother cited no authority that DHS was required to initiate that process to make her eligible for an improvement period.

5. Conclusion

In re D.C. affirms that improvement periods require more than a request and a diagnosis: the parent must prove a likelihood of full participation and the court must find the period serves the child’s best interests. Where severe, untreated psychosis persists, the parent lacks insight, refuses treatment, and services cannot be safely delivered, denial of improvement periods is within the circuit court’s discretion. The decision further underscores that DHS is not obligated—absent supporting authority—to pursue involuntary psychiatric commitment as a substitute for a parent’s engagement. Finally, the opinion illustrates how ongoing untreated mental illness and refusal to comply can satisfy the “no reasonable likelihood” standard supporting termination under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d)(3).